Commit Graph

4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Agent Zero abbe7a18fc fix(audit): P0-P3 audit fixes — 838 ruff errors → 0, 30 F821 bugs fixed, 118 files changed
- P0: hooks.py 3-tuple fix, trigger_dispatcher Contract, contacts/plugin unregister_actions_by_owner
- P0: 5 test files — check_permission mocks removed, hardcoded DB credential → env var
- P1: attachment_service DmsFile via Contract helper, restore_registry/history_hooks dedup
- P1: mail/plugin restore unregister, mcp_client datetime.now(UTC), saved_views/filters patterns
- P1: ProtectedRoute fail-closed, 13 test assertion fixes (bcrypt, DB-URLs, SECRET_KEYs)
- P2: deprecated notifications → post_system_message (3 files), forgejo Base, report_generator lazy import
- P2: webhooks permissions, deps.py/roles.py plugin perms removed, import_export default
- P2: address/tags/entity_links patterns removed, worker.py Contract-Umgehungen fixed
- P2: 28 frontend TODOs (hardcoded constants, deprecated notification API)
- P3: dead code, duplicates, deprecated imports, private attr, __import__ inline
- P3: 8 frontend TODOs (LucideIcons, inline styles, XSS, i18n)
- ruff: 838 → 0 (612 auto-fix + 246 manual + 27 F821 regression fix)
- F821: 30 → 0 (AutomationDefinition, DmsFile, user_id, Path, Any, String)
- Contract-Umgehungen: 2 neue gefunden (worker.py:169, worker.py:280) und gefixt
2026-08-16 01:17:18 +02:00
Agent Zero 1b1cbc05dd fix(tests): backend test suite - app version, DB roles, admin RBAC, companies route, field names, DeletionLog, ABAC, imports 2026-08-08 08:09:23 +02:00
Agent Zero 67015ef82b fix(permissions): comprehensive live permission system tests + delete permission fixes
- Add tests/test_permission_system_live.py: 33 live tests against real PostgreSQL
  testing RBAC, ABAC, RLS, cross-tenant isolation, guest access, entity sharing,
  field-level permissions, role invalidation, group permissions, membership suspension

- fix(contacts): delete route uses contacts:delete instead of contacts:write
  The delete_contact and delete_contact_person routes were checking contacts:write
  permission instead of contacts:delete, allowing users without delete permission
  to delete contacts.

- fix(contacts): DeleteContactCommand passes is_system_admin to service
  DeleteContactCommand.run() was not passing is_system_admin from the session
  to contact_service.delete_contact(), causing system admins to be blocked
  by the row-level admin access check.

- fix(contacts): allow deletion of tenant-owned contacts
  contact_service.delete_contact() required admin-level entity access for ALL
  contacts, including tenant-owned ones (owner_id=None). Tenant-owned contacts
  can now be deleted by any user with contacts:delete permission (already
  verified by the route via require_permission).
2026-08-06 09:49:07 +02:00
Agent Zero 727d86614e Security fixes: P0-P2 complete (22 fixes)
P0 (7): Auth-bypass removed, migrations fixed, plugin-upload disabled, RLS FORCE+WITH CHECK, plugin double-registration fixed, persistent volume, domain removed
P1 (11): User/tenant model, Redis centralized, worker separated, transactional outbox, XSS fixed, DMS chunked streaming, permissions unified, password reset, metrics secured, config/docs fixed, cross-tenant FK
P2 (4): Contact model normalized, cross-imports reduced 94%, commands+state machines for contacts/dms/mail/calendar, SPA path-traversal

8 new migrations, 99 unit tests, 13 commands, 8 contracts, 72 files changed
2026-07-25 21:03:46 +02:00