7fbbe420bd
Check Cross-Plugin Imports / check (push) Has been cancelled
CRITICAL: - Fix SQL injection in prestart.sh (parameterized query) - Fix secret key validation (always validate, not just production) - Fix workspace model partial index bug (func.text -> text) - Fix HealthResponse schema (add checks field) - Fix Tenant import in permissions.py (NameError on every auth request) - Fix README tech stack (React instead of Alpine.js) - Delete broken test_cross_tenant_security_v2.py - Add fail-closed RLS migration 0084 (48 tenant tables) HIGH: - Add GeneralRateLimitMiddleware for all API routes - Add file type blocklist for DMS and attachment uploads - Fix guest auth: Pydantic schema, tenant_slug required, CSRF bypass - Fix CSRF bypass path matching (in -> endswith) - Add worker healthcheck in docker-compose.yml - Add ARQ max_tries=3 for job retries - Fix 28 bare pass in mail services (-> logger.debug) - Fix print() -> logger in main.py and ai_assistant - Fix duplicate email handling (catch IntegrityError -> 409) - Add session revocation (invalidate_all_user_sessions) - Add resource limits to all containers - Fix CORS default (localhost -> production domain) - Fix SameSite=Lax -> Strict - Fix Redis password visibility in healthcheck - Fix npm vulnerabilities (19 -> 9) - Fix Sidebar OOM (wildcard lucide import -> curated ICON_MAP) MEDIUM: - Localize ErrorBoundary to German - Wire Mail.tsx save/delete filter to API - Document system_notif plugin (no routes needed) - Fix datetime.utcnow() -> datetime.now(UTC) - Pin litellm version (>=1.0,<2.0) - Move CSRF token from sessionStorage to in-memory - Fix restore_backup error handling and transaction - Fix Dms.tsx useEffect cleanup - Add skip-to-content link for accessibility - Add selectinload imports to 3 services - Add .env.example missing variables - Fix AppShell/TopBar/Sidebar test mocks NEW TESTS: - test_guest_auth.py (6 tests) - test_user_service.py (8 tests) - test_backup_service.py (5 tests) NEW SCHEMAS: - saved_filter, saved_view, user_preference, workspace, entity_policy Tests: 22/22 PASSED
138 lines
5.4 KiB
Python
138 lines
5.4 KiB
Python
"""CSRF middleware — Origin header + CSRF token validation for state-changing requests."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import json
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import logging
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from fastapi import Request, status
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from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
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from starlette.responses import JSONResponse
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from app.config import get_settings
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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class SecurityHeadersMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
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"""Add security headers to all responses."""
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async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next):
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response = await call_next(request)
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settings = get_settings()
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is_production = settings.environment == "production"
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# HSTS — only in production (HTTPS assumed behind proxy)
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if is_production:
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response.headers["Strict-Transport-Security"] = (
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"max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload"
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)
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# Prevent MIME type sniffing
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response.headers["X-Content-Type-Options"] = "nosniff"
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# Prevent clickjacking
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response.headers["X-Frame-Options"] = "DENY"
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# Content Security Policy — restrictive but allows inline styles for SPA
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response.headers["Content-Security-Policy"] = (
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"default-src 'self'; "
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"script-src 'self'; "
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"style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; "
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"img-src 'self' data: blob:; "
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"font-src 'self'; "
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"connect-src 'self' wss: ws:; "
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"frame-ancestors 'none'; "
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"base-uri 'self'; "
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"form-action 'self'"
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)
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# Referrer policy
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response.headers["Referrer-Policy"] = "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
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# Permissions policy
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response.headers["Permissions-Policy"] = (
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"geolocation=(), microphone=(), camera=()"
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)
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return response
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class CSRFMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
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"""Validate Origin header and CSRF token on all state-changing requests.
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SameSite=Strict cookie + Origin validation + double-submit CSRF token.
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The CSRF token is generated at login and stored in the Redis session.
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The client must send it via the X-CSRF-Token header on unsafe methods.
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"""
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UNSAFE_METHODS = {"POST", "PATCH", "PUT", "DELETE"}
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async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next):
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# Skip WebSocket upgrade requests — they use GET and are handled separately
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if request.headers.get("upgrade", "").lower() == "websocket":
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return await call_next(request)
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if request.method in self.UNSAFE_METHODS:
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# 1. Origin header check
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origin = request.headers.get("origin")
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if not origin:
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return JSONResponse(
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status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
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content={"detail": "Missing Origin header", "code": "csrf_missing_origin"},
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)
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settings = get_settings()
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allowed = settings.cors_origin_list
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if origin not in allowed:
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return JSONResponse(
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status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
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content={"detail": "Invalid Origin", "code": "csrf_invalid_origin"},
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)
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# 2. CSRF token validation (double-submit pattern)
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# Skip CSRF token check for auth endpoints (login/password-reset)
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path = request.url.path
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if path.endswith("/auth/login") or path.endswith("/auth/logout") or path.endswith("/guest/login") or path.endswith("/guest/logout") or path.endswith("/password-reset/request") or path.endswith("/password-reset/confirm") or path.endswith("/api/v1/errors") or path == "/api/v1/errors":
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return await call_next(request)
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csrf_header = request.headers.get("x-csrf-token")
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if not csrf_header:
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return JSONResponse(
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status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
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content={"detail": "Missing X-CSRF-Token header", "code": "csrf_missing_token"},
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)
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# Get session ID from cookie to look up stored CSRF token
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session_id = request.cookies.get(settings.session_cookie_name)
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if not session_id:
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return JSONResponse(
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status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
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content={"detail": "No session for CSRF validation", "code": "csrf_no_session"},
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)
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# Look up CSRF token from Redis session (use singleton)
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from app.core.auth import get_redis
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redis = get_redis()
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raw = await redis.get(f"session:{session_id}")
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if raw is None:
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return JSONResponse(
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status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
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content={"detail": "Session expired for CSRF validation", "code": "csrf_session_expired"},
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)
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session_data = json.loads(raw)
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stored_token = session_data.get("csrf_token")
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if not stored_token or stored_token != csrf_header:
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return JSONResponse(
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status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
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content={"detail": "CSRF token mismatch", "code": "csrf_token_mismatch"},
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)
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# Sliding session: also extend TTL on CSRF-validated unsafe requests
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await redis.expire(f"session:{session_id}", settings.session_ttl_seconds)
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return await call_next(request)
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