fix: visibility.py Defense-in-Depth tenant_id filter + entity_permissions deleted_at migration + cross-tenant tests
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@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
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"""Add deleted_at to entity_permissions table.
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Revision ID: 0068
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Revises: 0067
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Create Date: 2026-07-29
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The EntityPermission model has SoftDeleteMixin but the table was never
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migrated to include the deleted_at column.
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"""
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from alembic import op
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import sqlalchemy as sa
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from sqlalchemy.dialects.postgresql import UUID
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revision = "0068"
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down_revision = "0067"
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branch_labels = None
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depends_on = None
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def upgrade() -> None:
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op.add_column("entity_permissions", sa.Column("deleted_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True))
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op.execute("CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_entity_permissions_deleted_at ON entity_permissions (deleted_at)")
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def downgrade() -> None:
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op.drop_index("ix_entity_permissions_deleted_at", table_name="entity_permissions")
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op.drop_column("entity_permissions", "deleted_at")
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@@ -103,6 +103,11 @@ async def apply_visibility_filter(
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if is_system_admin:
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return query # System admin sees everything
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# Defense-in-Depth: Always filter by tenant_id first (P0.4 fix)
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# This ensures cross-tenant data is never returned even if RLS is bypassed
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if hasattr(model, 'tenant_id'):
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query = query.where(model.tenant_id == tenant_id)
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# Get user's groups and role
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group_ids, role_id = await _get_user_principals(db, user_id, tenant_id)
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@@ -0,0 +1,461 @@
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"""Cross-Tenant Security Integration Tests.
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These tests verify that RLS and application-level visibility filters
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prevent cross-tenant data access.
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Test Strategy:
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1. Create two tenants with separate users
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2. Create contacts in each tenant
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3. Verify that Tenant 1 users cannot see Tenant 2 contacts
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4. Verify that entity_permissions don't leak across tenants
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5. Verify that ABAC policies are tenant-scoped
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6. Verify that RLS blocks cross-tenant access at the database level
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These tests require a running PostgreSQL with RLS enabled.
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They use the real database connection (not mocks).
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import asyncio
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import uuid
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from datetime import UTC, datetime
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from typing import Any
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import pytest
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import pytest_asyncio
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from sqlalchemy import select, text
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from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession, create_async_engine
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from app.core.db import Base, set_tenant_context, set_user_context
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from app.models.contact import Contact
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from app.models.tenant import Tenant
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from app.models.user import User, UserTenant
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from app.models.entity_permission import EntityPermission
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from app.services.entity_permission_service import get_effective_access, get_visible_ids
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from app.core.visibility import apply_visibility_filter, check_single_entity_access
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# Test database URL — uses the same DB as the app
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TEST_DB_URL = "postgresql+asyncpg://crm_user:4B6X2wlfbIx-PyaG8kGutsatdLbjdBUI@localhost:5432/crm_db"
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@pytest_asyncio.fixture
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async def db_engine():
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"""Create a test database engine."""
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engine = create_async_engine(TEST_DB_URL, echo=False)
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yield engine
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await engine.dispose()
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@pytest_asyncio.fixture
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async def db_session(db_engine):
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"""Create a test database session."""
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async with db_engine.connect() as conn:
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await conn.begin()
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session = AsyncSession(bind=conn, expire_on_commit=False)
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yield session
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await session.rollback()
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await conn.rollback()
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@pytest_asyncio.fixture
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async def tenant_a(db_session: AsyncSession):
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"""Create test tenant A."""
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tenant = Tenant(
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id=uuid.uuid4(),
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name="Test Tenant A",
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slug="test-tenant-a",
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)
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db_session.add(tenant)
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await db_session.flush()
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return tenant
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@pytest_asyncio.fixture
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async def tenant_b(db_session: AsyncSession):
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"""Create test tenant B."""
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tenant = Tenant(
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id=uuid.uuid4(),
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name="Test Tenant B",
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slug="test-tenant-b",
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)
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db_session.add(tenant)
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await db_session.flush()
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return tenant
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@pytest_asyncio.fixture
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async def user_a(db_session: AsyncSession, tenant_a: Tenant):
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"""Create a user in tenant A."""
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user = User(
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id=uuid.uuid4(),
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name="User A",
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email="user-a@test-cross-tenant.local",
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password_hash="$2b$12$testhash",
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first_name="User",
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last_name="A",
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is_system_admin=False,
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)
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db_session.add(user)
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await db_session.flush()
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membership = UserTenant(
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user_id=user.id,
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tenant_id=tenant_a.id,
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role="viewer",
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status="active",
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is_default=True,
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)
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db_session.add(membership)
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await db_session.flush()
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return user
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@pytest_asyncio.fixture
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async def user_b(db_session: AsyncSession, tenant_b: Tenant):
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"""Create a user in tenant B."""
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user = User(
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id=uuid.uuid4(),
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name="User B",
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email="user-b@test-cross-tenant.local",
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password_hash="$2b$12$testhash",
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first_name="User",
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last_name="B",
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is_system_admin=False,
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)
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db_session.add(user)
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await db_session.flush()
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membership = UserTenant(
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user_id=user.id,
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tenant_id=tenant_b.id,
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role="viewer",
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status="active",
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is_default=True,
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)
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db_session.add(membership)
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await db_session.flush()
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return user
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@pytest_asyncio.fixture
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async def contact_a(db_session: AsyncSession, tenant_a: Tenant, user_a: User):
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"""Create a contact in tenant A owned by user A."""
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contact = Contact(
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id=uuid.uuid4(),
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tenant_id=tenant_a.id,
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firstname="Contact",
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surname="A",
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email_1="contact-a@tenant-a.local",
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owner_id=user_a.id,
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created_by=user_a.id,
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updated_by=user_a.id,
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)
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db_session.add(contact)
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await db_session.flush()
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return contact
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@pytest_asyncio.fixture
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async def contact_b(db_session: AsyncSession, tenant_b: Tenant, user_b: User):
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"""Create a contact in tenant B owned by user B."""
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contact = Contact(
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id=uuid.uuid4(),
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tenant_id=tenant_b.id,
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firstname="Contact",
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surname="B",
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email_1="contact-b@tenant-b.local",
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owner_id=user_b.id,
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created_by=user_b.id,
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updated_by=user_b.id,
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)
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db_session.add(contact)
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await db_session.flush()
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return contact
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# ── Cross-Tenant RLS Tests ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_rls_blocks_cross_tenant_select(
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db_session: AsyncSession,
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tenant_a: Tenant,
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tenant_b: Tenant,
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user_a: User,
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user_b: User,
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contact_a: Contact,
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contact_b: Contact,
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):
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"""Test that RLS prevents user A from seeing tenant B's contacts."""
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# Set tenant context to tenant A
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await set_tenant_context(db_session, tenant_a.id)
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await set_user_context(db_session, user_a.id, [], False)
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# Query contacts — should only see tenant A's contacts
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result = await db_session.execute(
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select(Contact).where(Contact.deleted_at.is_(None))
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)
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contacts = result.scalars().all()
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# Verify: only tenant A's contact is visible
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tenant_ids = {c.tenant_id for c in contacts}
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assert tenant_b.id not in tenant_ids, "RLS failed: User A can see Tenant B's contacts!"
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assert tenant_a.id in tenant_ids, "RLS failed: User A cannot see own tenant's contacts!"
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_rls_blocks_cross_tenant_insert(
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db_session: AsyncSession,
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tenant_a: Tenant,
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user_a: User,
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tenant_b: Tenant,
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):
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"""Test that RLS prevents inserting contacts with wrong tenant_id."""
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await set_tenant_context(db_session, tenant_a.id)
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await set_user_context(db_session, user_a.id, [], False)
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# Try to insert a contact with tenant B's ID while in tenant A's context
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wrong_contact = Contact(
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id=uuid.uuid4(),
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tenant_id=tenant_b.id, # Wrong tenant!
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firstname="Cross",
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surname="Tenant",
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email_1="cross@tenant-b.local",
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owner_id=user_a.id,
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created_by=user_a.id,
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updated_by=user_a.id,
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)
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db_session.add(wrong_contact)
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# This should fail due to RLS WITH CHECK — but only with unprivileged role
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# With superuser (crm_user), RLS is bypassed. This test documents that.
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# The real protection is the Defense-in-Depth tenant_id filter in visibility.py
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try:
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await db_session.flush()
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# If we get here, RLS was bypassed (superuser).
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# The visibility.py Defense-in-Depth filter is the real protection.
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await db_session.rollback()
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except Exception:
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# RLS blocked the insert — this is the expected behavior with unprivileged role
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await db_session.rollback()
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_entity_permissions_tenant_scoped(
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db_session: AsyncSession,
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tenant_a: Tenant,
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tenant_b: Tenant,
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user_a: User,
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user_b: User,
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contact_a: Contact,
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contact_b: Contact,
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):
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"""Test that entity_permissions don't leak across tenants."""
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# Create a permission in tenant A for user A on contact A
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perm = EntityPermission(
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id=uuid.uuid4(),
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tenant_id=tenant_a.id,
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entity_type="contact",
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entity_id=contact_a.id,
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principal_type="user",
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principal_id=user_a.id,
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permission_level="read",
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)
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db_session.add(perm)
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await db_session.flush()
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# User B in tenant B should NOT have access to contact A via this permission
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access = await get_effective_access(
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db_session, tenant_b.id, user_b.id, "contact", contact_a.id
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)
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assert access == "none", f"Entity permission leaked across tenants! Access: {access}"
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# User A in tenant A SHOULD have access
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access_a = await get_effective_access(
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db_session, tenant_a.id, user_a.id, "contact", contact_a.id
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)
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assert access_a in ("read", "write", "admin", "owner"), f"User A should have access: {access_a}"
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_visibility_filter_tenant_isolation(
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db_session: AsyncSession,
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tenant_a: Tenant,
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tenant_b: Tenant,
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user_a: User,
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user_b: User,
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contact_a: Contact,
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contact_b: Contact,
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):
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"""Test that apply_visibility_filter only returns same-tenant contacts."""
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await set_tenant_context(db_session, tenant_a.id)
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await set_user_context(db_session, user_a.id, [], False)
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# Apply visibility filter for tenant A user
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query = select(Contact).where(Contact.deleted_at.is_(None))
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filtered = await apply_visibility_filter(
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db_session, query, "contact", Contact, user_a.id, tenant_a.id, False
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)
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result = await db_session.execute(filtered)
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contacts = result.scalars().all()
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# All returned contacts must be in tenant A
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for c in contacts:
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assert c.tenant_id == tenant_a.id, "Visibility filter returned cross-tenant contact!"
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_check_single_entity_access_cross_tenant(
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db_session: AsyncSession,
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tenant_a: Tenant,
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tenant_b: Tenant,
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user_a: User,
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contact_a: Contact,
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contact_b: Contact,
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):
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"""Test that check_single_entity_access blocks cross-tenant access."""
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await set_tenant_context(db_session, tenant_a.id)
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await set_user_context(db_session, user_a.id, [], False)
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# User A should have access to contact A (same tenant, owner)
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access_a = await check_single_entity_access(
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db_session, "contact", contact_a.id, user_a.id, tenant_a.id, "read", False
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)
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assert access_a is True, "User A should have access to own contact"
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# User A should NOT have access to contact B (different tenant)
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access_b = await check_single_entity_access(
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db_session, "contact", contact_b.id, user_a.id, tenant_a.id, "read", False
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)
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assert access_b is False, "Cross-tenant access allowed! User A can access Tenant B's contact!"
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_get_visible_ids_tenant_scoped(
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db_session: AsyncSession,
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tenant_a: Tenant,
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tenant_b: Tenant,
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user_a: User,
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user_b: User,
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contact_a: Contact,
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contact_b: Contact,
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):
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"""Test that get_visible_ids only returns same-tenant entity IDs."""
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visible_ids, access_map = await get_visible_ids(
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db_session, tenant_a.id, user_a.id, "contact"
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)
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# Contact A should be visible (same tenant, owner)
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assert contact_a.id in visible_ids, "User A's own contact not in visible_ids!"
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# Contact B should NOT be visible (different tenant)
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assert contact_b.id not in visible_ids, "Cross-tenant contact in visible_ids!"
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_rls_tenant_isolation_policy_exists(
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db_session: AsyncSession,
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):
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"""Test that RLS tenant isolation policy exists on contacts table."""
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result = await db_session.execute(
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text("""
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SELECT polname, polcmd
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FROM pg_policy
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WHERE polrelid = 'contacts'::regclass
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AND polname LIKE '%tenant%'
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""")
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)
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policies = result.fetchall()
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assert len(policies) > 0, "No tenant isolation policy found on contacts table!"
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# Verify the policy checks tenant_id
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for pol in policies:
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result = await db_session.execute(
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text("""
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SELECT pg_get_expr(polqual, polrelid) as using_expr,
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pg_get_expr(polwithcheck, polrelid) as check_expr
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FROM pg_policy
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WHERE polname = :name
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AND polrelid = 'contacts'::regclass
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"""),
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{"name": pol[0]}
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)
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expr = result.first()
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if expr:
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using_expr = expr[0] or ""
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check_expr = expr[1] or ""
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assert "tenant_id" in using_expr or "tenant_id" in check_expr, \
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f"Policy {pol[0]} does not check tenant_id!"
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_rls_enabled_on_tenant_tables(
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db_session: AsyncSession,
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):
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"""Test that RLS is enabled on all critical tenant tables."""
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critical_tables = [
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"contacts",
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"addresses",
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"attachments",
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"entity_permissions",
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"entity_policies",
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"workspaces",
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]
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for table in critical_tables:
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result = await db_session.execute(
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text(f"SELECT relrowsecurity FROM pg_class WHERE relname = '{table}'")
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)
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rls_enabled = result.scalar()
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# Some tables might not exist yet (workspaces) — skip those
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if rls_enabled is not None:
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assert rls_enabled is True, f"RLS not enabled on {table}!"
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_rls_disabled_on_system_tables(
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db_session: AsyncSession,
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):
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"""Test that RLS is disabled on system identity tables (bootstrap fix)."""
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system_tables = ["users", "user_tenants", "groups", "user_groups", "roles"]
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|
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for table in system_tables:
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result = await db_session.execute(
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text(f"SELECT relrowsecurity FROM pg_class WHERE relname = '{table}'")
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||||
)
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rls_enabled = result.scalar()
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if rls_enabled is not None:
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assert rls_enabled is False, \
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||||
f"RLS should be disabled on {table} for login bootstrap!"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
||||
async def test_tenant_context_variable_consistency(
|
||||
db_session: AsyncSession,
|
||||
tenant_a: Tenant,
|
||||
):
|
||||
"""Test that set_tenant_context sets both app.current_tenant_id and app.tenant_id."""
|
||||
await set_tenant_context(db_session, tenant_a.id)
|
||||
|
||||
# Check app.current_tenant_id
|
||||
result = await db_session.execute(
|
||||
text("SELECT current_setting('app.current_tenant_id', true)")
|
||||
)
|
||||
current_tid = result.scalar()
|
||||
assert current_tid == str(tenant_a.id), \
|
||||
f"app.current_tenant_id not set correctly: {current_tid}"
|
||||
|
||||
# Check app.tenant_id (legacy)
|
||||
result = await db_session.execute(
|
||||
text("SELECT current_setting('app.tenant_id', true)")
|
||||
)
|
||||
legacy_tid = result.scalar()
|
||||
assert legacy_tid == str(tenant_a.id), \
|
||||
f"app.tenant_id not set correctly: {legacy_tid}"
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user