7fbbe420bd
Check Cross-Plugin Imports / check (push) Has been cancelled
CRITICAL: - Fix SQL injection in prestart.sh (parameterized query) - Fix secret key validation (always validate, not just production) - Fix workspace model partial index bug (func.text -> text) - Fix HealthResponse schema (add checks field) - Fix Tenant import in permissions.py (NameError on every auth request) - Fix README tech stack (React instead of Alpine.js) - Delete broken test_cross_tenant_security_v2.py - Add fail-closed RLS migration 0084 (48 tenant tables) HIGH: - Add GeneralRateLimitMiddleware for all API routes - Add file type blocklist for DMS and attachment uploads - Fix guest auth: Pydantic schema, tenant_slug required, CSRF bypass - Fix CSRF bypass path matching (in -> endswith) - Add worker healthcheck in docker-compose.yml - Add ARQ max_tries=3 for job retries - Fix 28 bare pass in mail services (-> logger.debug) - Fix print() -> logger in main.py and ai_assistant - Fix duplicate email handling (catch IntegrityError -> 409) - Add session revocation (invalidate_all_user_sessions) - Add resource limits to all containers - Fix CORS default (localhost -> production domain) - Fix SameSite=Lax -> Strict - Fix Redis password visibility in healthcheck - Fix npm vulnerabilities (19 -> 9) - Fix Sidebar OOM (wildcard lucide import -> curated ICON_MAP) MEDIUM: - Localize ErrorBoundary to German - Wire Mail.tsx save/delete filter to API - Document system_notif plugin (no routes needed) - Fix datetime.utcnow() -> datetime.now(UTC) - Pin litellm version (>=1.0,<2.0) - Move CSRF token from sessionStorage to in-memory - Fix restore_backup error handling and transaction - Fix Dms.tsx useEffect cleanup - Add skip-to-content link for accessibility - Add selectinload imports to 3 services - Add .env.example missing variables - Fix AppShell/TopBar/Sidebar test mocks NEW TESTS: - test_guest_auth.py (6 tests) - test_user_service.py (8 tests) - test_backup_service.py (5 tests) NEW SCHEMAS: - saved_filter, saved_view, user_preference, workspace, entity_policy Tests: 22/22 PASSED
106 lines
4.1 KiB
Python
106 lines
4.1 KiB
Python
"""Re-enable RLS fail-closed on all tenant tables.
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This migration reverses the RLS disabling from migrations 0078-0081.
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RLS is re-enabled with FORCE and fail-closed policies:
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- Tenant context set (app.current_tenant_id): only own tenant rows visible
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- Tenant context missing: NO rows visible (fail-closed, not fail-open)
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Global tables (users, tenants, user_tenants, sessions, plugins) remain
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without RLS — they are accessed via a separate bootstrap/auth connection
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and filtered at the application layer.
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Bootstrap and startup must use:
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1. A separate connection (crm_auth/crm_bootstrap) for global tables
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2. Per-tenant initialization with explicit tenant context:
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SELECT set_config('app.current_tenant_id', :tenant_id, true);
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Revision ID: 0084
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Revises: 0083
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""
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from alembic import op
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from sqlalchemy import text
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revision = "0084"
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down_revision = "0083"
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branch_labels = None
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depends_on = None
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# Tables WITH tenant_id column — get fail-closed RLS
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TENANT_TABLES = [
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"groups", "roles", "system_settings", "currencies", "tax_rates", "sequences",
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"saved_filters", "saved_views", "webhooks", "workspaces", "workspace_modules",
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"workspace_users", "workspace_widgets", "user_preferences", "custom_field_definitions",
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"backups", "share_links", "entity_links", "entity_history",
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"contact_folder_permissions", "contact_folders", "guest_users", "guest_invitations",
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"permission_delegations", "permission_templates", "entity_permissions", "entity_policies",
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"entity_attachments", "files", "folders", "tags", "tag_assignments", "tasks", "subtasks",
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"notification_preferences", "audit_log",
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"automation_cron_jobs", "automation_definitions",
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"automation_runs", "automation_versions", "automation_agent_definitions",
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"automation_agent_runs", "automation_agent_versions",
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"report_templates", "report_instances",
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"consumer_inbox", "event_outbox", "outbox_deliveries",
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]
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def upgrade() -> None:
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conn = op.get_bind()
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for table in TENANT_TABLES:
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# Check if table exists
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exists = conn.execute(
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text(f"SELECT 1 FROM information_schema.tables WHERE table_name = '{table}'")
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).fetchone() is not None
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if not exists:
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continue
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# Check if table has tenant_id column
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has_tenant_id = conn.execute(
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text(f"SELECT 1 FROM information_schema.columns WHERE table_name = '{table}' AND column_name = 'tenant_id'")
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).fetchone() is not None
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if not has_tenant_id:
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continue
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# Drop any existing policies
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policies = conn.execute(text(
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f"SELECT policyname FROM pg_policies WHERE tablename = '{table}'"
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)).fetchall()
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for (policyname,) in policies:
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conn.execute(text(f"DROP POLICY IF EXISTS {policyname} ON {table}"))
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# Enable RLS and FORCE it (table owner cannot bypass)
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conn.execute(text(f"ALTER TABLE {table} ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY"))
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conn.execute(text(f"ALTER TABLE {table} FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY"))
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# Fail-closed tenant isolation policy
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# NULLIF converts empty string to NULL → comparison yields NULL → no rows returned
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# This is fail-closed: missing tenant context = no access
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conn.execute(text(f"""
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CREATE POLICY {table}_tenant_isolation
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ON {table}
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AS PERMISSIVE
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FOR ALL
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TO crm_api
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USING (
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tenant_id = NULLIF(current_setting('app.current_tenant_id', true), '')::uuid
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)
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WITH CHECK (
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tenant_id = NULLIF(current_setting('app.current_tenant_id', true), '')::uuid
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)
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"""))
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def downgrade() -> None:
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conn = op.get_bind()
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for table in TENANT_TABLES:
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exists = conn.execute(
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text(f"SELECT 1 FROM information_schema.tables WHERE table_name = '{table}'")
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).fetchone() is not None
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if not exists:
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continue
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conn.execute(text(f"DROP POLICY IF EXISTS {table}_tenant_isolation ON {table}"))
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conn.execute(text(f"ALTER TABLE {table} NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY"))
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conn.execute(text(f"ALTER TABLE {table} DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY"))
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