feat(e1): AuditMiddleware als systematisches Safety-Net — alle erfolgreichen POST/PATCH/DELETE erzeugen Audit-Eintrag (Session-basierte user/tenant-Attribuierung, entity_type aus Pfad, source=middleware in changes); schließt Lücke von 349 mutierenden Endpoints in 59 Dateien ohne Audit; Skip-Liste auth/health/errors/audit/external; best-effort; Beweistest test_audit_middleware.py grün (POST ohne explizites log_audit → Audit-Zeile); Regressionssmoke 23/23 grün

2026-08-24 13:55:25 +02:00
parent 197b0d3bab
commit 46c909c226
4 changed files with 152 additions and 1 deletions
@@ -88,6 +88,8 @@
 | D6-b | ARCH-023 service_container.initialize 'unvollständig': Plugin-Services registrieren sich selbst bei on_activate (bewusstes Design) | ✅ Verifiziertes No-Op — Finding war Design-Missverständnis; dokumentiert in test-bugs.md | 3934aea |
 | E7-a | CI als hartes Gate (E7): ruff über app/ hatte 105 Findings (77 auto-fixable + 27 manuell); darunter 8 echte F821-NameError-Produktionsbugs (stream_chat in external_api mit falscher Call-Signatur, uuid_mod vor lokalem Import, UserTenant ×3 in automation/plugin, user_id in tasks delete-audit, timedelta in workflows/engine, Any ×5 in unified_search/contracts) + py311-inkompatibles type-Statement in step_handlers | ✅ Alle behoben: Auto-Fixes + manuelle Fixes; ruff exit=0 über app/; create_app OK (559 routes); Verifikation unified_tasks+automation+phase_g_workflows 85/89 grün (4 Failures = bekannter Vorbestand BUG-099 workstream) | — |
 | E7-b | Forgejo Actions: ci.yml existiert (.forgejo/workflows/ci.yml, trigger push/PR main), aber 0 Läufe bisher (total_count=0) — Runner-Konfiguration auf Server-Seite zu prüfen; Branch-Protection 'Merge nur bei grün' ist Forgejo-Server-Einstellung | ⏳ Dokumentiert für Server-Admin: Actions-Runner aktivieren + Branch-Protection setzen; Pipeline-Inhalt ist vollständig (15 Checks) | — |
+| E1-a | E1 Audit-Vollständigkeit: Lücken-Analyse — 349 mutierende Endpoints, 59 Dateien ohne JEDE Audit-Referenz (AGENTS.md-Verstoß 'jede Mutation erzeugt Audit-Eintrag') | ✅ AuditMiddleware als systematisches Safety-Net implementiert (app/core/middleware.py): loggt alle erfolgreichen POST/PATCH/DELETE mit Session-basierter user/tenant-Attribuierung, entity_type aus Pfad, source=middleware in changes; Skip-Liste für auth/health/errors/audit/external; best-effort (Audit-Fehler brechen Requests nie); registriert in main.py | — |
+| E1-b | E1 Beweis: Dedizierter Test test_audit_middleware.py — POST auf /api/v1/saved-views (Route OHNE explizites log_audit) erzeugt Audit-Zeile mit source=middleware | ✅ Test grün; Regressionssmoke test_permissions+test_audit_middleware 23/23 grün; ruff clean; dabei log_audit-details-Schwäche entdeckt (details-Parameter wird nicht persistiert — nur changes) und Middleware entsprechend auf changes umgestellt | — |

 **Block D ABGESCHLOSSEN** (D1–D6) — D1: alle 9 Ziel-Suites grün; D2: DateTime/SQLITE-001; D3: ARCH-051/055/056/057 + systemischer Permission-Resolver-Bug + conftest-pgvector; D4: Security-Triage (ARCH-027 verifiziert, BUG-019 = 0 echte Secrets, BUG-020 kein fixbares Finding); D5: Scanner-Triage (api_contracts -75%, plugins -100%, 371 Fehlalarme eliminiert); D6: ai_copilot deprecated + ARCH-023 No-Op. Offene Follow-ups dokumentiert (~12 echte API-Bugs aus D5, IMAP-Mocking für Mail-Tests). Nächster Block: E (Production-Härtung).

@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@
 from __future__ import annotations

 import logging
+import re
+import uuid as uuid_mod

 from fastapi import Request, status
 from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
@@ -137,3 +139,97 @@ class CSRFMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
                pass

        return await call_next(request)
+
+
+class AuditMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
+    """Safety-net audit trail for ALL successful mutating requests.
+
+    AGENTS.md requires every mutation to produce an audit entry. Explicit
+    ``log_audit`` calls in routes/services remain the detail layer (entity ids,
+    change diffs); this middleware guarantees a baseline entry for mutations
+    that lack one, marked with ``source=middleware`` in ``details``.
+
+    Best-effort by design: audit failures never break the request.
+    """
+
+    _MUTATING = {"POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE"}
+    _SKIP_PREFIXES = (
+        "/api/v1/auth",
+        "/api/v1/health",
+        "/api/v1/errors",
+        "/api/v1/audit",
+        "/api/v1/external",
+    )
+
+    async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next):
+        response = await call_next(request)
+
+        if request.method not in self._MUTATING:
+            return response
+        if response.status_code < 200 or response.status_code >= 300:
+            return response
+        path = request.url.path
+        if any(path.startswith(p) for p in self._SKIP_PREFIXES):
+            return response
+
+        try:
+            await self._write_entry(request, path, response.status_code)
+        except Exception:
+            logging.getLogger(__name__).debug(
+                "AuditMiddleware: failed to write baseline entry for %s %s", request.method, path
+            )
+        return response
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _derive_entity_type(path: str) -> str:
+        """Derive an entity_type from the second URL segment."""
+        parts = [p for p in path.split("/") if p]
+        # /api/v1/<resource>/... -> resource; singularize naive trailing 's'
+        resource = parts[2] if len(parts) > 2 and parts[0] == "api" and parts[1] == "v1" else (parts[0] if parts else "unknown")
+        return resource[:-1] if len(resource) > 3 and resource.endswith("s") else resource
+
+    async def _write_entry(self, request: Request, path: str, status_code: int) -> None:
+        from app.core.audit import log_audit
+        from app.core.auth import get_redis, get_session_data
+        from app.core.db import create_db_session
+
+        # Attribute via the Redis session (same source as CSRFMiddleware) —
+        # FastAPI dependencies run after middleware, so request.state is empty here.
+        settings = get_settings()
+        session_id = request.cookies.get(settings.session_cookie_name)
+        if not session_id:
+            return  # unauthenticated — nothing to attribute
+        redis = get_redis()
+        session_data = await get_session_data(redis, session_id)
+        if not session_data:
+            return
+        tenant_raw = session_data.get("tenant_id")
+        user_raw = session_data.get("user_id")
+        if not tenant_raw:
+            return
+
+        action_map = {"POST": "create", "PATCH": "update", "PUT": "update", "DELETE": "delete"}
+        entity_id: uuid_mod.UUID | None = None
+        parts = [p for p in path.split("/") if p]
+        if parts and re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-fA-F-]{36}", parts[-1]):
+            try:
+                entity_id = uuid_mod.UUID(parts[-1])
+            except ValueError:
+                entity_id = None
+
+        async with create_db_session(uuid_mod.UUID(tenant_raw)) as db:
+            await log_audit(
+                db,
+                uuid_mod.UUID(tenant_raw),
+                uuid_mod.UUID(user_raw) if user_raw else None,
+                action_map.get(request.method, request.method.lower()),
+                self._derive_entity_type(path),
+                entity_id,
+                changes={
+                    "source": "middleware",
+                    "method": request.method,
+                    "path": path,
+                    "status": status_code,
+                },
+            )
+            await db.commit()
@@ -23,7 +23,11 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 from app.config import get_settings  # noqa: E402
 from app.core.db import close_engine, get_engine  # noqa: E402
 from app.core.error_codes import ApiError, build_error_response  # noqa: E402
-from app.core.middleware import CSRFMiddleware, SecurityHeadersMiddleware  # noqa: E402
+from app.core.middleware import (  # noqa: E402
+    AuditMiddleware,
+    CSRFMiddleware,
+    SecurityHeadersMiddleware,
+)
 from app.core.monitoring import record_error, record_request  # noqa: E402
 from app.core.rate_limit import GeneralRateLimitMiddleware  # noqa: E402
 from app.core.resilience import CircuitBreakerMiddleware  # noqa: E402
@@ -472,6 +476,7 @@ def create_app() -> FastAPI:
    )
    app.add_middleware(CSRFMiddleware)
    app.add_middleware(SecurityHeadersMiddleware)
+    app.add_middleware(AuditMiddleware)
    app.add_middleware(GeneralRateLimitMiddleware)
    app.add_middleware(RequestLoggingMiddleware)
    app.add_middleware(CircuitBreakerMiddleware)
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+"""Tests for AuditMiddleware (Block E / E1).
+
+Proves the AGENTS.md requirement "every mutation produces an audit entry"
+for routes that lack an explicit ``log_audit`` call.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import uuid
+
+import pytest
+from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.models.audit import AuditLog
+from tests.conftest import ORIGIN_HEADER, login_client, seed_tenant_and_users
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_post_without_explicit_audit_creates_middleware_entry(
+    client, db_session: AsyncSession
+):
+    """POST to a route without explicit log_audit still yields an audit row."""
+    seed = await seed_tenant_and_users(db_session)
+    await login_client(client, "admin@tenanta.com")
+
+    # Mutating request on a route WITHOUT explicit log_audit:
+    # create a saved view via core route (no log_audit in saved_views.py)
+    view_name = f"audit-mw-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}"
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/api/v1/saved-views",
+        json={"name": view_name, "entity_type": "contact", "config": {}},
+        headers=ORIGIN_HEADER,
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code in (200, 201), resp.text
+
+    # A middleware-written entry must exist with source=middleware in changes
+    rows = (
+        await db_session.execute(select(AuditLog).where(AuditLog.tenant_id == seed["tenant_a"].id))
+    ).scalars().all()
+    mw_rows = [
+        r for r in rows if r.changes and isinstance(r.changes, dict) and r.changes.get("source") == "middleware"
+    ]
+    assert len(mw_rows) > 0, "expected at least one middleware-sourced audit entry"
+    latest = max(mw_rows, key=lambda r: r.timestamp)
+    assert latest.changes["method"] == "POST"
+    assert latest.changes["path"].startswith("/api/v1/")
+    assert latest.action in ("create", "update", "delete")