T01: core infrastructure + auth + multi-tenant + RLS

- 10 models: tenants, users, user_tenants, roles, sessions, audit_log, deletion_log, notifications, password_reset_tokens, api_tokens
- Session-based auth (Redis + PostgreSQL audit trail)
- Multi-tenant with ORM-level filtering + PostgreSQL RLS (set_config)
- RBAC with roles/permissions + field-level permissions
- CSRF protection via Origin header validation
- Auth rate limiting (Redis counters with TTL)
- CORS with explicit origins (no wildcard)
- Health endpoint (no auth required)
- Notification service + audit log middleware
- 29 tests, 26 ACs, all passing
- Coverage: 62% (infrastructure modules pending coverage in later tasks)
This commit is contained in:
leocrm-bot
2026-06-29 00:10:10 +02:00
parent 6520e88d53
commit 3ab4925783
137 changed files with 3866 additions and 10195 deletions
+37
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"""CSRF middleware — Origin header validation for POST/PATCH/DELETE."""
from __future__ import annotations
from fastapi import Request, status
from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
from starlette.responses import JSONResponse
from app.config import get_settings
class CSRFMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
"""Validate Origin header on all state-changing requests.
SameSite=Strict cookie + Origin validation = CSRF protection.
"""
UNSAFE_METHODS = {"POST", "PATCH", "PUT", "DELETE"}
async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next):
if request.method in self.UNSAFE_METHODS:
origin = request.headers.get("origin")
if not origin:
return JSONResponse(
status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
content={"detail": "Missing Origin header", "code": "csrf_missing_origin"},
)
settings = get_settings()
allowed = settings.cors_origin_list
# In production, same-origin is enforced; in dev, explicit origins
if origin not in allowed:
return JSONResponse(
status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
content={"detail": "Invalid Origin", "code": "csrf_invalid_origin"},
)
return await call_next(request)