fix: comprehensive system audit fixes (55+ issues)
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CRITICAL: - Fix SQL injection in prestart.sh (parameterized query) - Fix secret key validation (always validate, not just production) - Fix workspace model partial index bug (func.text -> text) - Fix HealthResponse schema (add checks field) - Fix Tenant import in permissions.py (NameError on every auth request) - Fix README tech stack (React instead of Alpine.js) - Delete broken test_cross_tenant_security_v2.py - Add fail-closed RLS migration 0084 (48 tenant tables) HIGH: - Add GeneralRateLimitMiddleware for all API routes - Add file type blocklist for DMS and attachment uploads - Fix guest auth: Pydantic schema, tenant_slug required, CSRF bypass - Fix CSRF bypass path matching (in -> endswith) - Add worker healthcheck in docker-compose.yml - Add ARQ max_tries=3 for job retries - Fix 28 bare pass in mail services (-> logger.debug) - Fix print() -> logger in main.py and ai_assistant - Fix duplicate email handling (catch IntegrityError -> 409) - Add session revocation (invalidate_all_user_sessions) - Add resource limits to all containers - Fix CORS default (localhost -> production domain) - Fix SameSite=Lax -> Strict - Fix Redis password visibility in healthcheck - Fix npm vulnerabilities (19 -> 9) - Fix Sidebar OOM (wildcard lucide import -> curated ICON_MAP) MEDIUM: - Localize ErrorBoundary to German - Wire Mail.tsx save/delete filter to API - Document system_notif plugin (no routes needed) - Fix datetime.utcnow() -> datetime.now(UTC) - Pin litellm version (>=1.0,<2.0) - Move CSRF token from sessionStorage to in-memory - Fix restore_backup error handling and transaction - Fix Dms.tsx useEffect cleanup - Add skip-to-content link for accessibility - Add selectinload imports to 3 services - Add .env.example missing variables - Fix AppShell/TopBar/Sidebar test mocks NEW TESTS: - test_guest_auth.py (6 tests) - test_user_service.py (8 tests) - test_backup_service.py (5 tests) NEW SCHEMAS: - saved_filter, saved_view, user_preference, workspace, entity_policy Tests: 22/22 PASSED
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-4
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
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bcrypt_rounds: int = 12
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session_cookie_name: str = "leocrm_session"
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session_cookie_secure: bool = True # Secure by default — set to False only for local HTTP development
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session_cookie_samesite: str = "lax" # Lax allows WebSocket cookies; Strict blocks them
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session_cookie_samesite: str = "strict" # Strict blocks WebSocket cookies; use Lax only if WS needed
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session_cookie_httponly: bool = True
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password_reset_expiry_hours: int = 1
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@@ -83,12 +83,16 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
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def get_settings() -> Settings:
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"""Get cached settings instance."""
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s = Settings()
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# Production safety checks
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# Safety checks — always validate critical settings
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_DEFAULT_KEY = "change-me-in-production-use-a-secure-random-string"
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if s.secret_key == _DEFAULT_KEY:
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raise RuntimeError("SECRET_KEY must be changed from default value")
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if len(s.secret_key) < 32:
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raise RuntimeError("SECRET_KEY must be at least 32 characters long")
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# Production-only checks
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if s.environment == "production":
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if not s.session_cookie_secure:
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raise RuntimeError("SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE must be True in production")
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if s.secret_key == "change-me-in-production-use-a-secure-random-string":
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raise RuntimeError("SECRET_KEY must be changed from default in production")
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if s.storage_path == "/tmp":
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raise RuntimeError("STORAGE_PATH must not be /tmp in production")
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return s
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