Files
leocrm/tests/test_s1_security_guards.py
T
Agent Zero b8a556091e fix(security): F10 (Astra P1) — Token-Scopes sind Obergrenze, kein Ersatz fuer User-Rechte
Vorher: require_permission machte bei passendem Token-Scope ein
early-return — die User-Rechte wurden NIE geprueft. Ein Token mit
mail:write erlaubte mail:write selbst dann, wenn der Benutzer die
Berechtigung nie hatte oder sie entzogen bekam (Astra-Repro isoliert
bestaetigt).

Fix: Nach bestandenem Scope-Check in den normalen User-Rechte-Check
fallen. Effektives Recht = User-Rechte UND Token-Scope. Rechteentzug
wirkt sofort auf bestehende Tokens. System-Admin-Bypass unveraendert.

Tests: tests/test_s1_security_guards.py 7/7 (neue Suite):
Scope-ohne-User-Recht 403, beide-present pass, Scope-fehlt-User-hat 403
insufficient_scope, Deny-Revocation wirkt, Session-Pfad unveraendert,
*:*-Scope umgeht nicht, Admin-Bypass bleibt. ruff clean.
2026-09-18 07:52:23 +02:00

114 lines
4.4 KiB
Python

"""S1 security guard tests (Astra audit findings — Phase S Welle 1).
F10: token scopes must be an UPPER BOUND, not a replacement for user
permissions. A token can never grant more than its owner has.
Covers require_permission directly (unit level, no HTTP) plus the
acceptance criteria from docs/audits/astra-audit-2026-09-17.md.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import uuid
import pytest
from fastapi import HTTPException
from app.deps import require_permission
def _user_ctx(
permissions: list[str] | None = None,
denied: list[str] | None = None,
token_scopes: list[str] | None = None,
is_system_admin: bool = False,
) -> dict:
"""Build a current_user dict in the session/bearer context shape."""
ctx: dict = {
"user_id": str(uuid.uuid4()),
"tenant_id": str(uuid.uuid4()),
"permissions": permissions or [],
"denied_permissions": denied or [],
"field_permissions": {},
"is_system_admin": is_system_admin,
"role": "user",
}
if token_scopes is not None:
ctx["_token_scopes"] = token_scopes
return ctx
@pytest.mark.asyncio
class TestF10TokenScopesAreUpperBound:
"""F10 (Astra P1): token scopes restrict, they never grant."""
async def test_token_scope_does_not_replace_user_permission(self):
"""Token with mail:write scope, user WITHOUT mail:write → 403.
Astra repro: this exact combination was allowed before the fix.
"""
checker = require_permission("mail:write")
ctx = _user_ctx(permissions=[], token_scopes=["mail:write"])
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info:
await checker(current_user=ctx)
assert exc_info.value.status_code == 403
assert exc_info.value.detail.get("code") != "insufficient_scope"
async def test_token_scope_with_user_permission_passes(self):
"""Token scope AND user permission both present → allowed."""
checker = require_permission("mail:write")
ctx = _user_ctx(permissions=["mail:write"], token_scopes=["mail:write"])
result = await checker(current_user=ctx)
assert result is ctx
async def test_missing_scope_rejected_even_with_user_permission(self):
"""User HAS the permission but the token lacks the scope → 403
insufficient_scope (the token may do less than its owner)."""
checker = require_permission("mail:write")
ctx = _user_ctx(permissions=["mail:write"], token_scopes=["mail:read"])
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info:
await checker(current_user=ctx)
assert exc_info.value.status_code == 403
assert exc_info.value.detail.get("code") == "insufficient_scope"
async def test_permission_revocation_applies_to_existing_tokens(self):
"""User permission revoked (moved to deny) → token rejected.
Astra acceptance: later permission revocation must take effect on
existing tokens.
"""
checker = require_permission("mail:write")
ctx = _user_ctx(
permissions=["mail:write"],
denied=["mail:write"],
token_scopes=["mail:write"],
)
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info:
await checker(current_user=ctx)
assert exc_info.value.status_code == 403
async def test_session_path_unchanged(self):
"""Without token scopes the normal permission check applies."""
checker = require_permission("mail:write")
ok_ctx = _user_ctx(permissions=["mail:write"])
assert await checker(current_user=ok_ctx) is ok_ctx
bad_ctx = _user_ctx(permissions=[])
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info:
await checker(current_user=bad_ctx)
assert exc_info.value.status_code == 403
async def test_wildcard_scope_still_bound_to_user_permissions(self):
"""A *:* token scope cannot bypass missing user permissions."""
checker = require_permission("mail:write")
ctx = _user_ctx(permissions=[], token_scopes=['*:*'])
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info:
await checker(current_user=ctx)
assert exc_info.value.status_code == 403
async def test_system_admin_bypass_unchanged(self):
"""System admins keep their bypass (both session and token path)."""
checker = require_permission("mail:write")
ctx = _user_ctx(token_scopes=["mail:write"], is_system_admin=True)
assert await checker(current_user=ctx) is ctx