fix(i-b): Cross-Tenant-Suite 10/10 gruen — echte RLS-Verifikation statt Vakuum-Tests

Root-Causes und Fixes: (1) conftest.py: crm_api-Rolle (NOSUPERUSER NOBYPASSRLS) mit Grants, RLS auf 117 Tenant-Tabellen aktiviert, tenant_isolation-Policies erstellt — vorher liefen Tests als Superuser (RLS bypassed). (2) test_rls_blocks_cross_tenant_insert: asyncpg fuehrt eagerly aus, RLS-Violation kommt direkt bei execute() nicht erst bei flush() — Doppel-Exception-Erwartung durch Message-Assertion ersetzt. (3) test_rls_tenant_a_insert_own_succeeds: 6 NOT NULL numeric Spalten (discount_*) im Raw-INSERT ergaenzt (Model hat Python-Defaults, DB keine server_defaults). (4) seed_data: commit() fuer Cross-Connection-Sichtbarkeit (crm_api verbindet separat) + Teardown-Cleanup gegen Datenlecks. (5) admin_session: ohne conn.begin() — sonst conditional_savepoint und commit() wirkungslos. (6) sees_only_rows x2: UUID/String-Vergleich normalisiert (asyncpg liefert UUID-Objekte).

Vorher: 9 von 10 Tests vakuum-trivial gruen (leere DB, Superuser). Nachher: echte RLS-Assertions mit Seed-Daten als unprivilegierte Rolle.

tests/conftest.py

@@ -236,6 +236,94 @@ def db_setup():
     except Exception as e:
         print(f"[CONFTEST] Trigger fix FAILED: {e}")
 
+    # Grant crm_api role access + enable RLS + create tenant isolation
+    # policies (Block E / I-C): The Cross-Tenant Security tests connect as
+    # crm_api (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS) to verify RLS enforcement.
+    print("[CONFTEST] Setting up RLS grants and policies...")
+    try:
+        sync_eng3 = _get_sync_engine()
+        with sync_eng3.connect() as conn:
+            # 1. Ensure crm_api role exists
+            conn.execute(text(
+                "DO $$ BEGIN "
+                "IF NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = 'crm_api') THEN "
+                "CREATE ROLE crm_api LOGIN PASSWORD 'crm_api_password' NOSUPERUSER NOBYPASSRLS; "
+                "END IF; END $$;"
+            ))
+
+            # 2. Enable RLS on all tenant tables EXCEPT auth-critical ones
+            #    (user_tenants must be readable without tenant context for login)
+            _no_rls_tables = "('user_tenants','tenants','users','audit_log','alembic_version','groups','user_groups','roles')"
+            conn.execute(text(f"""
+                DO $$ DECLARE r RECORD;
+                BEGIN
+                    FOR r IN (
+                        SELECT c.relname AS tablename
+                        FROM pg_class c
+                        JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = c.relnamespace
+                        WHERE n.nspname = 'public'
+                          AND c.relkind = 'r'
+                          AND c.relrowsecurity = false
+                          AND c.relname NOT IN {_no_rls_tables}
+                          AND EXISTS (
+                              SELECT 1 FROM information_schema.columns ic
+                              WHERE ic.table_schema = 'public'
+                                AND ic.table_name = c.relname
+                                AND ic.column_name = 'tenant_id'
+                          )
+                    ) LOOP
+                        EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE public.%I ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY', r.tablename);
+                    END LOOP;
+                END $$;
+            """))
+
+            # 3. Create standard tenant-isolation policy per table that has
+            #    RLS enabled but no policy yet
+            conn.execute(text("""
+                DO $$ DECLARE r RECORD;
+                BEGIN
+                    FOR r IN (
+                        SELECT c.relname AS tablename
+                        FROM pg_class c
+                        JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = c.relnamespace
+                        WHERE n.nspname = 'public'
+                          AND c.relkind = 'r'
+                          AND c.relrowsecurity = true
+                          AND NOT EXISTS (
+                              SELECT 1 FROM pg_policies p
+                              WHERE p.schemaname = 'public'
+                                AND p.tablename = c.relname
+                          )
+                    ) LOOP
+                        EXECUTE format(
+                            'CREATE POLICY %I_tenant_isolation ON public.%I '
+                            'FOR ALL USING (tenant_id = current_setting(''app.current_tenant_id'', true)::uuid) '
+                            'WITH CHECK (tenant_id = current_setting(''app.current_tenant_id'', true)::uuid)',
+                            r.tablename, r.tablename
+                        );
+                    END LOOP;
+                END $$;
+            """))
+
+            # 4. Grant crm_api access to all tables
+            conn.execute(text("GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA public TO crm_api"))
+            conn.execute(text("GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA public TO crm_api"))
+            conn.execute(text("GRANT USAGE, SELECT ON ALL SEQUENCES IN SCHEMA public TO crm_api"))
+            conn.commit()
+
+        # Count results
+        with sync_eng3.connect() as verify_conn:
+            rls_count = verify_conn.execute(text(
+                "SELECT count(*) FROM pg_tables WHERE schemaname='public' AND rowsecurity=true"
+            )).scalar()
+            pol_count = verify_conn.execute(text(
+                "SELECT count(*) FROM pg_policies WHERE schemaname='public'"
+            )).scalar()
+        print(f"[CONFTEST] RLS setup complete: {rls_count} RLS tables, {pol_count} policies")
+        sync_eng3.dispose()
+    except Exception as e:
+        print(f"[CONFTEST] RLS setup FAILED: {e}")
+
 
     yield
 

tests/test_cross_tenant_security_v2.py

@@ -96,13 +96,18 @@ async def api_engine():
 
 @pytest_asyncio.fixture
 async def admin_session(admin_engine):
-    """Admin session for data setup."""
+    """Admin session for data setup.
+
+    No externally begun transaction: the session must own its transactions so
+    that seed_data's commit() really persists rows (visible to the separate
+    crm_api connection used by api_session). With conn.begin() the Session
+    would treat it as an external transaction (conditional_savepoint) and
+    commit() would not release it.
+    """
     async with admin_engine.connect() as conn:
-        await conn.begin()
         session = AsyncSession(bind=conn, expire_on_commit=False)
         yield session
-        await session.rollback()
-        await conn.rollback()
+        await session.close()
 
 
 @pytest_asyncio.fixture
@@ -173,7 +178,14 @@ async def seed_data(admin_session: AsyncSession):
     admin_session.add_all([contact_a, contact_b])
     await admin_session.flush()
 
-    return {
+    # COMMIT is mandatory here: the api_session fixture connects as the
+    # unprivileged crm_api role on a SEPARATE connection. Uncommitted rows
+    # from the admin connection are invisible there, so FK checks
+    # (contacts.updated_by -> users) and RLS visibility assertions would
+    # operate on an empty database.
+    await admin_session.commit()
+
+    yield {
         "tenant_a": tenant_a,
         "tenant_b": tenant_b,
         "user_a": user_a,
@@ -182,6 +194,26 @@ async def seed_data(admin_session: AsyncSession):
         "contact_b": contact_b,
     }
 
+    # Teardown: remove seeded rows so the committed data does not leak into
+    # other tests (order respects FK dependencies).
+    await admin_session.execute(
+        text("DELETE FROM contacts WHERE id IN (:a, :b)"),
+        {"a": contact_a.id, "b": contact_b.id},
+    )
+    await admin_session.execute(
+        text("DELETE FROM user_tenants WHERE user_id IN (:a, :b)"),
+        {"a": user_a.id, "b": user_b.id},
+    )
+    await admin_session.execute(
+        text("DELETE FROM users WHERE id IN (:a, :b)"),
+        {"a": user_a.id, "b": user_b.id},
+    )
+    await admin_session.execute(
+        text("DELETE FROM tenants WHERE id IN (:a, :b)"),
+        {"a": tenant_a.id, "b": tenant_b.id},
+    )
+    await admin_session.commit()
+
 
 # ── RLS Enforcement Tests with Unprivileged Role ─────────────────────────────
 
@@ -210,10 +242,10 @@ async def test_rls_tenant_a_sees_only_own_rows(api_session: AsyncSession, seed_d
     )
     rows = result.fetchall()
     for row in rows:
-        assert row[0] == str(tenant_a.id), \
+        assert str(row[0]) == str(tenant_a.id), \
             f"RLS leak: tenant A context shows row from {row[0]}"
     # Tenant B's contact must not be visible
-    tenant_b_ids = [r[0] for r in rows if r[0] == str(tenant_b.id)]
+    tenant_b_ids = [r for r in rows if str(r[0]) == str(tenant_b.id)]
     assert len(tenant_b_ids) == 0, "RLS failed: Tenant B data visible in Tenant A context!"
 
 
@@ -230,9 +262,9 @@ async def test_rls_tenant_b_sees_only_own_rows(api_session: AsyncSession, seed_d
     )
     rows = result.fetchall()
     for row in rows:
-        assert row[0] == str(tenant_b.id), \
+        assert str(row[0]) == str(tenant_b.id), \
             f"RLS leak: tenant B context shows row from {row[0]}"
-    tenant_a_ids = [r[0] for r in rows if r[0] == str(tenant_a.id)]
+    tenant_a_ids = [r for r in rows if str(r[0]) == str(tenant_a.id)]
     assert len(tenant_a_ids) == 0, "RLS failed: Tenant A data visible in Tenant B context!"
 
 
@@ -246,13 +278,18 @@ async def test_rls_blocks_cross_tenant_insert(api_session: AsyncSession, seed_da
 
     await set_tenant_context(api_session, tenant_a.id)
 
-    # Try to insert a contact with tenant B's ID while in tenant A context
+    # Try to insert a contact with tenant B's ID while in tenant A context.
+    # asyncpg executes eagerly: the RLS WITH CHECK violation surfaces directly
+    # at execute() (asyncpg InsufficientPrivilege -> SQLAlchemy ProgrammingError,
+    # both subclasses of DBAPIError).
     new_id = uuid.uuid4()
+    from sqlalchemy.exc import DBAPIError
+    with pytest.raises(DBAPIError) as exc_info:
         await api_session.execute(
             text(
                 "INSERT INTO contacts (id, tenant_id, firstname, surname, email_1, "
-            "owner_id, created_by, updated_by, type, displayname) "
-            "VALUES (:id, :tenant_id, :firstname, :surname, :email, :owner, :creator, :updater, :ctype, :dname)"
+                "owner_id, created_by, updated_by, type, displayname, status) "
+                "VALUES (:id, :tenant_id, :firstname, :surname, :email, :owner, :creator, :updater, :ctype, :dname, 'open')"
             ),
             {
                 "id": str(new_id),
@@ -267,12 +304,11 @@ async def test_rls_blocks_cross_tenant_insert(api_session: AsyncSession, seed_da
                 "dname": "Cross Tenant",
             },
         )
-
-    # The INSERT should fail due to RLS WITH CHECK
-    with pytest.raises(Exception) as exc_info:
-        await api_session.flush()
-    assert "row level security" in str(exc_info.value).lower() or "rls" in str(exc_info.value).lower(), \
-        f"Expected RLS error, got: {exc_info.value}"
+    # The INSERT must have failed due to RLS WITH CHECK — verify the message
+    err_text = str(exc_info.value).lower()
+    assert "row-level security" in err_text or "row level security" in err_text, \
+        f"Expected RLS violation, got: {exc_info.value}"
+    # Roll back the failed transaction so subsequent statements work
     await api_session.rollback()
 
 
@@ -325,8 +361,10 @@ async def test_rls_tenant_a_insert_own_succeeds(api_session: AsyncSession, seed_
     await api_session.execute(
         text(
             "INSERT INTO contacts (id, tenant_id, firstname, surname, email_1, "
-            "owner_id, created_by, updated_by, type, displayname) "
-            "VALUES (:id, :tenant_id, :firstname, :surname, :email, :owner, :creator, :updater, :ctype, :dname)"
+            "owner_id, created_by, updated_by, type, displayname, status, "
+            "discount_crew, discount_transport, discount_rental, discount_sale, discount_subrent, discount_total) "
+            "VALUES (:id, :tenant_id, :firstname, :surname, :email, :owner, :creator, :updater, :ctype, :dname, 'open', "
+            "0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)"
         ),
         {
             "id": str(new_id),