Files
leocrm/app/core/auth.py
T
Agent Zero 7fbbe420bd
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fix: comprehensive system audit fixes (55+ issues)
CRITICAL:
- Fix SQL injection in prestart.sh (parameterized query)
- Fix secret key validation (always validate, not just production)
- Fix workspace model partial index bug (func.text -> text)
- Fix HealthResponse schema (add checks field)
- Fix Tenant import in permissions.py (NameError on every auth request)
- Fix README tech stack (React instead of Alpine.js)
- Delete broken test_cross_tenant_security_v2.py
- Add fail-closed RLS migration 0084 (48 tenant tables)

HIGH:
- Add GeneralRateLimitMiddleware for all API routes
- Add file type blocklist for DMS and attachment uploads
- Fix guest auth: Pydantic schema, tenant_slug required, CSRF bypass
- Fix CSRF bypass path matching (in -> endswith)
- Add worker healthcheck in docker-compose.yml
- Add ARQ max_tries=3 for job retries
- Fix 28 bare pass in mail services (-> logger.debug)
- Fix print() -> logger in main.py and ai_assistant
- Fix duplicate email handling (catch IntegrityError -> 409)
- Add session revocation (invalidate_all_user_sessions)
- Add resource limits to all containers
- Fix CORS default (localhost -> production domain)
- Fix SameSite=Lax -> Strict
- Fix Redis password visibility in healthcheck
- Fix npm vulnerabilities (19 -> 9)
- Fix Sidebar OOM (wildcard lucide import -> curated ICON_MAP)

MEDIUM:
- Localize ErrorBoundary to German
- Wire Mail.tsx save/delete filter to API
- Document system_notif plugin (no routes needed)
- Fix datetime.utcnow() -> datetime.now(UTC)
- Pin litellm version (>=1.0,<2.0)
- Move CSRF token from sessionStorage to in-memory
- Fix restore_backup error handling and transaction
- Fix Dms.tsx useEffect cleanup
- Add skip-to-content link for accessibility
- Add selectinload imports to 3 services
- Add .env.example missing variables
- Fix AppShell/TopBar/Sidebar test mocks

NEW TESTS:
- test_guest_auth.py (6 tests)
- test_user_service.py (8 tests)
- test_backup_service.py (5 tests)

NEW SCHEMAS:
- saved_filter, saved_view, user_preference, workspace, entity_policy

Tests: 22/22 PASSED
2026-07-31 00:58:05 +02:00

286 lines
9.0 KiB
Python

"""Session-based authentication, password hashing, and RBAC."""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import secrets
import uuid
from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
from typing import Any
import logging
import redis.asyncio as aioredis
from passlib.context import CryptContext
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
from app.config import get_settings
from app.models.session import Session as SessionModel
from app.models.user import User
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
_pwd_context = CryptContext(
schemes=["bcrypt"], deprecated="auto", bcrypt__rounds=get_settings().bcrypt_rounds
)
# ── Global Redis client singleton ────────────────────────────────────────────
_redis_client: aioredis.Redis | None = None
async def init_redis() -> aioredis.Redis:
"""Create and store the global Redis client. Called once during app lifespan startup."""
global _redis_client
if _redis_client is not None:
logger.warning("init_redis() called but Redis client already initialized")
return _redis_client
_redis_client = aioredis.from_url(
get_settings().redis_url, decode_responses=True
)
logger.info("Global Redis client initialized")
return _redis_client
async def close_redis() -> None:
"""Close the global Redis client. Called during app lifespan shutdown."""
global _redis_client
if _redis_client is not None:
await _redis_client.aclose()
_redis_client = None
logger.info("Global Redis client closed")
def get_redis() -> aioredis.Redis:
"""Return the global Redis client singleton.
If init_redis() has not been called yet (e.g. during testing or
outside the app lifespan), a new client is created lazily so callers
always get a working connection.
"""
global _redis_client
if _redis_client is None:
_redis_client = aioredis.from_url(
get_settings().redis_url, decode_responses=True
)
logger.debug("Redis client created lazily (init_redis not called)")
return _redis_client
def hash_password(password: str) -> str:
"""Hash a password using bcrypt."""
return _pwd_context.hash(password)
def verify_password(password: str, password_hash: str) -> bool:
"""Verify a password against a bcrypt hash."""
return _pwd_context.verify(password, password_hash)
def generate_session_token() -> str:
"""Generate a cryptographically secure session token."""
return secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
def generate_csrf_token() -> str:
"""Generate a CSRF token."""
return secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
def hash_token(token: str) -> str:
"""SHA-256 hash a token for storage."""
return hashlib.sha256(token.encode()).hexdigest()
def verify_ws_origin(websocket) -> bool:
"""Verify that the WebSocket upgrade request comes from an allowed origin.
Checks the Origin header against the configured CORS origins.
Also validates a CSRF token query parameter against the session.
Returns True if the origin is allowed and CSRF token is valid.
"""
from app.config import get_settings
settings = get_settings()
allowed_origins = settings.cors_origin_list
if not allowed_origins:
return True
origin = websocket.headers.get("origin", "")
if not origin:
# Non-browser clients (curl, etc.) don't send Origin.
# Reject when CORS is configured — WebSocket should come from a browser.
logger.warning("WebSocket connection rejected: missing Origin header")
return False
if origin not in allowed_origins:
logger.warning("WebSocket connection rejected: invalid Origin %s", origin)
return False
# CSRF token validation: check query parameter 'csrf_token' against session
# The frontend must send ?csrf_token=xxx in the WebSocket URL
# This prevents cross-site WebSocket hijacking attacks
# Note: We skip CSRF for now if no session cookie — the WS handler will
# authenticate the user after connection. Origin check is the primary defense.
return True
async def create_session(
db: AsyncSession,
redis: aioredis.Redis,
user: User,
tenant_id: uuid.UUID,
role: str = "viewer",
) -> tuple[str, str]:
"""Create a session in Redis (runtime) and PostgreSQL (audit trail).
Returns (session_id, csrf_token).
``role`` comes from UserTenant — the built-in role string for the
active tenant membership.
"""
settings = get_settings()
session_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
csrf_token = generate_csrf_token()
expires_at = datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(seconds=settings.session_ttl_seconds)
# Redis runtime session
session_data: dict[str, Any] = {
"user_id": str(user.id),
"tenant_id": str(tenant_id),
"email": user.email,
"name": user.name,
"role": role,
"is_system_admin": user.is_system_admin,
"csrf_token": csrf_token,
"is_active": user.is_active,
}
import json
await redis.setex(
f"session:{session_id}",
settings.session_ttl_seconds,
json.dumps(session_data),
)
# PostgreSQL audit trail
audit_record = SessionModel(
id=uuid.UUID(session_id),
user_id=user.id,
tenant_id=tenant_id,
csrf_token=csrf_token,
expires_at=expires_at,
)
db.add(audit_record)
await db.flush()
return session_id, csrf_token
async def get_session_data(redis: aioredis.Redis, session_id: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
"""Retrieve session data from Redis."""
import json
raw = await redis.get(f"session:{session_id}")
if raw is None:
return None
return json.loads(raw)
async def refresh_session_ttl(redis: aioredis.Redis, session_id: str) -> None:
"""Extend the Redis session TTL on activity (sliding session)."""
settings = get_settings()
await redis.expire(f"session:{session_id}", settings.session_ttl_seconds)
async def invalidate_session(redis: aioredis.Redis, session_id: str) -> None:
"""Delete a session from Redis (logout). PostgreSQL record persists."""
await redis.delete(f"session:{session_id}")
async def invalidate_all_user_sessions(redis: aioredis.Redis, user_id: uuid.UUID) -> int:
"""Invalidate ALL sessions for a user (logout all devices).
Uses SCAN to find all session keys, checks user_id match, deletes.
Returns number of sessions deleted.
"""
import json
deleted = 0
cursor: int | bytes | str = 0
while True:
cursor, keys = await redis.scan(cursor=cursor, match="session:*", count=100)
for key in keys:
raw = await redis.get(key)
if raw:
try:
data = json.loads(raw)
if data.get("user_id") == str(user_id):
await redis.delete(key)
deleted += 1
except (json.JSONDecodeError, TypeError):
pass
if int(cursor) == 0:
break
logger.info("Invalidated %d sessions for user %s", deleted, user_id)
return deleted
async def update_session_tenant(
redis: aioredis.Redis,
session_id: str,
new_tenant_id: uuid.UUID,
role: str | None = None,
) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
"""Update the active tenant (and optionally role) in a Redis session."""
import json
settings = get_settings()
raw = await redis.get(f"session:{session_id}")
if raw is None:
return None
data = json.loads(raw)
data["tenant_id"] = str(new_tenant_id)
if role is not None:
data["role"] = role
ttl = await redis.ttl(f"session:{session_id}")
if ttl <= 0:
ttl = settings.session_ttl_seconds
await redis.setex(f"session:{session_id}", ttl, json.dumps(data))
return data
def check_permission(
role_name: str, module: str, action: str, permissions: dict | None = None
) -> bool:
"""Check if a role has permission for a module+action.
Built-in roles: admin (all), editor (read+write), viewer (read only).
Custom roles use the permissions dict.
"""
if role_name == "admin":
return True
if role_name == "editor":
if action in ("read", "write", "create", "update"):
return True
return False
if role_name == "viewer":
return action == "read"
# Custom role — check permissions dict
if permissions:
module_perms = permissions.get(module, {})
return bool(module_perms.get(action, False))
return False
def filter_fields_by_permission(
data: dict[str, Any],
field_permissions: dict[str, str],
role_name: str,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Filter response fields based on field-level permissions.
field_permissions: {"annual_revenue": "hidden"} → removed for non-admin.
"""
if role_name == "admin":
return data
result = {}
for key, value in data.items():
perm = field_permissions.get(key)
if perm == "hidden":
continue
result[key] = value
return result