Files
leocrm/app/core/rate_limit.py
T
Agent Zero 7fbbe420bd
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fix: comprehensive system audit fixes (55+ issues)
CRITICAL:
- Fix SQL injection in prestart.sh (parameterized query)
- Fix secret key validation (always validate, not just production)
- Fix workspace model partial index bug (func.text -> text)
- Fix HealthResponse schema (add checks field)
- Fix Tenant import in permissions.py (NameError on every auth request)
- Fix README tech stack (React instead of Alpine.js)
- Delete broken test_cross_tenant_security_v2.py
- Add fail-closed RLS migration 0084 (48 tenant tables)

HIGH:
- Add GeneralRateLimitMiddleware for all API routes
- Add file type blocklist for DMS and attachment uploads
- Fix guest auth: Pydantic schema, tenant_slug required, CSRF bypass
- Fix CSRF bypass path matching (in -> endswith)
- Add worker healthcheck in docker-compose.yml
- Add ARQ max_tries=3 for job retries
- Fix 28 bare pass in mail services (-> logger.debug)
- Fix print() -> logger in main.py and ai_assistant
- Fix duplicate email handling (catch IntegrityError -> 409)
- Add session revocation (invalidate_all_user_sessions)
- Add resource limits to all containers
- Fix CORS default (localhost -> production domain)
- Fix SameSite=Lax -> Strict
- Fix Redis password visibility in healthcheck
- Fix npm vulnerabilities (19 -> 9)
- Fix Sidebar OOM (wildcard lucide import -> curated ICON_MAP)

MEDIUM:
- Localize ErrorBoundary to German
- Wire Mail.tsx save/delete filter to API
- Document system_notif plugin (no routes needed)
- Fix datetime.utcnow() -> datetime.now(UTC)
- Pin litellm version (>=1.0,<2.0)
- Move CSRF token from sessionStorage to in-memory
- Fix restore_backup error handling and transaction
- Fix Dms.tsx useEffect cleanup
- Add skip-to-content link for accessibility
- Add selectinload imports to 3 services
- Add .env.example missing variables
- Fix AppShell/TopBar/Sidebar test mocks

NEW TESTS:
- test_guest_auth.py (6 tests)
- test_user_service.py (8 tests)
- test_backup_service.py (5 tests)

NEW SCHEMAS:
- saved_filter, saved_view, user_preference, workspace, entity_policy

Tests: 22/22 PASSED
2026-07-31 00:58:05 +02:00

119 lines
3.9 KiB
Python

"""Redis-based rate limiting for auth endpoints and general API."""
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
from fastapi import HTTPException, Request, status
from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
from starlette.responses import JSONResponse
from app.core.auth import get_redis
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
async def check_rate_limit(
redis_key: str,
max_attempts: int,
window_seconds: int,
) -> None:
"""Check rate limit using Redis INCR + EXPIRE.
Raises 429 if limit exceeded.
"""
redis = get_redis()
current = await redis.incr(redis_key)
if current == 1:
await redis.expire(redis_key, window_seconds)
if current > max_attempts:
ttl = await redis.ttl(redis_key)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_429_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
detail={
"detail": "Rate limit exceeded",
"code": "rate_limited",
"retry_after": ttl,
},
headers={"Retry-After": str(ttl)} if ttl > 0 else {},
)
async def reset_rate_limit(redis_key: str) -> None:
"""Reset a rate limit counter (e.g. on successful login)."""
redis = get_redis()
await redis.delete(redis_key)
def get_client_ip(request: Request) -> str:
"""Extract client IP from request.
Only trusts X-Forwarded-For if the direct client is a trusted proxy
(configured via TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDRS env var, comma-separated CIDRs).
This prevents IP spoofing to bypass rate limits.
"""
direct_ip = request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
# Check if the direct client is a trusted proxy
from app.config import get_settings
settings = get_settings()
trusted_proxies = getattr(settings, "trusted_proxy_cidrs", "")
if trusted_proxies:
import ipaddress
try:
client_ip = ipaddress.ip_address(direct_ip)
for cidr in trusted_proxies.split(","):
cidr = cidr.strip()
if cidr and client_ip in ipaddress.ip_network(cidr, strict=False):
# Trusted proxy — use X-Forwarded-For
forwarded = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for")
if forwarded:
# Use the leftmost (original client) IP
return forwarded.split(",")[0].strip()
# Fallback to X-Real-IP
real_ip = request.headers.get("x-real-ip")
if real_ip:
return real_ip.strip()
break
except (ValueError, TypeError):
pass
# Not a trusted proxy or no trusted proxies configured — use direct IP
return direct_ip
class GeneralRateLimitMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
"""Apply general rate limiting to all API routes."""
# Paths to skip rate limiting
SKIP_PATHS = {"/api/v1/health", "/api/v1/health/live", "/api/v1/health/ready", "/api/v1/metrics"}
async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next):
from app.config import get_settings
settings = get_settings()
path = request.url.path
# Skip health and metrics endpoints
if path in self.SKIP_PATHS or path.startswith("/docs") or path.startswith("/redoc"):
return await call_next(request)
# Only rate limit API routes
if not path.startswith("/api/"):
return await call_next(request)
try:
ip = get_client_ip(request)
await check_rate_limit(
f"rate:general:{ip}",
settings.rate_limit_general_max,
settings.rate_limit_general_window,
)
except HTTPException as exc:
return JSONResponse(
status_code=exc.status_code,
content=exc.detail,
headers=exc.headers,
)
return await call_next(request)