f265eef5ae
fix(auth): useAuth() hook in AppShell/StartLayout + is_system_admin in login response
2026-08-16 23:26:59 +02:00
abbe7a18fc
fix(audit): P0-P3 audit fixes — 838 ruff errors → 0, 30 F821 bugs fixed, 118 files changed
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- P0: hooks.py 3-tuple fix, trigger_dispatcher Contract, contacts/plugin unregister_actions_by_owner
- P0: 5 test files — check_permission mocks removed, hardcoded DB credential → env var
- P1: attachment_service DmsFile via Contract helper, restore_registry/history_hooks dedup
- P1: mail/plugin restore unregister, mcp_client datetime.now(UTC), saved_views/filters patterns
- P1: ProtectedRoute fail-closed, 13 test assertion fixes (bcrypt, DB-URLs, SECRET_KEYs)
- P2: deprecated notifications → post_system_message (3 files), forgejo Base, report_generator lazy import
- P2: webhooks permissions, deps.py/roles.py plugin perms removed, import_export default
- P2: address/tags/entity_links patterns removed, worker.py Contract-Umgehungen fixed
- P2: 28 frontend TODOs (hardcoded constants, deprecated notification API)
- P3: dead code, duplicates, deprecated imports, private attr, __import__ inline
- P3: 8 frontend TODOs (LucideIcons, inline styles, XSS, i18n)
- ruff: 838 → 0 (612 auto-fix + 246 manual + 27 F821 regression fix)
- F821: 30 → 0 (AutomationDefinition, DmsFile, user_id, Path, Any, String)
- Contract-Umgehungen: 2 neue gefunden (worker.py:169, worker.py:280) und gefixt
2026-08-16 01:17:18 +02:00
bb36378494
feat(B-RL): Rate-Limiting Konsistenz — zentrale Policies für Auth/AI/Upload/Webhook
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B-RL: Rate-Limiting auf zentrale check_rate_limit() umgestellt
- forgejo_error_reporter: In-Memory → zentrale Redis-Rate-Limit
- ai_proactive: eigene Redis-Logik → zentrale check_rate_limit()
- agent_runner: DB-basiertes Limit bleibt (zählt echte Ausführungen)
- RateLimitPolicy Enum (AUTH/AI/UPLOAD/WEBHOOK) + check_rate_limit_policy()
- 8 neue config.py Settings für Policy-Limits
- 12 Routes mit Policies versehen (login, password-reset, AI, uploads, webhooks)
Tests: 20 Tests in test_rate_limit_policies.py — alle grün
- Policies, check_rate_limit, reset, get_client_ip, forgejo, ai_proactive
- Keine Regression: 116 bestehende Tests grün
2026-08-13 17:51:04 +02:00
100b9f705c
phase1: separate DB roles, RLS restoration, login on crm_auth
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- config.py: add auth_database_url, worker_database_url, migration_database_url
- db/__init__.py: separate engines for auth/worker/migration + get_auth_db/get_worker_db
- auth.py: all auth endpoints use get_auth_db (crm_auth role)
- auth_service.py: remove login fallback, require active membership, check status
- auth_service.py: switch_tenant checks active membership status
- alembic/env.py: use migration_database_url for Alembic
- docker-compose.yml: add AUTH_DATABASE_URL, WORKER_DATABASE_URL
- .env.example: add all 4 DB URLs with separate roles
- migration 0085: transfer ownership to crm_migration, fix BYPASSRLS,
enable RLS+FORCE on all tenant tables, drop old policies, create new
fail-closed policies scoped to crm_api+crm_worker, revoke excessive grants,
grant minimal crm_auth access, drop crm_runtime, set default privileges
- tests/test_rls_coverage.py: automated RLS coverage check (13 tests)
- tests/test_cross_tenant_security_v2.py: RLS tests with unprivileged role
2026-07-31 02:05:16 +02:00
825d638130
Phase 3: Fix medium-priority issues (M1-M4, M6)
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M1: Password complexity validation (min 8 chars, uppercase, lowercase, digit)
M2: Remove is_system_admin from login response (prevent role leaking)
M3: Permission cache invalidates on DB error instead of using stale data
M4: .env.docker.example already fixed in B9 (SECRET_KEY, FRONTEND_URL, SMTP)
M6: Frontend test setup auto-wraps with QueryClientProvider (fixes ~29 test failures)
Remaining: M5 (frontend component integration — WelcomeDialog, SavedFilterBar, etc.)
2026-07-26 20:51:40 +02:00
727d86614e
Security fixes: P0-P2 complete (22 fixes)
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P0 (7): Auth-bypass removed, migrations fixed, plugin-upload disabled, RLS FORCE+WITH CHECK, plugin double-registration fixed, persistent volume, domain removed
P1 (11): User/tenant model, Redis centralized, worker separated, transactional outbox, XSS fixed, DMS chunked streaming, permissions unified, password reset, metrics secured, config/docs fixed, cross-tenant FK
P2 (4): Contact model normalized, cross-imports reduced 94%, commands+state machines for contacts/dms/mail/calendar, SPA path-traversal
8 new migrations, 99 unit tests, 13 commands, 8 contracts, 72 files changed
2026-07-25 21:03:46 +02:00
66b6c32ed8
Phase 5.14: API documentation - OpenAPI tags, response models, examples, docs
2026-07-23 22:44:54 +02:00
ad41771b10
feat: implement sliding session - extend TTL on each authenticated request
2026-07-18 18:48:21 +02:00
b490a62322
feat: granular RBAC system with user groups, deny-list, permission registry, system-admin, self-mod prevention
2026-07-15 21:59:45 +02:00
a2452cc04b
chore: fix all ruff lint errors + format — 0 errors, 306 tests pass
2026-06-29 17:43:56 +02:00
3ab4925783
T01: core infrastructure + auth + multi-tenant + RLS
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- 10 models: tenants, users, user_tenants, roles, sessions, audit_log, deletion_log, notifications, password_reset_tokens, api_tokens
- Session-based auth (Redis + PostgreSQL audit trail)
- Multi-tenant with ORM-level filtering + PostgreSQL RLS (set_config)
- RBAC with roles/permissions + field-level permissions
- CSRF protection via Origin header validation
- Auth rate limiting (Redis counters with TTL)
- CORS with explicit origins (no wildcard)
- Health endpoint (no auth required)
- Notification service + audit log middleware
- 29 tests, 26 ACs, all passing
- Coverage: 62% (infrastructure modules pending coverage in later tasks)
2026-06-29 08:02:14 +02:00
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