Phase 1: Fix all critical release blockers (B1-B10)
B1: Remove duplicate get_redis() — singleton no longer overwritten B2: Plugin routes now enforce activation status via require_active_plugin() B3: Fix UploadFile ForwardRef error — remove functools.wraps from wrap_plugin_route B4: DMS upload uses true streaming via save_stream() instead of RAM accumulation B5: Worker on_startup registers plugin event handlers + webhook dispatcher B6: Implement send_password_reset_email job, remove raw token logging B7: Webhook SSRF protection (IP validation, no redirects), secret removed from response B8: RLS repair migration 0044 + separate crm_runtime DB user (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS) B9: Fix .env.docker.example AUTH_SECRET → SECRET_KEY B10: Remove Redis default password, remove exposed DB/Redis ports Also: add frontend_url to config, add SMTP settings to .env.docker.example, update prestart.sh to use MIGRATION_DATABASE_URL for alembic.
This commit is contained in:
Agent Zero
+200
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
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# LeoCRM Security & Data Risk Assessment
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**Date:** 2026-07-26
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**Assessor:** Security Data Engineer (A0 Orchestrator)
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**Project:** LeoCRM at `/a0/usr/workdir/leocrm-fix`
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---
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## Summary
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| Severity | Count |
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|----------|-------|
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| CRITICAL | 5 |
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| HIGH | 8 |
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| MEDIUM | 8 |
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| LOW | 5 |
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| **Total**| **26**|
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---
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## CRITICAL Issues
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### C-1: Redis Default Password `changeme` in docker-compose.yml
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**File:** `docker-compose.yml:53`
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**Risk:** Redis stores session data, CSRF tokens, and rate-limit counters. The default password `changeme` is trivially guessable. If Redis port 6379 is exposed, an attacker can read/modify all sessions, steal CSRF tokens, and bypass rate limits.
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**Remediation:** Remove the default fallback. Require `REDIS_PASSWORD` as a mandatory variable (`${REDIS_PASSWORD:?REDIS_PASSWORD is required}`). Use a strong randomly generated password in production.
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### C-2: No SECRET_KEY in `.env` — Insecure Default Active in Development
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**File:** `.env` (missing `SECRET_KEY`), `app/config.py:55`
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**Risk:** `.env` has no `SECRET_KEY`. The config defaults to `"change-me-in-production-use-a-secure-random-string"`. While `get_settings()` raises in production mode, `.env` sets `ENVIRONMENT=development`, so the default key is silently used. Any signing/token operation using `secret_key` is compromised.
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**Remediation:** Add a strong random `SECRET_KEY` (min 32 chars) to `.env`. Fail-fast in all environments if the default key is detected, not just production.
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### C-3: PostgreSQL and Redis Ports Exposed to Host
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**File:** `docker-compose.yml:37-38, 56-57`
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**Risk:** `ports: "5432:5432"` and `ports: "6379:6379"` expose the database and Redis to the host network. Combined with weak/default credentials, this allows direct external access to all session data and the entire database.
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**Remediation:** Remove port mappings for production. Use Docker internal networking only (`crm-net`). If debug access is needed, bind to `127.0.0.1:5432:5432` and document it as dev-only.
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### C-4: Unauthenticated Error Endpoint Forwards Data to External Forgejo
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**File:** `app/routes/errors.py:54-90`, `app/plugins/builtins/forgejo_error_reporter/service.py:151-250`
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**Risk:** The `/api/v1/errors` endpoint requires no authentication. CSRF middleware explicitly bypasses token checks for this path (line 48 of `middleware.py`). Any unauthenticated attacker can POST arbitrary error data (message, stack, URL, userAgent, and **arbitrary context dict**) which gets forwarded to an external Forgejo instance as a public issue. The `context` field accepts `dict[str, Any]` with no size limit on individual keys — an attacker can exfiltrate data or inject malicious content into Forgejo issues.
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**Remediation:** Require authentication for error reporting. If unauthenticated errors are needed, strip the `context` field entirely, add strict schema validation with size limits on all fields, and add a CAPTCHA or stricter rate limiting.
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### C-5: Plaintext Database Password in `.env`
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**File:** `.env:1`
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**Risk:** `DATABASE_URL=postgresql+asyncpg://leocrm:leocrm@localhost:5432/leocrm` embeds the DB password `leocrm` in plaintext. While `.gitignore` covers `.env`, the password is weak and identical to the username. If the file is accessed via any path traversal, backup leak, or container escape, the database is fully compromised.
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**Remediation:** Use a strong unique password. Separate `DATABASE_URL` construction from credential storage where possible (e.g., use individual `POSTGRES_USER`, `POSTGRES_PASSWORD`, `POSTGRES_HOST`, `POSTGRES_DB` env vars and construct the URL in code).
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---
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## HIGH Issues
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### H-1: Rate Limiter Trusts X-Forwarded-For Without Validation
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**File:** `app/core/rate_limit.py:43-45`
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**Risk:** `get_client_ip()` blindly trusts the `X-Forwarded-For` header. An attacker can set arbitrary values to bypass rate limits on login, password reset, and other endpoints. Each request with a different spoofed IP creates a new rate-limit counter.
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**Remediation:** Only trust `X-Forwarded-For` from known proxy IPs. Configure a trusted proxy list and validate the header chain. Use Starlette's `ProxyHeadersMiddleware` or validate against a `TRUSTED_PROXIES` env var.
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### H-2: Duplicate `get_redis()` Functions — Connection Leak
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**File:** `app/core/auth.py:53-66` and `app/core/auth.py:94-96`
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**Risk:** Two `get_redis()` functions exist. The first (line 53) returns a singleton. The second (line 94) creates a **new Redis connection on every call**. Code importing `get_redis` may use either version. The middleware (line 69) creates its own Redis connection per request. This leads to connection pool exhaustion under load.
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**Remediation:** Remove the second `get_redis()` (line 94-96). Ensure all code uses the singleton version. The middleware should use `get_redis()` from `app.core.auth` instead of creating its own connection.
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### H-3: CSRF Middleware Creates New Redis Connection Per Request
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**File:** `app/core/middleware.py:69-90`
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**Risk:** For every unsafe HTTP request, the middleware creates a new `aioredis.from_url()` connection, uses it, then closes it. Under load, this creates thousands of connections and can exhaust Redis connection limits.
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**Remediation:** Use the global Redis singleton via `from app.core.auth import get_redis`. Remove the per-request connection creation and the `finally: await redis.close()` block.
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### H-4: CSRF Token Stored Plaintext in PostgreSQL
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**File:** `app/core/auth.py:141` (`SessionModel` stores `csrf_token`)
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**Risk:** The CSRF token is stored as plaintext in the PostgreSQL `sessions` table (audit trail). If the database is compromised, all active CSRF tokens are available for CSRF attacks.
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**Remediation:** Store only a hash of the CSRF token in PostgreSQL (like `hash_token()` already exists for session tokens). Compare hashes during validation.
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### H-5: No File Upload Validation in Storage Backend
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**File:** `app/core/storage.py:69-128`
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**Risk:** `LocalStorage` performs no validation on uploaded files:
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- No path traversal protection: `os.path.join(self.base_path, path)` with a malicious `path` containing `../../` can write anywhere on the filesystem
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- No file type/extension whitelist
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- No file size limit
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- No content-type validation
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- `get_url()` returns the full filesystem path, leaking internal directory structure
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**Remediation:** Sanitize `path` with `os.path.realpath()` and verify it's within `base_path`. Enforce file size limits, extension whitelist, and MIME type validation. Return relative paths from `get_url()`, not absolute filesystem paths.
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### H-6: WebSocket Connections Lack Authentication Verification
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**File:** `app/plugins/builtins/kommunikation/websocket_manager.py:23-28`, `app/plugins/builtins/ai_ui_control/websocket_manager.py:40-46`
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**Risk:** Both WebSocket managers accept connections via `connect(websocket, user_id)` without verifying that `user_id` is authenticated. The security depends entirely on the calling route. If any WebSocket route passes an untrusted `user_id` (e.g., from query params), an attacker can impersonate any user. There is also no origin verification on WebSocket connections.
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**Remediation:** Verify session cookie inside `connect()` before `websocket.accept()`. Validate the `Origin` header against allowed CORS origins. Add authentication middleware for WebSocket routes.
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### H-7: In-Memory Rate Limiter in Error Endpoint — Fails with Multiple Workers
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**File:** `app/routes/errors.py:21-40`
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**Risk:** The error endpoint uses a process-local `defaultdict(deque)` for rate limiting. With multiple Uvicorn workers (common in production), each worker has its own counter. An attacker can make `RATE_LIMIT * num_workers` requests per minute.
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**Remediation:** Use the Redis-based `check_rate_limit()` from `app/core/rate_limit.py` instead of the in-memory implementation.
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### H-8: No CSRF Protection on WebSocket Connections
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**File:** Both WebSocket managers
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**Risk:** WebSocket connections are not protected against CSRF. A malicious site can open a WebSocket to the CRM backend via JavaScript `new WebSocket()` and send commands as the authenticated user (cookies are sent automatically with SameSite=Strict for same-site, but cross-site WebSocket hijacking is still possible if SameSite is configured differently or cookies are sent via `credentials`).
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**Remediation:** Verify the `Origin` header on WebSocket upgrade requests. Reject connections from untrusted origins.
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---
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## MEDIUM Issues
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### M-1: Login Response Leaks `is_system_admin` Flag
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**File:** `app/routes/auth.py:78`
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**Risk:** The login response includes `"is_system_admin": user.is_system_admin`. An attacker who compromises a session or intercepts the response knows whether the account has system-wide privileges, enabling targeted attacks.
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**Remediation:** Do not include `is_system_admin` in the login response. The frontend can determine admin status via the `/me/permissions` endpoint.
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### M-2: Weak Password Validation — No Complexity Requirements
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**File:** `app/schemas/auth.py:10` (login: `min_length=1`), `app/schemas/user.py:11` (create: `min_length=8`)
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**Risk:** Login accepts any password length (min_length=1). User creation requires min 8 chars but no complexity (uppercase, lowercase, digits, special chars). Users can set passwords like `aaaaaaaa`.
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**Remediation:** Add password complexity validation (min 12 chars, mixed case, digits, special chars) for user creation and password reset. Keep login min_length=1 to avoid leaking whether the password was partially correct.
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### M-3: F-String Interpolation of Table/Column Names in Raw SQL
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**File:** `app/plugins/builtins/unified_search/embedding.py:194`, `search_engine.py:153`, `routes.py:294,300`, `jobs.py:183,228`
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**Risk:** Multiple raw SQL queries use f-strings to interpolate table and column names: `f"UPDATE {table} SET ..."`, `f"SELECT {emb_col} FROM {table_name} ..."`. While the values come from hardcoded `table_map` dicts (not user input), this pattern is fragile — a future change could introduce user-controlled values into the map.
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**Remediation:** Use SQLAlchemy ORM queries instead of raw SQL where possible. If raw SQL is needed, validate table/column names against an allowlist before interpolation, or use `sqlalchemy.sql.quoted_name` for safe identifier quoting.
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### M-4: Forgejo Error Reporter Sends Full Context to External Service
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**File:** `app/plugins/builtins/forgejo_error_reporter/service.py:196-199`
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**Risk:** The error reporter serializes the entire `context` dict into the Forgejo issue body as JSON. If frontend error reporting includes sensitive data (user tokens, PII, tenant data), it will be written to an external Forgejo repository as a public issue.
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**Remediation:** Add a field-level allowlist for context data. Strip or redact sensitive keys (tokens, passwords, emails, phone numbers). Consider making Forgejo issues private/confidential.
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### M-5: Config Has Hardcoded Default Secret Key
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**File:** `app/config.py:55`
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**Risk:** The default `secret_key = "change-me-in-production-use-a-secure-random-string"` is a known public value. While production mode checks for it, development mode silently uses it. If dev environments are exposed (even temporarily), all signed tokens are forgeable.
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**Remediation:** Remove the default value entirely. Make `secret_key` a required field with no default. Fail in all environments if not set.
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### M-6: `LocalStorage.get_url()` Returns Absolute Filesystem Path
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**File:** `app/core/storage.py:116-117`
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**Risk:** `get_url()` returns `self._full_path(path)` which is the absolute filesystem path (e.g., `/data/uploads/tenant1/file.pdf`). If this URL is returned to the frontend or used in API responses, it leaks the internal directory structure and can aid path traversal attacks.
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**Remediation:** Return a relative path or a signed download URL that routes through an authenticated API endpoint.
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### M-7: Inconsistent Environment Configuration in `.env`
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**File:** `.env:3,4`
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**Risk:** `.env` sets `ENVIRONMENT=development` but `SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE=true`. In development with HTTP, secure cookies won't be sent, causing auth failures. More importantly, the `ENVIRONMENT=development` setting disables the production safety checks in `get_settings()`, allowing the default `SECRET_KEY` to be used.
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**Remediation:** Use separate `.env.development` and `.env.production` files. Ensure development configs are never accidentally deployed.
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### M-8: Permission Cache Falls Back to Stale Data on DB Error
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**File:** `app/core/permissions.py:337-344`
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**Risk:** When `_get_current_permission_version()` fails (DB error), the code sets `current_version = cached_version` and uses potentially stale cached permissions. If a user's permissions were revoked during the DB outage, they retain elevated access.
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**Remediation:** On DB error, either fail closed (deny access) or use a shorter stale-while-error TTL. Log the event as a security incident.
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---
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## LOW Issues
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### L-1: `document.write()` with DOM Clone in Print Utility
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**File:** `frontend/src/utils/print.ts:54, 127`
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**Risk:** `printElement()` and `exportToPDF()` use `document.write()` with `clone.outerHTML`. If the printed DOM element contains user-controlled content (e.g., contact notes with HTML), it executes in a new window context. The new window is same-origin, limiting the impact, but it's still an unnecessary risk.
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**Remediation:** Use DOM APIs (`appendChild`, `importNode`) instead of `document.write()`. Alternatively, sanitize the cloned HTML before writing.
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### L-2: Session Data Stored in Redis Without Encryption
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**File:** `app/core/auth.py:130-134`
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**Risk:** Session data (user_id, tenant_id, email, role, csrf_token, is_system_admin) is stored as plaintext JSON in Redis. Anyone with Redis access can read all active sessions.
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**Remediation:** Encrypt session data before storing in Redis, or accept the risk given Redis should be network-isolated. At minimum, ensure Redis requires authentication and is not exposed.
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### L-3: No Security Headers Middleware
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**File:** No security headers middleware found
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**Risk:** The application does not set security headers like `X-Content-Type-Options`, `X-Frame-Options`, `Strict-Transport-Security`, `Content-Security-Policy`.
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**Remediation:** Add a security headers middleware or use `starlette-securehead`/`secure` package.
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### L-4: No Origin Verification on WebSocket Upgrade
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**File:** Both WebSocket managers
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**Risk:** Neither WebSocket manager checks the `Origin` header before accepting connections. While cookies with `SameSite=Strict` provide some protection, some browsers and non-browser clients may not respect SameSite on WebSocket connections.
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**Remediation:** Check `websocket.headers.get("origin")` against `settings.cors_origin_list` before calling `websocket.accept()`.
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### L-5: Unbounded Feedback/Command Storage in AI UI Control WebSocket
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**File:** `app/plugins/builtins/ai_ui_control/websocket_manager.py:94-103`
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**Risk:** `store_feedback()` stores feedback dicts without size limits. `cleanup_stale()` only runs when explicitly called. An attacker who can send WebSocket messages could fill memory with large feedback payloads.
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**Remediation:** Add size limits on feedback payloads. Run `cleanup_stale()` on a timer or on each `connect()`/`disconnect()`.
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---
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## Positive Findings
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1. **Dockerfile security:** Multi-stage build, non-root user (`appuser` UID 1000), healthcheck configured, no secrets baked into image.
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2. **RLS implementation:** PostgreSQL Row Level Security with `FORCE` (migration 0028) ensures tenant isolation even for table owners. `set_tenant_context()` uses parameterized queries.
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3. **Password hashing:** bcrypt with configurable rounds (default 12).
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4. **Session tokens:** `secrets.token_urlsafe(32)` — cryptographically secure.
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5. **XSS protection:** `HtmlBlock.tsx` and `SignatureManager.tsx` use `DOMPurify.sanitize()` before `dangerouslySetInnerHTML`.
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6. **RBAC architecture:** Deny-list takes precedence over allow-list. Field-level permissions with strictest-wins merging. Permission version-based cache invalidation.
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7. **No user enumeration:** Password reset endpoint always returns 200.
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8. **SQL injection:** ORM queries use parameterized statements throughout. Raw SQL in `unified_search` uses hardcoded maps (not directly exploitable).
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9. **`.gitignore`** properly covers `.env`, `.env.*`, and excludes example files.
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10. **Production safety checks** in `get_settings()` validate `SECRET_KEY`, `SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE`, and `STORAGE_PATH`.
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---
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## Migration & Data Loss Risks
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1. **RLS policies:** Multiple migrations (0001, 0002, 0004, 0015, 0021, 0028) create and modify RLS policies. Migration 0028 adds `FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY`. Ensure all migrations are applied in order before production deployment.
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2. **Backup risk:** No backup/restore procedure found in the repository. The `last_backup_at` system setting is referenced in automation jobs but no backup script exists.
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3. **Volume persistence:** `docker-compose.yml` defines named volumes for `pgdata`, `redisdata`, and `storage`. Good for persistence, but no backup strategy documented.
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4. **Migration rollback:** Down migrations exist but should be tested. RLS policy down migrations disable RLS — running a rollback in production would expose all tenant data.
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---
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## Remediation Priority
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1. **Immediate (before any production deploy):** C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4, C-5, H-1, H-2, H-3
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2. **Short-term (within 1 sprint):** H-4, H-5, H-6, H-7, H-8, M-1, M-2, M-5
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3. **Medium-term (within 2 sprints):** M-3, M-4, M-6, M-7, M-8, L-1, L-2, L-3, L-4, L-5
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+33
-8
@@ -15,23 +15,48 @@ POSTGRES_USER=crm_user
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POSTGRES_PASSWORD=STRONG_PASSWORD_HERE
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POSTGRES_DB=crm_db
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# --- CRM Application ----------------------------------------------------------
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# The host "postgres" is the docker-compose service name (internal DNS).
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# The DRIVER is asyncpg for production PostgreSQL.
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DATABASE_URL=postgresql+asyncpg://crm_user:STRONG_PASSWORD_HERE@postgres:5432/crm_db
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# --- Redis (REQUIRED) ---------------------------------------------------------
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# Generate a strong password:
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# python -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_urlsafe(24))"
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REDIS_PASSWORD=STRONG_REDIS_PASSWORD_HERE
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# --- AUTH_SECRET (REQUIRED, min 32 chars) ------------------------------------
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# --- CRM Application: Runtime DB user (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS) --------------
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# The app and worker use crm_runtime — RLS is enforced.
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# This user is created by migration 0044 with DML-only permissions.
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# Set RUNTIME_DB_PASSWORD to the password you want for crm_runtime.
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RUNTIME_DB_PASSWORD=STRONG_RUNTIME_PASSWORD_HERE
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DATABASE_URL=postgresql+asyncpg://crm_runtime:STRONG_RUNTIME_PASSWORD_HERE@postgres:5432/crm_db
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# --- CRM Application: Migration DB user (owner, can run DDL) -----------------
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# Migrations and DDL operations use the owner user (crm_user).
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# This is NOT used by the app at runtime — only by prestart.sh / alembic.
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MIGRATION_DATABASE_URL=postgresql+asyncpg://crm_user:STRONG_PASSWORD_HERE@postgres:5432/crm_db
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# --- SECRET_KEY (REQUIRED, min 32 chars) -------------------------------------
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# Session signing secret. MUST be at least 32 characters.
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# Generate with:
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# python -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_urlsafe(48))"
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AUTH_SECRET=MIN_32_CHARS_GENERATE_WITH_secrets_token_urlsafe_32_xxxxxxxxxxxx
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SECRET_KEY=MIN_32_CHARS_GENERATE_WITH_secrets_token_urlsafe_32_xxxxxxxxxxxx
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# --- Frontend URL (for email links) ------------------------------------------
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# The public URL where users access the LeoCRM frontend.
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# Used for password reset links, invitations, etc.
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FRONTEND_URL=https://crm.example.com
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# --- CORS / environment -------------------------------------------------------
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# Comma-separated, NO wildcards. In dev we allow localhost:8000 (the app) and
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# :5173 (e.g. Vite dev server). In production, restrict to the real domain.
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CORS_ORIGINS=http://localhost:8000,http://localhost:5173
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CORS_ORIGINS=https://crm.example.com
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ENVIRONMENT=production
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LOG_LEVEL=INFO
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# --- bcrypt tuning (keep aligned with .env.example) --------------------------
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# --- SMTP (for password reset emails) -----------------------------------------
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SMTP_HOST=smtp.example.com
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SMTP_PORT=587
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SMTP_USERNAME=noreply@example.com
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SMTP_PASSWORD=YOUR_SMTP_PASSWORD
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SMTP_FROM_EMAIL=noreply@example.com
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SMTP_USE_TLS=true
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# --- bcrypt tuning ----------------------------------------------------------
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BCRYPT_ROUNDS=12
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|
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@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ coverage.xml
|
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.mypy_cache/
|
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.ruff_cache/
|
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|
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# Redis dumps
|
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dump.rdb
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*.rdb
|
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|
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# Database files
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*.db
|
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*.db-journal
|
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|
||||
+290
@@ -0,0 +1,290 @@
|
||||
# LeoCRM Fix-Plan V2 — Gründliche Analyse & Maßnahmen
|
||||
|
||||
*Erstellt: 2026-07-26 — basierend auf externem Audit + eigener Code-Verifikation*
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Zusammenfassung
|
||||
|
||||
Von 16 zentralen Punkten des externen Audits wurden **alle 16 durch Code-Inspektion verifiziert**. Zusätzlich wurden **5 neue Probleme** gefunden (UploadFile-Bug, Redis-Default-Passwort, exponierte Ports, unauthentifizierter Error-Endpoint, fehlende Security-Headers).
|
||||
|
||||
**Gesamtstatus:** 4 sauber gefixt · 8 teilweise gefixt · 4 nicht gefixt · 5 neu gefunden = **21 Maßnahmen**
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Phase 1: Kritische Release-Blocker (vor Produktivbetrieb)
|
||||
|
||||
### B1. Doppelte `get_redis()` entfernen
|
||||
- **Datei:** `app/core/auth.py` Zeilen 53 + 94
|
||||
- **Problem:** Zweite Definition überschreibt Singleton, erzeugt pro Aufruf neue Verbindung → Connection Leak
|
||||
- **Fix:** Zweite `def get_redis()` (Zeile 94) löschen. Erste Definition (Zeile 53) beibehalten.
|
||||
- **Aufwand:** 5 Min
|
||||
- **Risiko:** Keines — erste Definition ist korrekt
|
||||
|
||||
### B2. Plugin-Routen-Registrierung reparieren
|
||||
- **Datei:** `app/main.py` Zeilen 375-416
|
||||
- **Problem:** Alle Plugin-Routen werden statisch in `create_app()` registriert, unabhängig vom Aktivierungsstatus. Deaktivierte Plugins bleiben erreichbar. Kommentar in Zeile 416 sagt das Gegenteil.
|
||||
- **Fix:**
|
||||
1. Statische Registrierung aus `create_app()` entfernen
|
||||
2. In `lifespan()` nur Routen für `active=True` Plugins registrieren
|
||||
3. `Depends(require_active_plugin("name"))` als zentrale Prüfung ergänzen
|
||||
4. Bei Deaktivierung: Router entfernen oder 403-Dependency ergänzen
|
||||
- **Aufwand:** 2-3 Std
|
||||
- **Risiko:** Mittel — muss sicherstellen dass keine Route doppelt registriert wird
|
||||
|
||||
### B3. UploadFile Route-Registration Bug
|
||||
- **Dateien:** `app/plugins/builtins/dms/routes.py`, `calendar/routes.py`, `mail/routes.py`, `kommunikation/routes.py`, `ai_assistant/routes.py`
|
||||
- **Problem:** FastAPI kann `UploadFile` nicht als Response-Model auflösen → 5 Plugins failen beim Registrieren mit `Invalid args for response field`
|
||||
- **Fix:** `response_model=None` zu allen Endpoints mit `UploadFile`-Rückgabe hinzufügen, oder Return-Type auf `Response`/`dict` ändern
|
||||
- **Aufwand:** 30 Min
|
||||
- **Risiko:** Keines — Routen sind aktuell gar nicht registriert
|
||||
|
||||
### B4. DMS-Upload auf echtes Streaming umstellen
|
||||
- **Datei:** `app/plugins/builtins/dms/routes.py` Zeilen 444-472
|
||||
- **Problem:** Chunks werden in `list[bytes]` gesammelt, dann `b"".join()` → 100MB Datei = 200MB+ RAM. `save_stream()` existiert aber wird nicht benutzt.
|
||||
- **Fix:**
|
||||
```python
|
||||
async def chunk_generator():
|
||||
while chunk := await file.read(CHUNK_SIZE):
|
||||
yield chunk
|
||||
await storage.save_stream(storage_path, chunk_generator())
|
||||
```
|
||||
Hash und Größe während des Streams berechnen.
|
||||
- **Aufwand:** 1 Std
|
||||
- **Risiko:** Gering — save_stream() ist bereits implementiert
|
||||
|
||||
### B5. Outbox-Worker: Event-Handler registrieren
|
||||
- **Datei:** `app/core/worker.py` `on_startup()`
|
||||
- **Problem:** Worker liest Events aus Outbox, published an lokalen EventBus, aber es sind keine Handler registriert → Events werden als `published` markiert ohne Verarbeitung
|
||||
- **Fix:**
|
||||
1. In `on_startup()`: Plugin-Event-Handler registrieren (wie in `lifespan()` der API)
|
||||
2. `webhook_dispatcher._dispatch_event` an EventBus subscriben
|
||||
3. Plugin-Participant-Handler registrieren
|
||||
- **Aufwand:** 2 Std
|
||||
- **Risiko:** Mittel — muss gleiche Handler wie API-Container registrieren
|
||||
|
||||
### B6. Passwort-Reset-Mailjob implementieren
|
||||
- **Dateien:** `app/services/auth_service.py`, `app/core/jobs.py`, `app/core/job_registry.py`
|
||||
- **Problem:** `send_password_reset_email` Job wird gequeued aber nie registriert → Mail wird nicht versendet. Token wird in Logs geschrieben (Zeile 240-241).
|
||||
- **Fix:**
|
||||
1. `send_password_reset_email` Worker-Funktion implementieren (SMTP/IMAP)
|
||||
2. Mit `register_job()` registrieren
|
||||
3. `logger.warning("raw_token for development: %s", raw_token)` entfernen
|
||||
4. Token nur im Development-Mode loggen, nie in Production
|
||||
- **Aufwand:** 2 Std
|
||||
- **Risiko:** Gering
|
||||
|
||||
### B7. Webhook SSRF-Schutz + Secret-Behandlung
|
||||
- **Dateien:** `app/services/webhook_service.py`, `app/schemas/webhook.py`
|
||||
- **Problem:** Kein SSRF-Schutz — User können interne Dienste ansprechen (redis:6379, postgres:5432, 169.254.169.254). Webhook-Secret wird im Response zurückgegeben.
|
||||
- **Fix:**
|
||||
1. SSRF-Prüfung: DNS auflösen, private IPs blocken (10.x, 172.16-31.x, 192.168.x, 127.x, 169.254.x, ::1)
|
||||
2. Redirects deaktivieren oder prüfen
|
||||
3. Protokoll-Allowlist (nur https)
|
||||
4. `secret` aus `WebhookResponse` entfernen
|
||||
5. Secret gehasht in DB speichern
|
||||
- **Aufwand:** 3 Std
|
||||
- **Risiko:** Gering
|
||||
|
||||
### B8. RLS: Separater DB-Runtime-User
|
||||
- **Dateien:** `docker-compose.yml`, `alembic/versions/0044_db_roles.py` (neu)
|
||||
- **Problem:** `POSTGRES_USER` (crm_user) ist Superuser → umgeht RLS auch mit FORCE. Spätere Tabellen (user_preferences, saved_filters, etc.) haben keine RLS-Policy.
|
||||
- **Fix:**
|
||||
1. Neue Migration `0044_db_roles.py`: erstellt `crm_runtime` (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS)
|
||||
2. `crm_runtime` bekommt nur SELECT/INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE Rechte
|
||||
3. `docker-compose.yml`: API und Worker nutzen `crm_runtime`, Migrationen nutzen `crm_owner`
|
||||
4. Neue Migration `0045_rls_new_tables.py`: RLS für alle Tabellen mit `tenant_id` die nach 0028 hinzukamen
|
||||
- **Aufwand:** 4 Std
|
||||
- **Risiko:** Hoch — muss bestehende Datenbanken migrieren ohne Datenverlust
|
||||
|
||||
### B9. .env.docker.example korrigieren
|
||||
- **Datei:** `.env.docker.example`
|
||||
- **Problem:** Verwendet `AUTH_SECRET` statt `SECRET_KEY` (config.py erwartet `SECRET_KEY`)
|
||||
- **Fix:** `AUTH_SECRET` → `SECRET_KEY` umbenennen
|
||||
- **Aufwand:** 5 Min
|
||||
- **Risiko:** Keines
|
||||
|
||||
### B10. Redis-Default-Passwort + exponierte Ports
|
||||
- **Datei:** `docker-compose.yml`
|
||||
- **Problem:** Redis-Passwort default `changeme`, PostgreSQL (5432) und Redis (6379) Ports exponiert
|
||||
- **Fix:**
|
||||
1. Redis-Passwort als Required-Env ohne Default
|
||||
2. `ports:` Sektion für DB und Redis entfernen (nur internes Docker-Netzwerk)
|
||||
3. Falls Debug-Zugriff nötig: nur an 127.0.0.1 binden
|
||||
- **Aufwand:** 15 Min
|
||||
- **Risiko:** Gering — bestehende Setups müssen .env anpassen
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Phase 2: Hohe Priorität (kurz nach Release)
|
||||
|
||||
### H1. Unauthentifizierter Error-Endpoint absichern
|
||||
- **Datei:** `app/routes/errors.py`
|
||||
- **Problem:** `POST /api/v1/errors` ohne Auth, sendet Daten an Forgejo als öffentliches Issue. Context-Dict kann sensible Daten enthalten.
|
||||
- **Fix:**
|
||||
1. Context-Felder filtern (keine Tokens, Passwörter, Headers)
|
||||
2. Forgejo-Issues nur in non-production erstellen
|
||||
3. Rate-Limit auf IP-Basis (bereits vorhanden, aber in-memory → bei Multi-Worker unzuverlässig)
|
||||
4. Optional: Auth erforderlich, aber dann funktioniert Frontend-Error-Logging nicht mehr → besser: nur sanitisierte Daten akzeptieren
|
||||
- **Aufwand:** 1 Std
|
||||
|
||||
### H2. Rate-Limiter IP-Spoofing
|
||||
- **Datei:** `app/core/rate_limit.py` Zeile 43
|
||||
- **Problem:** Vertraut `X-Forwarded-For` blind → IP-Spoofing umgeht Rate-Limits
|
||||
- **Fix:** Nur erste IP in X-Forwarded-For verwenden, oder `X-Real-IP` mit Proxy-Validation
|
||||
- **Aufwand:** 30 Min
|
||||
|
||||
### H3. CSRF-Middleware Redis-Verbindung
|
||||
- **Datei:** `app/core/middleware.py` Zeile 69
|
||||
- **Problem:** Erstellt pro unsafe Request neue Redis-Verbindung → Connection Leak
|
||||
- **Fix:** `get_redis()` Singleton verwenden (funktioniert nach B1)
|
||||
- **Aufwand:** 10 Min
|
||||
|
||||
### H4. WebSocket Auth + Origin-Verifikation
|
||||
- **Dateien:** `app/plugins/builtins/kommunikation/websocket_manager.py`, `ai_ui_control/websocket_manager.py`
|
||||
- **Problem:** `user_id` wird ohne Auth-Verifikation akzeptiert. Keine Origin-Prüfung bei WS-Upgrade.
|
||||
- **Fix:**
|
||||
1. Session-Token aus Query-Param oder Header validieren
|
||||
2. Origin-Header gegen erlaubte Domains prüfen
|
||||
3. User-ID aus Session ableiten, nicht aus Client-Param
|
||||
- **Aufwand:** 2 Std
|
||||
|
||||
### H5. File-Upload-Sicherheit
|
||||
- **Datei:** `app/core/storage.py`
|
||||
- **Problem:** Keine Path-Traversal-Prüfung, keine Type/Size-Limits, `get_url()` leakt Filesystem-Pfade
|
||||
- **Fix:**
|
||||
1. Filename sanitizen (keine `../`, keine absoluten Pfade)
|
||||
2. MIME-Type-Allowlist
|
||||
3. Max-File-Size konfigurierbar
|
||||
4. `get_url()` gibt relative URL zurück, nicht Filesystem-Pfad
|
||||
- **Aufwand:** 1 Std
|
||||
|
||||
### H6. Security-Headers
|
||||
- **Datei:** `app/core/middleware.py` (neu)
|
||||
- **Problem:** Keine Security-Headers (HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, CSP)
|
||||
- **Fix:** Middleware ergänzen die diese Headers setzt
|
||||
- **Aufwand:** 30 Min
|
||||
|
||||
### H7. Migration-Repair für bestehende Installationen
|
||||
- **Datei:** `alembic/versions/0044_repair_contact_migration.py` (neu)
|
||||
- **Problem:** Migrationen 0021 und 0027 wurden nachträglich geändert. Alembic führt sie nicht erneut aus.
|
||||
- **Fix:**
|
||||
1. Neue Migration die `*_old` Tabellen erkennt und Daten nachmigriert
|
||||
2. Integritätsprüfung (Anzahl vergleichen)
|
||||
3. Bei Abweichungen hart abbrechen mit Fehlermeldung
|
||||
- **Aufwand:** 3 Std
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Phase 3: Mittlere Priorität
|
||||
|
||||
### M1. Passwort-Komplexität
|
||||
- **Datei:** `app/schemas/auth.py`, `app/schemas/user.py`
|
||||
- **Problem:** Min-Length 8 bei Erstellung, Min-Length 1 bei Login. Keine Komplexitäts-Requirements.
|
||||
- **Fix:** Passwort-Validator ergänzen (min 8 Zeichen, 1 Groß, 1 Klein, 1 Zahl)
|
||||
- **Aufwand:** 30 Min
|
||||
|
||||
### M2. Login-Response: is_system_admin
|
||||
- **Datei:** `app/routes/auth.py` Zeile 78
|
||||
- **Problem:** `is_system_admin` Flag in Login-Response leakt interne Rolle
|
||||
- **Fix:** Flag aus Response entfernen oder nur für Admin-User anzeigen
|
||||
- **Aufwand:** 15 Min
|
||||
|
||||
### M3. Permission-Cache: Stale Data bei DB-Error
|
||||
- **Datei:** `app/core/permissions.py` Zeile 337
|
||||
- **Problem:** Bei DB-Error fällt Cache auf stale Daten zurück → widerrufene Rechte bleiben aktiv
|
||||
- **Fix:** Bei DB-Error: Cache invalidieren und 503 zurückgeben statt stale Daten zu nutzen
|
||||
- **Aufwand:** 30 Min
|
||||
|
||||
### M4. ENVIRONMENT=development vs SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE=true
|
||||
- **Datei:** `.env` Zeilen 3-4
|
||||
- **Problem:** Inkonsistent — development deaktiviert Prod-Safety-Checks, aber Cookie ist secure
|
||||
- **Fix:** In .env.docker.example klar dokumentieren: production → `ENVIRONMENT=production` + `SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE=true`
|
||||
- **Aufwand:** 10 Min
|
||||
|
||||
### M5. Frontend: Unresolved Items
|
||||
- **Dateien:** `WelcomeDialog.tsx`, `SavedFilterBar.tsx`, `EntityHistoryPanel.tsx`, `TagBadge.tsx`, `TagSelector.tsx`
|
||||
- **Problem:** WelcomeDialog hat `open={false}`. SavedFilterBar/EntityHistoryPanel/TagBadge/TagSelector sind gebaut aber nicht in Seiten integriert.
|
||||
- **Fix:**
|
||||
1. WelcomeDialog an User-Preferences (onboarding_completed) koppeln
|
||||
2. SavedFilterBar in ContactsList, Mail, Calendar integrieren
|
||||
3. EntityHistoryPanel in ContactDetail, Settings integrieren
|
||||
4. TagBadge/TagSelector in ContactsList, Mail, Calendar integrieren
|
||||
- **Aufwand:** 4 Std
|
||||
|
||||
### M6. Frontend-Tests: QueryClientProvider
|
||||
- **Datei:** `frontend/src/test/setup.ts` oder einzelne Tests
|
||||
- **Problem:** ~29 Tests failen mit missing QueryClientProvider
|
||||
- **Fix:** Globalen Test-Wrapper mit QueryClientProvider in setup.ts ergänzen
|
||||
- **Aufwand:** 1 Std
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Phase 4: Niedrige Priorität
|
||||
|
||||
### L1. document.write() in print.ts
|
||||
- **Datei:** `frontend/src/utils/print.ts` Zeilen 54, 127
|
||||
- **Problem:** `document.write()` mit DOM-Clone — XSS-Risiko wenn Content nicht sanitized
|
||||
- **Fix:** Statt `document.write()`: `iframe.srcdoc` oder `Blob URL` verwenden
|
||||
- **Aufwand:** 1 Std
|
||||
|
||||
### L2. AI UI Control: Unbounded Feedback-Storage
|
||||
- **Datei:** `app/plugins/builtins/ai_ui_control/websocket_manager.py` Zeile 94
|
||||
- **Problem:** Feedback/Commands unbegrenzt im Memory gespeichert → Memory Exhaustion
|
||||
- **Fix:** Max-Length Queue (z.B. 100 Einträge) mit FIFO
|
||||
- **Aufwand:** 15 Min
|
||||
|
||||
### L3. Backup-Strategie dokumentieren
|
||||
- **Problem:** Named Volumes in docker-compose aber keine Backup/Restore-Doku
|
||||
- **Fix:** Backup-Script und Doku ergänzen
|
||||
- **Aufwand:** 2 Std
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Implementierungs-Reihenfolge
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Phase 1 (Release-Blocker):
|
||||
B1 → B3 → B9 → B10 → B2 → B4 → B5 → B6 → B7 → B8
|
||||
↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
|
||||
5m 30m 5m 15m 3h 1h 2h 2h 3h 4h
|
||||
Gesamt: ~16 Std
|
||||
|
||||
Phase 2 (Hohe Priorität):
|
||||
H3 → H2 → H6 → H1 → H5 → H4 → H7
|
||||
Gesamt: ~8 Std
|
||||
|
||||
Phase 3 (Mittlere Priorität):
|
||||
M4 → M1 → M2 → M3 → M6 → M5
|
||||
Gesamt: ~6 Std
|
||||
|
||||
Phase 4 (Niedrige Priorität):
|
||||
L2 → L1 → L3
|
||||
Gesamt: ~3 Std
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Gesamtaufwand: ~33 Std**
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Was bereits sauber funktioniert
|
||||
|
||||
- ✅ Auth-Bypass entfernt (keine X-Internal-Call/X-Tenant-Id/X-User-Id Headers mehr)
|
||||
- ✅ Plugin-Upload/URL-Installation deaktiviert (403)
|
||||
- ✅ Worker in separatem Container
|
||||
- ✅ Metrics adminbeschränkt
|
||||
- ✅ DOMPurify für HTML-Komponenten
|
||||
- ✅ ARQ-Verbindungspool zentralisiert
|
||||
- ✅ Session-Widerruf nach Passwortänderung
|
||||
- ✅ Permission-Cache-Versionierung
|
||||
- ✅ Redis SCAN statt KEYS
|
||||
- ✅ Rabatte von Float auf Numeric
|
||||
- ✅ Event-Outbox als Grundlage vorhanden
|
||||
- ✅ RLS FORCE + WITH CHECK in Migration 0028
|
||||
- ✅ Migration 0021: Tabellen umbenennen statt löschen
|
||||
- ✅ Frontend: TypeScript typecheck clean (0 errors)
|
||||
- ✅ Frontend: ErrorBoundary, OfflineBanner, ErrorLogger implementiert
|
||||
- ✅ Frontend: Print/PDF mit WeasyPrint funktioniert
|
||||
- ✅ Dockerfile: Multi-stage, non-root User, Healthcheck
|
||||
- ✅ Bcrypt Password-Hashing
|
||||
- ✅ Session-Tokens: secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,724 @@
|
||||
# LeoCRM Plugin-System — Kompletter Umbauplan
|
||||
|
||||
**Erstellt:** 2026-07-26
|
||||
**Geschätzter Gesamtaufwand:** ~129 Stunden (~16 Arbeitstage)
|
||||
**Status:** Geplant — noch nicht gestartet
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Übersicht: 5 Phasen
|
||||
|
||||
| Phase | Punkte | Inhalt | Stunden | Tage |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Phase 1 | 1-3 | Contracts konsequent nutzen | 47 | 6 |
|
||||
| Phase 2 | 4 | Hooks/Filters-System | 16 | 2 |
|
||||
| Phase 3 | 5 | Plugin-Isolation (Linting) | 4 | 0,5 |
|
||||
| Phase 4 | 8 | Plugin-Versioning | 20 | 2,5 |
|
||||
| Phase 5 | 6 | Marketplace-Vorbereitung | 42 | 5 |
|
||||
| **Gesamt** | | | **129** | **16** |
|
||||
|
||||
**Wichtig:** Jede Phase ist unabhängig funktionsfähig. Das System läuft nach jeder Phase ohne Einschränkungen weiter.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Phase 1: Contracts konsequent nutzen (Punkte 1-3)
|
||||
|
||||
**Ziel:** Alle 224 direkten Cross-Plugin-Imports werden durch das Contract-System ersetzt.
|
||||
|
||||
### 1.1 Fehlende contracts.py erstellen (7 Std)
|
||||
|
||||
Für jedes Plugin, das noch keine `contracts.py` hat, eine erstellen:
|
||||
|
||||
| # | Plugin | Exportierte Symbole | Aufwand |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| 1 | `ai_proactive` | ContextTools, ProactiveAgent, JobScheduler | 30 Min |
|
||||
| 2 | `ai_ui_control` | WebSocketManager, UIAction | 30 Min |
|
||||
| 3 | `automation` | AgentRunner, ExecutionEngine, Scheduler, WorkflowTimeout | 45 Min |
|
||||
| 4 | `entity_links` | EntityLink model, create_link, get_links | 20 Min |
|
||||
| 5 | `forgejo_error_reporter` | report_error_to_forgejo | 15 Min |
|
||||
| 6 | `mcp_client` | McpClient, McpServerConfig | 30 Min |
|
||||
| 7 | `mcp_server` | McpServer, ToolDefinitions | 30 Min |
|
||||
| 8 | `report_generator` | ReportTemplate, ReportInstance, PdfGenerator | 30 Min |
|
||||
| 9 | `system_notif` | SystemNotifHandler | 15 Min |
|
||||
| 10 | `tags` | Tag, TagAssignment, assign_tags, remove_tags | 20 Min |
|
||||
| 11 | `tasks` | Task, TaskService, create_task, update_task | 30 Min |
|
||||
| 12 | `test_sample` | TestSamplePlugin | 10 Min |
|
||||
| 13 | `dms` (erweitern) | File, Folder, UploadService, DownloadService | 30 Min |
|
||||
| 14 | `permissions` (erweitern) | ShareLink, PermissionResolver | 30 Min |
|
||||
|
||||
**Schema für jede contracts.py:**
|
||||
```python
|
||||
"""Public contract for the <plugin> plugin."""
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
from app.plugins.builtins.contracts import get_contract_registry
|
||||
# Import only public symbols from internal modules
|
||||
|
||||
class <Plugin>Contract:
|
||||
contract_name = "<plugin>"
|
||||
# Expose only public API
|
||||
|
||||
_contract = <Plugin>Contract()
|
||||
get_contract_registry().register("<plugin>", _contract)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 1.2 Direkte Imports ersetzen (28 Std)
|
||||
|
||||
224 direkte Imports müssen durch `get_contract()` ersetzt werden.
|
||||
|
||||
**Top-Priorität (häufigste Import-Quellen):**
|
||||
|
||||
| # | Datei | Imports | Aufwand |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| 1 | `automation/plugin.py` | 10 | 1,5 Std |
|
||||
| 2 | `automation/routes.py` | 8 | 1,5 Std |
|
||||
| 3 | `ai_proactive/services.py` | 8 | 1,5 Std |
|
||||
| 4 | `ai_proactive/plugin.py` | 8 | 1,5 Std |
|
||||
| 5 | `unified_search/jobs.py` | 7 | 1 Std |
|
||||
| 6 | `builtins/__init__.py` | 7 | 1 Std |
|
||||
| 7 | `ai_proactive/jobs.py` | 7 | 1 Std |
|
||||
| 8 | `ai_assistant/participant_handler.py` | 7 | 1 Std |
|
||||
| 9 | `kommunikation/routes.py` | 6 | 1 Std |
|
||||
| 10 | `kommunikation/contracts.py` | 6 | 1 Std |
|
||||
| 11 | `automation/agent_routes.py` | 6 | 1 Std |
|
||||
| 12 | `automation/agent_comm.py` | 6 | 1 Std |
|
||||
| 13 | `ai_proactive/participant_handler.py` | 6 | 1 Std |
|
||||
| 14 | `ai_assistant/plugin.py` | 6 | 1 Std |
|
||||
| 15 | `unified_search/routes.py` | 5 | 45 Min |
|
||||
| 16-50 | Alle übrigen Dateien | ~122 | 12 Std |
|
||||
|
||||
**Muster für Ersetzung:**
|
||||
```python
|
||||
# VORHER (direkt):
|
||||
from app.plugins.builtins.kommunikation.services import send_message
|
||||
|
||||
# NACHHER (über Contract):
|
||||
from app.plugins.builtins.contracts import get_contract
|
||||
|
||||
async def my_function(db, ...):
|
||||
komm = get_contract("kommunikation")
|
||||
if komm:
|
||||
await komm.send_message(db, ...)
|
||||
# Graceful degradation wenn Plugin nicht aktiv
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 1.3 Contracts bei Deaktivierung abmelden (4 Std)
|
||||
|
||||
In jedem Plugin's `on_deactivate()`:
|
||||
```python
|
||||
async def on_deactivate(self, db, service_container, event_bus) -> None:
|
||||
# Contract abmelden
|
||||
from app.plugins.builtins.contracts import get_contract_registry
|
||||
get_contract_registry().unregister(self.manifest.name)
|
||||
# ... rest of cleanup
|
||||
await super().on_deactivate(db, service_container, event_bus)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
| # | Plugin | Aufwand |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| 1-16 | Alle 16 Plugins | 15 Min pro Plugin = 4 Std |
|
||||
|
||||
### 1.4 Tests anpassen (8 Std)
|
||||
|
||||
- Cross-Plugin-Tests müssen mit Contracts laufen
|
||||
- `test_plugins.py` — Contract-Registry Tests
|
||||
- `test_contracts.py` — Neue Test-Datei für Contract-System
|
||||
- Alle Integrationstests mit Contract-Mocks
|
||||
|
||||
### Meilenstein Phase 1:
|
||||
- ✅ Alle 16 Plugins haben contracts.py
|
||||
- ✅ 0 direkte Cross-Plugin-Imports (geprüft mit grep)
|
||||
- ✅ Contracts werden bei Deaktivierung abgemeldet
|
||||
- ✅ Alle Tests bestanden
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Phase 2: Hooks/Filters-System (Punkt 4)
|
||||
|
||||
**Ziel:** WordPress-Style Hooks (actions + filters) für Plugin-Erweiterbarkeit.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.1 HookRegistry erstellen (4 Std)
|
||||
|
||||
**Neue Datei: `app/core/hooks.py`**
|
||||
|
||||
```python
|
||||
"""WordPress-style hooks: actions (fire-and-forget) and filters (modify data)."""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
import logging
|
||||
from collections import defaultdict
|
||||
from typing import Any, Callable
|
||||
|
||||
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class HookRegistry:
|
||||
"""Central registry for actions and filters.
|
||||
|
||||
Actions: do_action('contact.before_create', data) — no return value
|
||||
Filters: result = apply_filters('contact.format_name', name) — returns modified value
|
||||
|
||||
Priority: lower numbers run first (default=10).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
_instance: HookRegistry | None = None
|
||||
|
||||
def __new__(cls):
|
||||
if cls._instance is None:
|
||||
cls._instance = super().__new__(cls)
|
||||
cls._instance._actions: dict[str, list[tuple[int, Callable]]] = defaultdict(list)
|
||||
cls._instance._filters: dict[str, list[tuple[int, Callable]]] = defaultdict(list)
|
||||
return cls._instance
|
||||
|
||||
def register_action(self, hook_name: str, callback: Callable, priority: int = 10) -> None:
|
||||
self._actions[hook_name].append((priority, callback))
|
||||
self._actions[hook_name].sort(key=lambda x: x[0])
|
||||
|
||||
def register_filter(self, hook_name: str, callback: Callable, priority: int = 10) -> None:
|
||||
self._filters[hook_name].append((priority, callback))
|
||||
self._filters[hook_name].sort(key=lambda x: x[0])
|
||||
|
||||
async def do_action(self, hook_name: str, *args, **kwargs) -> None:
|
||||
for _, callback in self._actions.get(hook_name, []):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
result = callback(*args, **kwargs)
|
||||
if hasattr(result, '__await__'):
|
||||
await result
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
logger.exception("Error in action %s", hook_name)
|
||||
|
||||
async def apply_filters(self, hook_name: str, value: Any, *args, **kwargs) -> Any:
|
||||
for _, callback in self._filters.get(hook_name, []):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
result = callback(value, *args, **kwargs)
|
||||
if hasattr(result, '__await__'):
|
||||
result = await result
|
||||
value = result
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
logger.exception("Error in filter %s", hook_name)
|
||||
return value
|
||||
|
||||
def unregister(self, hook_name: str, callback: Callable) -> None:
|
||||
self._actions[hook_name] = [(p, c) for p, c in self._actions.get(hook_name, []) if c != callback]
|
||||
self._filters[hook_name] = [(p, c) for p, c in self._filters.get(hook_name, []) if c != callback]
|
||||
|
||||
def unregister_all(self, hook_name: str) -> None:
|
||||
self._actions.pop(hook_name, None)
|
||||
self._filters.pop(hook_name, None)
|
||||
|
||||
def _reset_for_testing(self) -> None:
|
||||
self._actions.clear()
|
||||
self._filters.clear()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def get_hook_registry() -> HookRegistry:
|
||||
return HookRegistry()
|
||||
|
||||
async def do_action(hook_name: str, *args, **kwargs) -> None:
|
||||
await get_hook_registry().do_action(hook_name, *args, **kwargs)
|
||||
|
||||
async def apply_filters(hook_name: str, value: Any, *args, **kwargs) -> Any:
|
||||
return await get_hook_registry().apply_filters(hook_name, value, *args, **kwargs)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.2 Integration in BasePlugin (2 Std)
|
||||
|
||||
```python
|
||||
# In BasePlugin.on_activate:
|
||||
async def on_activate(self, db, service_container, event_bus) -> None:
|
||||
# ... existing code ...
|
||||
# Hooks werden in Subklassen registriert
|
||||
|
||||
# In BasePlugin.on_deactivate:
|
||||
async def on_deactivate(self, db, service_container, event_bus) -> None:
|
||||
# Alle Hooks dieses Plugins abmelden
|
||||
from app.core.hooks import get_hook_registry
|
||||
# Plugin-spezifische Hooks entfernen (prefix mit plugin name)
|
||||
# ... existing code ...
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.3 Hook-Punkte in Core-Services (6 Std)
|
||||
|
||||
| # | Service | Hook-Name | Typ | Beschreibung |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| 1 | contact_service | `contact.before_create` | Action | Vor Kontakt-Erstellung |
|
||||
| 2 | contact_service | `contact.after_create` | Action | Nach Kontakt-Erstellung |
|
||||
| 3 | contact_service | `contact.format_display_name` | Filter | Anzeigenamen formatieren |
|
||||
| 4 | contact_service | `contact.before_update` | Action | Vor Kontakt-Update |
|
||||
| 5 | contact_service | `contact.after_update` | Action | Nach Kontakt-Update |
|
||||
| 6 | contact_service | `contact.before_delete` | Action | Vor Kontakt-Löschung |
|
||||
| 7 | mail_service | `mail.before_send` | Filter | E-Mail vor Versand modifizieren |
|
||||
| 8 | mail_service | `mail.after_send` | Action | Nach E-Mail-Versand |
|
||||
| 9 | calendar | `calendar.before_appointment` | Action | Vor Termin-Erstellung |
|
||||
| 10 | calendar | `calendar.after_appointment` | Action | Nach Termin-Erstellung |
|
||||
| 11 | auth_service | `auth.before_login` | Filter | Login-Daten validieren/modifizieren |
|
||||
| 12 | auth_service | `auth.after_login` | Action | Nach erfolgreichem Login |
|
||||
| 13 | user_service | `user.before_create` | Action | Vor User-Erstellung |
|
||||
| 14 | user_service | `user.after_create` | Action | Nach User-Erstellung |
|
||||
| 15 | dms | `dms.before_upload` | Filter | Datei-Upload validieren/modifizieren |
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.4 Tests für Hooks/Filters (4 Std)
|
||||
|
||||
- `test_hooks.py` — HookRegistry Tests
|
||||
- Integrationstests: Plugin registriert Hook, Core-Service löst Hook aus
|
||||
- Filter-Tests: Wert wird korrekt modifiziert
|
||||
- Priority-Tests: Reihenfolge wird eingehalten
|
||||
- Unregister-Tests: Hooks werden bei Deaktivierung entfernt
|
||||
|
||||
### Meilenstein Phase 2:
|
||||
- ✅ `app/core/hooks.py` mit HookRegistry
|
||||
- ✅ 15 Hook-Punkte in Core-Services
|
||||
- ✅ BasePlugin registriert/unregistriert Hooks automatisch
|
||||
- ✅ Tests bestanden
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Phase 3: Plugin-Isolation (Punkt 5)
|
||||
|
||||
**Ziel:** Direkte Cross-Plugin-Imports werden durch Linting verhindert.
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.1 Linting-Regel erstellen (2 Std)
|
||||
|
||||
**Neue Datei: `.ruff/rules/no_cross_plugin_imports.py`**
|
||||
|
||||
```python
|
||||
"""Ruff rule: forbid direct imports from app.plugins.builtins.* (except contracts)."""
|
||||
|
||||
# Erlaubt:
|
||||
# from app.plugins.builtins.contracts import get_contract
|
||||
# from app.plugins.builtins.<name>.contracts import ...
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Verboten:
|
||||
# from app.plugins.builtins.<name>.services import ...
|
||||
# from app.plugins.builtins.<name>.models import ...
|
||||
# from app.plugins.builtins.<name>.routes import ...
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.2 CI/CD Integration (1 Std)
|
||||
|
||||
- `ruff check` in GitHub Actions / Forgejo CI
|
||||
- Pre-commit Hook für lokale Entwicklung
|
||||
- Fehler bei direkten Cross-Plugin-Imports
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.3 Ausnahmen definieren (1 Std)
|
||||
|
||||
- `conftest.py` — Tests dürfen direkt importieren
|
||||
- `app/plugins/builtins/__init__.py` — Plugin-Discovery
|
||||
- `app/plugins/registry.py` — Registry darf importieren
|
||||
|
||||
### Meilenstein Phase 3:
|
||||
- ✅ Linting-Regel aktiv
|
||||
- ✅ CI/CD prüft bei jedem Commit
|
||||
- ✅ 0 direkte Cross-Plugin-Imports (automatisch erzwungen)
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Phase 4: Plugin-Versioning (Punkt 8)
|
||||
|
||||
**Ziel:** Vollständige Versionsverwaltung mit SemVer, Rollback und Kompatibilitäts-Check.
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.1 SemVer-Vergleich (3 Std)
|
||||
|
||||
**Neue Datei: `app/plugins/semver.py`**
|
||||
|
||||
```python
|
||||
"""Semantic version comparison for plugin versions."""
|
||||
|
||||
from dataclasses import dataclass
|
||||
import re
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class SemVer:
|
||||
major: int
|
||||
minor: int
|
||||
patch: int
|
||||
prerelease: str = ""
|
||||
|
||||
@classmethod
|
||||
def parse(cls, version: str) -> "SemVer":
|
||||
match = re.match(r"(\d+)\.(\d+)\.(\d+)(?:-(.+))?", version)
|
||||
if not match:
|
||||
raise ValueError(f"Invalid semver: {version}")
|
||||
return cls(int(match[1]), int(match[2]), int(match[3]), match[4] or "")
|
||||
|
||||
def __lt__(self, other): ...
|
||||
def __eq__(self, other): ...
|
||||
def __le__(self, other): ...
|
||||
def __gt__(self, other): ...
|
||||
|
||||
def is_breaking_change(self, other: "SemVer") -> bool:
|
||||
return self.major != other.major
|
||||
|
||||
def is_compatible_with(self, min_version: "SemVer") -> bool:
|
||||
return self >= min_version
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Änderung in `registry.py`:**
|
||||
```python
|
||||
# VORHER: String-Vergleich
|
||||
if record.version != plugin.manifest.version:
|
||||
|
||||
# NACHHER: SemVer-Vergleich
|
||||
old_ver = SemVer.parse(record.version)
|
||||
new_ver = SemVer.parse(plugin.manifest.version)
|
||||
if old_ver != new_ver:
|
||||
if new_ver < old_ver:
|
||||
# Downgrade — nur mit Rollback-Migration
|
||||
...
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.2 Rollback-Migrationen (6 Std)
|
||||
|
||||
**Erweiterung des Migration-Systems:**
|
||||
|
||||
```python
|
||||
# MigrationRunner erweitern:
|
||||
async def run_migration_down(self, db, plugin_name, migration_filename):
|
||||
"""Run rollback (down) migration."""
|
||||
# Suche <filename>_down.sql oder parse DOWNGRADE-Block
|
||||
|
||||
async def rollback_to_version(self, db, plugin_name, target_version: str):
|
||||
"""Rollback plugin to a specific version."""
|
||||
# 1. Finde alle Migrationen nach target_version
|
||||
# 2. Führe sie in umgekehrter Reihenfolge aus
|
||||
# 3. Aktualisiere DB-Version
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Migration-Datei-Format:**
|
||||
```sql
|
||||
-- 0001_initial.sql
|
||||
-- UP:
|
||||
CREATE TABLE ...;
|
||||
-- DOWN:
|
||||
DROP TABLE ... CASCADE;
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Oder separate Dateien:
|
||||
- `0001_initial_up.sql`
|
||||
- `0001_initial_down.sql`
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.3 Version-Kompatibilitäts-Check (3 Std)
|
||||
|
||||
**Manifest-Erweiterung:**
|
||||
```python
|
||||
class PluginManifest(BaseModel):
|
||||
# ... existing fields ...
|
||||
min_app_version: str = Field(
|
||||
default="0.0.0",
|
||||
description="Minimum LeoCRM version required"
|
||||
)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Check bei Installation:**
|
||||
```python
|
||||
async def install(self, db, name):
|
||||
plugin = self.get_plugin(name)
|
||||
# Check app version compatibility
|
||||
app_version = SemVer.parse(settings.app_version)
|
||||
min_version = SemVer.parse(plugin.manifest.min_app_version)
|
||||
if app_version < min_version:
|
||||
raise ValueError(
|
||||
f"Plugin '{name}' requires LeoCRM >= {plugin.manifest.min_app_version}, "
|
||||
f"but current version is {settings.app_version}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.4 Update-Benachrichtigung im Frontend (4 Std)
|
||||
|
||||
**Backend:**
|
||||
- `GET /api/v1/plugins/updates` — Liste Plugins mit verfügbarer neuer Version
|
||||
- Vergleich mit Marketplace-Registry (wenn verfügbar) oder lokaler Version
|
||||
|
||||
**Frontend:**
|
||||
- Badge im Plugin-Settings: "Update verfügbar (1.2.0 → 1.3.0)"
|
||||
- Update-Button: Löst Update aus (führt neue Migrationen aus)
|
||||
- Changelog-Anzeige (optional)
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.5 Tests (4 Std)
|
||||
|
||||
- `test_semver.py` — SemVer-Vergleich, Parse, Edge Cases
|
||||
- `test_versioning.py` — Upgrade, Downgrade, Kompatibilitäts-Check
|
||||
- `test_rollback.py` — Rollback-Migrationen
|
||||
- Integrationstests: Version-Update löst Migrationen aus
|
||||
|
||||
### Meilenstein Phase 4:
|
||||
- ✅ SemVer-Vergleich statt String-Vergleich
|
||||
- ✅ Rollback-Migrationen funktionieren
|
||||
- ✅ min_app_version wird geprüft
|
||||
- ✅ Frontend zeigt Update-Benachrichtigungen
|
||||
- ✅ Tests bestanden
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Phase 5: Marketplace-Vorbereitung (Punkt 6)
|
||||
|
||||
**Ziel:** Code so vorbereiten, dass ein Marketplace nur noch gebaut werden muss — ohne Systemänderungen.
|
||||
|
||||
**Wichtig:** Funktioniert auch OHNE Marketplace — Built-in Plugins laufen normal weiter.
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.1 Externe Plugin-Discovery (6 Std)
|
||||
|
||||
**Erweiterung `registry.py`:**
|
||||
|
||||
```python
|
||||
class PluginRegistry:
|
||||
|
||||
def discover_all(self) -> list[str]:
|
||||
"""Discover built-in AND external plugins."""
|
||||
discovered = self.discover_builtins()
|
||||
discovered.extend(self.discover_external())
|
||||
return discovered
|
||||
|
||||
def discover_external(self) -> list[str]:
|
||||
"""Discover plugins from external plugins/ directory."""
|
||||
external_dir = Path(settings.external_plugins_path or "plugins")
|
||||
if not external_dir.exists():
|
||||
return []
|
||||
|
||||
discovered = []
|
||||
for plugin_dir in external_dir.iterdir():
|
||||
if not plugin_dir.is_dir() or plugin_dir.name.startswith("_"):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
# Look for plugin.py or __init__.py with BasePlugin subclass
|
||||
plugin_file = plugin_dir / "plugin.py"
|
||||
if not plugin_file.exists():
|
||||
continue
|
||||
# Import and register
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0, str(external_dir))
|
||||
try:
|
||||
module = importlib.import_module(f"{plugin_dir.name}.plugin")
|
||||
# ... find BasePlugin subclass ...
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
sys.path.remove(str(external_dir))
|
||||
return discovered
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.2 Plugin-Signatur-Validierung (8 Std)
|
||||
|
||||
**Neue Datei: `app/plugins/signature.py`**
|
||||
|
||||
```python
|
||||
"""Plugin signature verification for external plugins."""
|
||||
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
import hashlib
|
||||
import hmac
|
||||
|
||||
# Ed25519 oder HMAC-SHA256 Signatur
|
||||
|
||||
class PluginSignature:
|
||||
"""Verify plugin package signatures."""
|
||||
|
||||
@staticmethod
|
||||
def verify_signature(zip_path: Path, signature: bytes, public_key: bytes) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Verify Ed25519 signature of plugin ZIP."""
|
||||
# 1. Read ZIP content
|
||||
# 2. Compute hash
|
||||
# 3. Verify signature with public key
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
@staticmethod
|
||||
def compute_hash(zip_path: Path) -> bytes:
|
||||
"""Compute SHA-256 hash of plugin ZIP."""
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
@staticmethod
|
||||
def sign_plugin(zip_path: Path, private_key: bytes) -> bytes:
|
||||
"""Sign a plugin ZIP (for plugin authors)."""
|
||||
pass
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.3 Plugin-Allowlist (4 Std)
|
||||
|
||||
**Neue Alembic-Migration: `0044_plugin_allowlist.py`**
|
||||
|
||||
```python
|
||||
# Tabelle: plugin_allowlist
|
||||
# - id: UUID
|
||||
# - plugin_name: VARCHAR(80)
|
||||
# - allowed_hash: VARCHAR(64) # SHA-256
|
||||
# - allowed_signature: TEXT # Ed25519 signature
|
||||
# - added_by: UUID (user)
|
||||
# - created_at: TIMESTAMPTZ
|
||||
# - is_active: BOOLEAN
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.4 Plugin-Metadata-Erweiterung (4 Std)
|
||||
|
||||
**Manifest-Erweiterung:**
|
||||
```python
|
||||
class PluginManifest(BaseModel):
|
||||
# ... existing fields ...
|
||||
author: str = Field(default="", description="Plugin author")
|
||||
author_email: str = Field(default="", description="Author contact")
|
||||
homepage: str = Field(default="", description="Plugin homepage URL")
|
||||
license: str = Field(default="MIT", description="License")
|
||||
min_app_version: str = Field(default="0.0.0")
|
||||
icon: str = Field(default="", description="Icon URL or emoji")
|
||||
screenshots: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list)
|
||||
changelog: str = Field(default="", description="Changelog URL or text")
|
||||
tags: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list, description="Marketplace categories")
|
||||
price: float = Field(default=0.0, description="Price (0 = free)")
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.5 Plugin-Download-Endpoint (4 Std)
|
||||
|
||||
**Neue Route: `POST /api/v1/plugins/install-marketplace`**
|
||||
|
||||
```python
|
||||
@router.post("/install-marketplace")
|
||||
async def install_from_marketplace(
|
||||
body: MarketplaceInstall,
|
||||
db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
|
||||
current_user: dict = Depends(require_permission("plugins:configure")),
|
||||
):
|
||||
"""Install a plugin from the marketplace.
|
||||
|
||||
1. Download ZIP from marketplace URL
|
||||
2. Verify signature against allowlist
|
||||
3. Validate manifest
|
||||
4. Check dangerous imports
|
||||
5. Validate migration SQL
|
||||
6. Install (migrations + DB record)
|
||||
7. Activate (optional)
|
||||
"""
|
||||
# 1. Download
|
||||
async with httpx.AsyncClient() as client:
|
||||
resp = await client.get(body.url)
|
||||
zip_data = resp.content
|
||||
|
||||
# 2. Verify signature
|
||||
if not PluginSignature.verify_signature(zip_data, body.signature, public_key):
|
||||
raise HTTPException(403, "Invalid plugin signature")
|
||||
|
||||
# 3-6. Validate and install
|
||||
# ... (reuse existing validation + install logic)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.6 Plugin-Update-Check (4 Std)
|
||||
|
||||
```python
|
||||
@router.get("/updates")
|
||||
async def check_plugin_updates(
|
||||
db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
|
||||
current_user: dict = Depends(require_permission("plugins:read")),
|
||||
):
|
||||
"""Check for available plugin updates from marketplace."""
|
||||
# 1. Query marketplace registry (if configured)
|
||||
# 2. Compare versions with installed plugins
|
||||
# 3. Return list of available updates
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.7 Plugin-Quarantine (4 Std)
|
||||
|
||||
```python
|
||||
async def _quarantine_plugin(zip_path: Path) -> Path:
|
||||
"""Extract plugin to temp dir, validate, then move to plugins/ dir.
|
||||
|
||||
1. Extract to /tmp/plugin_upload_<uuid>/
|
||||
2. Validate manifest exists
|
||||
3. Check dangerous imports
|
||||
4. Validate migration SQL
|
||||
5. Check signature
|
||||
6. If all OK: move to plugins/ dir
|
||||
7. If any fail: delete temp dir, raise error
|
||||
"""
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.8 Tests (8 Std)
|
||||
|
||||
- `test_marketplace.py` — Download, Verify, Install Flow
|
||||
- `test_signature.py` — Signatur-Validierung
|
||||
- `test_allowlist.py` — Allowlist-Management
|
||||
- `test_quarantine.py` — Quarantine-Validierung
|
||||
- `test_external_discovery.py` — Externe Plugin-Discovery
|
||||
- Integrationstests: Vollständiger Marketplace-Flow
|
||||
|
||||
### Meilenstein Phase 5:
|
||||
- ✅ Externe Plugins können entdeckt werden
|
||||
- ✅ Signatur-Validierung funktioniert
|
||||
- ✅ Allowlist schützt vor nicht autorisierten Plugins
|
||||
- ✅ Marketplace-Endpoint ist vorbereitet (deaktiviert bis Marketplace live)
|
||||
- ✅ Plugin-Upload bleibt deaktiviert
|
||||
- ✅ Built-in Plugins laufen ohne Marketplace
|
||||
- ✅ Tests bestanden
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Zeitplan
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Woche 1 (Tag 1-5): Phase 1 — Contracts (Teil 1: contracts.py + Imports)
|
||||
Woche 2 (Tag 6-8): Phase 1 — Contracts (Teil 2: Deaktivierung + Tests)
|
||||
(Tag 9-10): Phase 2 — Hooks/Filters-System
|
||||
Woche 3 (Tag 11): Phase 3 — Plugin-Isolation
|
||||
(Tag 12-14): Phase 4 — Plugin-Versioning
|
||||
Woche 4 (Tag 15-19): Phase 5 — Marketplace-Vorbereitung
|
||||
(Tag 20): Puffer / Bugfixes / Doku
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Abhängigkeiten
|
||||
```
|
||||
Phase 1 (Contracts) ──→ Phase 3 (Isolation: Linting braucht Contracts als Ausnahme)
|
||||
│
|
||||
└──→ Phase 2 (Hooks: unabhängig, kann parallel)
|
||||
│
|
||||
└──→ Phase 4 (Versioning: braucht Contracts für min_app_version)
|
||||
│
|
||||
└──→ Phase 5 (Marketplace: braucht alles)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Parallelisierungsmöglichkeiten
|
||||
- Phase 1 und Phase 2 können **parallel** laufen (verschiedene Entwickler)
|
||||
- Phase 3 kann erst nach Phase 1 starten
|
||||
- Phase 4 kann nach Phase 1 starten
|
||||
- Phase 5 kann erst nach Phase 1+4 starten
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Risiken
|
||||
|
||||
| Risiko | Wahrscheinlichkeit | Auswirkung | Mitigation |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Contract-Refactoring bricht bestehende Funktionalität | Mittel | Hoch | Tests nach jedem Plugin, schrittweise Migration |
|
||||
| Hooks/Filters verändern Core-Verhalten | Niedrig | Mittel | Tests für alle Hook-Punkte, Priority-System |
|
||||
| Externe Plugin-Discovery hat Sicherheitslücken | Mittel | Hoch | Signatur-Validierung, Quarantine, Allowlist |
|
||||
| SemVer-Parse-Fehler bei bestehenden Versionen | Niedrig | Niedrig | Fallback auf String-Vergleich |
|
||||
| Rollback-Migrationen löschen Daten | Mittel | Hoch | Bestätigungs-Prompt, Backup vor Rollback |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Erfolgskriterien
|
||||
|
||||
Nach Abschluss aller 5 Phasen:
|
||||
|
||||
1. ✅ **0 direkte Cross-Plugin-Imports** (grep-verifiziert, linting-enforced)
|
||||
2. ✅ **Alle 16 Plugins haben contracts.py** mit klarer öffentlicher API
|
||||
3. ✅ **Contracts werden bei Deaktivierung abgemeldet**
|
||||
4. ✅ **Hooks/Filters-System** mit 15+ Hook-Punkten in Core-Services
|
||||
5. ✅ **Plugin-Isolation** durch Linting-Regeln erzwungen
|
||||
6. ✅ **SemVer-Vergleich** statt String-Vergleich
|
||||
7. ✅ **Rollback-Migrationen** für alle Plugins verfügbar
|
||||
8. ✅ **min_app_version** wird bei Installation geprüft
|
||||
9. ✅ **Update-Benachrichtigung** im Frontend
|
||||
10. ✅ **Marketplace-Endpoint** vorbereitet (deaktiviert)
|
||||
11. ✅ **Signatur-Validierung** für externe Plugins
|
||||
12. ✅ **Allowlist** schützt vor nicht autorisierten Plugins
|
||||
13. ✅ **Externe Plugin-Discovery** funktioniert
|
||||
14. ✅ **Alle Tests bestanden**
|
||||
15. ✅ **Built-in Plugins laufen ohne Marketplace**
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Dokumentation
|
||||
|
||||
Nach Abschluss jeder Phase:
|
||||
- `docs/plugin-system/phase-N.md` — Was wurde gemacht, was geändert
|
||||
- `docs/plugin-system/contracts-api.md` — Contract-API Referenz
|
||||
- `docs/plugin-system/hooks-api.md` — Hooks/Filters Referenz
|
||||
- `docs/plugin-system/marketplace-api.md` — Marketplace-API Referenz
|
||||
- `docs/plugin-system/plugin-development-guide.md` — Wie man ein Plugin entwickelt
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
**Dieser Plan ist vollständig. Alle Aufgaben, Aufwände, Abhängigkeiten und Risiken sind erfasst.**
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
|
||||
"""RLS repair + separate DB runtime user.
|
||||
|
||||
Revision ID: 0044
|
||||
Revises: 0043
|
||||
Created: 2026-07-26
|
||||
|
||||
This migration:
|
||||
1. Re-discovers ALL tenant-scoped tables and ensures RLS is enabled
|
||||
with FORCE + WITH CHECK (covers tables added after migration 0028).
|
||||
2. Creates a separate ``crm_runtime`` role with NOSUPERUSER and
|
||||
NOBYPASSRLS so the application cannot bypass RLS.
|
||||
3. Grants only DML permissions (SELECT/INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE) to
|
||||
``crm_runtime`` on all tenant-scoped tables.
|
||||
|
||||
IMPORTANT: After this migration, the application's DATABASE_URL must
|
||||
use ``crm_runtime`` (not the superuser) for API and worker containers.
|
||||
Migration/DDL operations continue to use the owner user (crm_user).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from alembic import op
|
||||
import sqlalchemy as sa
|
||||
import logging
|
||||
|
||||
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
|
||||
|
||||
revision = "0044"
|
||||
down_revision = "0043"
|
||||
branch_labels = None
|
||||
depends_on = None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _discover_tenant_tables(conn) -> list[str]:
|
||||
"""Return all table names in the public schema that have a tenant_id column."""
|
||||
result = conn.execute(
|
||||
sa.text(
|
||||
"SELECT table_name FROM information_schema.columns "
|
||||
"WHERE table_schema = 'public' AND column_name = 'tenant_id' "
|
||||
"ORDER BY table_name"
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
return [row[0] for row in result]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _discover_existing_policies(conn, table_name: str) -> list[str]:
|
||||
"""Return all policy names on *table_name* that contain 'tenant' or 'isolation'."""
|
||||
result = conn.execute(
|
||||
sa.text(
|
||||
"SELECT policyname FROM pg_policies "
|
||||
"WHERE schemaname = 'public' AND tablename = :t "
|
||||
"AND (policyname LIKE '%tenant%' OR policyname LIKE '%isolation%')"
|
||||
),
|
||||
{"t": table_name},
|
||||
)
|
||||
return [row[0] for row in result]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def upgrade() -> None:
|
||||
conn = op.get_bind()
|
||||
|
||||
# ── 1. RLS Repair: ensure all tenant tables have RLS + WITH CHECK ──
|
||||
tenant_tables = _discover_tenant_tables(conn)
|
||||
logger.info("RLS repair: discovered %d tenant-scoped tables: %s", len(tenant_tables), tenant_tables)
|
||||
|
||||
for table_name in tenant_tables:
|
||||
# Enable RLS
|
||||
op.execute(f'ALTER TABLE "{table_name}" ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY')
|
||||
# Force RLS (applies to table owner too)
|
||||
op.execute(f'ALTER TABLE "{table_name}" FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY')
|
||||
|
||||
# Drop existing tenant policies
|
||||
existing_policies = _discover_existing_policies(conn, table_name)
|
||||
for policy_name in existing_policies:
|
||||
op.execute(f'DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "{policy_name}" ON "{table_name}"')
|
||||
logger.info("Dropped policy %s on %s", policy_name, table_name)
|
||||
|
||||
# Create unified tenant isolation policy with WITH CHECK
|
||||
op.execute(
|
||||
f'CREATE POLICY tenant_isolation ON "{table_name}" '
|
||||
f"USING (tenant_id = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true)::uuid) "
|
||||
f"WITH CHECK (tenant_id = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true)::uuid)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
logger.info("Created/updated tenant_isolation policy on %s (USING + WITH CHECK)", table_name)
|
||||
|
||||
# ── 2. Create crm_runtime role (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS) ──
|
||||
# Use DO block for idempotent creation
|
||||
op.execute(
|
||||
sa.text(
|
||||
"DO $$ "
|
||||
"BEGIN "
|
||||
" IF NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = 'crm_runtime') THEN "
|
||||
" CREATE ROLE crm_runtime LOGIN NOSUPERUSER NOCREATEDB NOCREATEROLE "
|
||||
" NOREPLICATION NOBYPASSRLS; "
|
||||
" END IF; "
|
||||
"END $$;"
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
logger.info("Ensured crm_runtime role exists (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS)")
|
||||
|
||||
# ── 3. Grant DML permissions to crm_runtime on all tenant tables ──
|
||||
for table_name in tenant_tables:
|
||||
op.execute(
|
||||
f'GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "{table_name}" TO crm_runtime'
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Grant usage on sequences (for SERIAL/IDENTITY columns)
|
||||
op.execute("GRANT USAGE, SELECT ON ALL SEQUENCES IN SCHEMA public TO crm_runtime")
|
||||
|
||||
logger.info("Granted DML permissions to crm_runtime on %d tables", len(tenant_tables))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def downgrade() -> None:
|
||||
conn = op.get_bind()
|
||||
|
||||
# Revoke permissions from crm_runtime
|
||||
tenant_tables = _discover_tenant_tables(conn)
|
||||
for table_name in tenant_tables:
|
||||
op.execute(f'REVOKE SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "{table_name}" FROM crm_runtime')
|
||||
op.execute("REVOKE USAGE, SELECT ON ALL SEQUENCES IN SCHEMA public FROM crm_runtime")
|
||||
|
||||
# Drop crm_runtime role
|
||||
op.execute("DROP ROLE IF EXISTS crm_runtime")
|
||||
logger.info("Dropped crm_runtime role")
|
||||
|
||||
# Note: RLS policies are NOT reverted here to avoid weakening security.
|
||||
# Migration 0028's downgrade handles the original set of tables.
|
||||
@@ -57,6 +57,9 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
|
||||
# CORS
|
||||
cors_origins: str = "http://localhost:5173,http://localhost:3000"
|
||||
|
||||
# Frontend URL for email links (password reset, invitations, etc.)
|
||||
frontend_url: str = "http://localhost:5173"
|
||||
|
||||
# Rate Limiting
|
||||
rate_limit_login_max: int = 5
|
||||
rate_limit_login_window: int = 900 # 15 min
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -91,11 +91,6 @@ def hash_token(token: str) -> str:
|
||||
return hashlib.sha256(token.encode()).hexdigest()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def get_redis() -> aioredis.Redis:
|
||||
"""Get a Redis client instance."""
|
||||
return aioredis.from_url(get_settings().redis_url, decode_responses=True)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def create_session(
|
||||
db: AsyncSession,
|
||||
redis: aioredis.Redis,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -80,3 +80,72 @@ async def get_job_status(job_id: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
"start_time": job_info.start_time.isoformat() if job_info.start_time else None,
|
||||
"finish_time": job_info.finish_time.isoformat() if job_info.finish_time else None,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Password Reset Email Job ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
async def send_password_reset_email(
|
||||
ctx: dict[str, Any],
|
||||
*,
|
||||
user_id: str,
|
||||
email: str,
|
||||
raw_token: str,
|
||||
expires_at: str,
|
||||
) -> None:
|
||||
"""Send a password reset email via SMTP.
|
||||
|
||||
This is an ARQ worker function. It is registered with the job registry
|
||||
so the worker can execute it when the auth service enqueues it.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
import aiosmtplib
|
||||
from email.mime.text import MIMEText
|
||||
from email.mime.multipart import MIMEMultipart
|
||||
|
||||
settings = get_settings()
|
||||
|
||||
# Build the reset URL
|
||||
reset_url = f"{settings.frontend_url.rstrip('/')}/reset-password?token={raw_token}"
|
||||
|
||||
# Build the email
|
||||
msg = MIMEMultipart("alternative")
|
||||
msg["From"] = settings.smtp_from_email
|
||||
msg["To"] = email
|
||||
msg["Subject"] = "LeoCRM — Passwort zurücksetzen"
|
||||
|
||||
text_body = (
|
||||
f"Sie haben angefordert, Ihr Passwort zurückzusetzen.\n\n"
|
||||
f"Klicken Sie auf den folgenden Link, um ein neues Passwort zu setzen:\n"
|
||||
f"{reset_url}\n\n"
|
||||
f"Dieser Link ist gültig bis {expires_at}.\n\n"
|
||||
f"Falls Sie diese Anfrage nicht gestellt haben, können Sie diese\n"
|
||||
f"E-Mail ignorieren. Ihr Passwort bleibt unverändert.\n"
|
||||
)
|
||||
html_body = (
|
||||
f"<html><body>"
|
||||
f"<h2>Passwort zurücksetzen</h2>"
|
||||
f"<p>Sie haben angefordert, Ihr Passwort zurückzusetzen.</p>"
|
||||
f"<p><a href=\"{reset_url}\">Passwort jetzt zurücksetzen</a></p>"
|
||||
f"<p>Dieser Link ist gültig bis {expires_at}.</p>"
|
||||
f"<p>Falls Sie diese Anfrage nicht gestellt haben, können Sie diese "
|
||||
f"E-Mail ignorieren. Ihr Passwort bleibt unverändert.</p>"
|
||||
f"</body></html>"
|
||||
)
|
||||
msg.attach(MIMEText(text_body, "plain", "utf-8"))
|
||||
msg.attach(MIMEText(html_body, "html", "utf-8"))
|
||||
|
||||
# Send via SMTP
|
||||
await aiosmtplib.send(
|
||||
msg,
|
||||
hostname=settings.smtp_host,
|
||||
port=settings.smtp_port,
|
||||
username=settings.smtp_username,
|
||||
password=settings.smtp_password,
|
||||
start_tls=settings.smtp_use_tls,
|
||||
)
|
||||
logger.info("Password reset email sent to %s for user %s", email, user_id)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Register the job so the worker can find it
|
||||
from app.core.job_registry import register_job # noqa: E402
|
||||
|
||||
register_job("send_password_reset_email", send_password_reset_email)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,14 +1,19 @@
|
||||
"""Plugin error isolation wrapper."""
|
||||
import logging
|
||||
import functools
|
||||
from fastapi import UploadFile as _UploadFile # noqa: F401 — needed for ForwardRef resolution
|
||||
from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
|
||||
|
||||
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def wrap_plugin_route(handler):
|
||||
"""Decorator that isolates plugin route errors and returns structured JSON."""
|
||||
@functools.wraps(handler)
|
||||
"""Decorator that isolates plugin route errors and returns structured JSON.
|
||||
|
||||
Does NOT use functools.wraps to avoid copying __annotations__ and
|
||||
__wrapped__ — FastAPI would otherwise try to resolve
|
||||
``ForwardRef('UploadFile')`` from the original handler's signature.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
async def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
return await handler(*args, **kwargs)
|
||||
@@ -18,4 +23,8 @@ def wrap_plugin_route(handler):
|
||||
status_code=500,
|
||||
content={'detail': f'Plugin error: {exc}', 'code': 'plugin_error'}
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Preserve identity for debugging but NOT __wrapped__ or __annotations__
|
||||
wrapper.__name__ = getattr(handler, '__name__', 'wrapper')
|
||||
wrapper.__module__ = getattr(handler, '__module__', __name__)
|
||||
wrapper.__qualname__ = getattr(handler, '__qualname__', 'wrapper')
|
||||
return wrapper
|
||||
|
||||
+52
-2
@@ -90,11 +90,59 @@ def _get_redis_settings() -> RedisSettings:
|
||||
async def on_startup(ctx: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
|
||||
"""Called when worker starts."""
|
||||
logger.info("ARQ worker starting...")
|
||||
|
||||
# Initialize Redis singleton (same as API lifespan)
|
||||
from app.core.auth import init_redis
|
||||
await init_redis()
|
||||
|
||||
# Initialize service container
|
||||
from app.core.service_container import get_container
|
||||
container = get_container()
|
||||
await container.initialize()
|
||||
|
||||
# Initialize plugin registry and discover built-in plugins
|
||||
from app.plugins.registry import get_registry
|
||||
from app.core.db import get_engine
|
||||
from app.core.event_bus import get_event_bus
|
||||
from app.core.webhook_dispatcher import register_webhook_event_handlers
|
||||
from sqlalchemy import select as sa_select
|
||||
from app.models.plugin import Plugin as PluginModel
|
||||
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import async_sessionmaker
|
||||
|
||||
registry = get_registry()
|
||||
registry.initialize(get_engine(), app=None)
|
||||
registry.discover_builtins()
|
||||
|
||||
event_bus = get_event_bus()
|
||||
async_session = async_sessionmaker(get_engine(), expire_on_commit=False)
|
||||
|
||||
# Activate plugins that are marked active in DB (register event handlers)
|
||||
async with async_session() as db:
|
||||
for name in registry.resolve_load_order():
|
||||
plugin = registry.get_plugin(name)
|
||||
if plugin is None:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
result = await db.execute(
|
||||
sa_select(PluginModel).where(PluginModel.name == name)
|
||||
)
|
||||
plugin_record = result.scalar_one_or_none()
|
||||
if plugin_record is None or not plugin_record.active:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
try:
|
||||
await plugin.on_activate(db, container, event_bus)
|
||||
logger.info(f"Worker: activated plugin {name}")
|
||||
except Exception as exc:
|
||||
logger.error(f"Worker: failed to activate plugin {name}: {exc}")
|
||||
await db.commit()
|
||||
|
||||
# Register webhook dispatcher on the event bus
|
||||
register_webhook_event_handlers(event_bus)
|
||||
logger.info("Worker: webhook event handlers registered")
|
||||
|
||||
# Register search providers (normally done by app startup)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
from app.core.db import get_session_factory
|
||||
from app.plugins.builtins.unified_search.provider_registry import auto_register_providers
|
||||
factory = get_session_factory()
|
||||
factory = async_session
|
||||
async with factory() as db:
|
||||
await auto_register_providers(db)
|
||||
logger.info("Search providers registered for worker")
|
||||
@@ -105,6 +153,8 @@ async def on_startup(ctx: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
|
||||
async def on_shutdown(ctx: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
|
||||
"""Called when worker shuts down."""
|
||||
logger.info("ARQ worker shutting down...")
|
||||
from app.core.auth import close_redis
|
||||
await close_redis()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
+31
@@ -224,3 +224,34 @@ async def get_current_user_id(
|
||||
) -> uuid.UUID:
|
||||
"""Extract user_id from current user session."""
|
||||
return uuid.UUID(current_user["user_id"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def require_active_plugin(plugin_name: str):
|
||||
"""FastAPI dependency factory: require that a plugin is active.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns 403 if the plugin is not active in the permission registry.
|
||||
This allows routes to be registered at app creation time while
|
||||
enforcing activation status at request time.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
async def _check(
|
||||
current_user: dict[str, Any] = Depends(get_current_user),
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
from app.core.permission_registry import get_permission_registry
|
||||
try:
|
||||
registry = get_permission_registry()
|
||||
if not registry.is_plugin_active(plugin_name):
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
|
||||
detail={
|
||||
"detail": f"Plugin '{plugin_name}' is not active",
|
||||
"code": "plugin_inactive",
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
except HTTPException:
|
||||
raise
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
# If registry not initialized yet, allow request (startup race)
|
||||
pass
|
||||
return current_user
|
||||
|
||||
return _check
|
||||
|
||||
+15
-5
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ import time
|
||||
import traceback
|
||||
from contextlib import asynccontextmanager
|
||||
|
||||
from fastapi import FastAPI, HTTPException, Request
|
||||
from fastapi import FastAPI, HTTPException, Request, Depends
|
||||
from fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware
|
||||
from fastapi.responses import FileResponse, JSONResponse
|
||||
from fastapi.staticfiles import StaticFiles
|
||||
@@ -208,6 +208,11 @@ async def lifespan(app: FastAPI):
|
||||
init_permission_registry(active_plugin_names)
|
||||
logger.info("Permission registry initialized with %d active plugins", len(active_plugin_names))
|
||||
|
||||
# Register webhook dispatcher on the event bus
|
||||
from app.core.webhook_dispatcher import register_webhook_event_handlers
|
||||
register_webhook_event_handlers(event_bus)
|
||||
logger.info("Webhook event handlers registered")
|
||||
|
||||
# Register field definitions from active plugins only
|
||||
from app.core.permission_registry import get_permission_registry
|
||||
for name in active_plugin_names:
|
||||
@@ -368,9 +373,10 @@ def create_app() -> FastAPI:
|
||||
app.include_router(errors.router)
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Register plugin routes for all built-in plugins ──
|
||||
# Routes are registered here (before app start); activation status
|
||||
# is enforced at runtime via require_permission and plugin checks.
|
||||
# Routes are registered at app creation time so OpenAPI docs are complete.
|
||||
# Activation status is enforced per-request via require_active_plugin().
|
||||
import importlib
|
||||
from app.deps import require_active_plugin
|
||||
# Discover all built-in plugin modules and register their routes
|
||||
plugin_modules = [
|
||||
"app.plugins.builtins.tags",
|
||||
@@ -399,6 +405,7 @@ def create_app() -> FastAPI:
|
||||
for attr_name in dir(mod):
|
||||
attr = getattr(mod, attr_name)
|
||||
if isinstance(attr, type) and hasattr(attr, "manifest") and hasattr(attr.manifest, "routes"):
|
||||
plugin_name = getattr(attr.manifest, "name", mod_name.split(".")[-1])
|
||||
for route_def in attr.manifest.routes:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
router_module = importlib.import_module(route_def.module)
|
||||
@@ -407,13 +414,16 @@ def create_app() -> FastAPI:
|
||||
for route in router.routes:
|
||||
if hasattr(route, 'endpoint'):
|
||||
route.endpoint = wrap_plugin_route(route.endpoint)
|
||||
app.include_router(router)
|
||||
# Add active-plugin check as a router-level dependency
|
||||
app.include_router(
|
||||
router,
|
||||
dependencies=[Depends(require_active_plugin(plugin_name))],
|
||||
)
|
||||
except Exception as exc:
|
||||
logger.error(f"Failed to register route {route_def.module}.{route_def.router_attr}: {exc}")
|
||||
break
|
||||
except Exception as exc:
|
||||
logger.error(f"Failed to register plugin routes for {mod_name}: {exc}")
|
||||
# Do NOT register plugin routes here — lifespan() handles it for active plugins only
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Serve frontend static files (SPA) ──────────────────────────────
|
||||
# Mount built frontend assets (JS, CSS, images)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
import uuid
|
||||
from datetime import datetime
|
||||
|
||||
from sqlalchemy import BigInteger, DateTime, String, Text
|
||||
from sqlalchemy import BigInteger, DateTime, String, Text, func
|
||||
from sqlalchemy.dialects.postgresql import UUID as PGUUID
|
||||
from sqlalchemy.orm import Mapped, mapped_column
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ class Backup(Base, TenantMixin):
|
||||
PGUUID(as_uuid=True), nullable=True
|
||||
)
|
||||
created_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(
|
||||
DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False, default=datetime.utcnow
|
||||
DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False, server_default=func.now()
|
||||
)
|
||||
completed_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(
|
||||
DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True, default=None
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ class Notification(Base, TenantMixin):
|
||||
user_id: Mapped[uuid.UUID] = mapped_column(
|
||||
PGUUID(as_uuid=True), ForeignKey("users.id", ondelete="CASCADE"), nullable=False, index=True
|
||||
)
|
||||
type: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(20), nullable=False)
|
||||
type: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(100), nullable=False)
|
||||
title: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(200), nullable=False)
|
||||
body: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(Text, nullable=True)
|
||||
read_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True)
|
||||
@@ -83,5 +83,5 @@ class NotificationPreference(Base, TenantMixin):
|
||||
ForeignKey("users.id", ondelete="CASCADE"),
|
||||
nullable=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
type_key: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(20), nullable=False)
|
||||
type_key: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(100), nullable=False)
|
||||
is_enabled: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, nullable=False, default=True)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import uuid
|
||||
from datetime import datetime
|
||||
|
||||
from sqlalchemy import DateTime, ForeignKey, Index, Integer, String
|
||||
from sqlalchemy.dialects.postgresql import JSONB
|
||||
from sqlalchemy.dialects.postgresql import UUID as PGUUID
|
||||
from sqlalchemy.orm import Mapped, mapped_column
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -51,5 +52,4 @@ class SystemSettings(Base, TenantMixin):
|
||||
theme_font_family: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(100), nullable=False, default="Inter")
|
||||
theme_border_radius: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(20), nullable=False, default="0.5rem")
|
||||
# Automation plugin settings (JSONB)
|
||||
from sqlalchemy.dialects.postgresql import JSONB
|
||||
automation_config: Mapped[dict | None] = mapped_column(JSONB, nullable=True)
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-1
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import uuid
|
||||
from datetime import datetime
|
||||
from decimal import Decimal
|
||||
|
||||
from sqlalchemy import Boolean, DateTime, Index, Numeric, String
|
||||
from sqlalchemy.dialects.postgresql import UUID as PGUUID
|
||||
@@ -25,6 +26,6 @@ class TaxRate(Base, TenantMixin):
|
||||
PGUUID(as_uuid=True), primary_key=True, default=uuid.uuid4
|
||||
)
|
||||
name: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(100), nullable=False)
|
||||
rate: Mapped[float] = mapped_column(Numeric(5, 2), nullable=False)
|
||||
rate: Mapped[Decimal] = mapped_column(Numeric(5, 2), nullable=False)
|
||||
is_default: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, nullable=False, default=False)
|
||||
country: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String(2), nullable=True)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -41,3 +41,8 @@ class Webhook(Base, TenantMixin):
|
||||
updated_by: Mapped[uuid.UUID | None] = mapped_column(
|
||||
PGUUID(as_uuid=True), nullable=True
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@property
|
||||
def has_secret(self) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Return True if a webhook secret is set (never expose the secret itself)."""
|
||||
return self.secret is not None and len(self.secret) > 0
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -698,7 +698,7 @@ ATTACHMENT_DIR = Path(os.environ.get("STORAGE_PATH", "/data/storage")) / "ai_att
|
||||
MAX_ATTACHMENT_SIZE = 25 * 1024 * 1024 # 25MB
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.post("/sessions/{session_id}/attachments", dependencies=[Depends(require_permission("ai:write"))])
|
||||
@router.post("/sessions/{session_id}/attachments", response_model=None, dependencies=[Depends(require_permission("ai:write"))])
|
||||
async def upload_attachment(
|
||||
session_id: str,
|
||||
file: UploadFile,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -820,7 +820,7 @@ async def ics_feed(
|
||||
return Response(content=ics_content, media_type="text/calendar")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.post("/calendar/import", dependencies=[Depends(require_permission("calendar:write"))])
|
||||
@router.post("/calendar/import", response_model=None, dependencies=[Depends(require_permission("calendar:write"))])
|
||||
async def import_ics(
|
||||
file: UploadFile = File(...),
|
||||
calendar_id: str | None = None,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ async def delete_folder(
|
||||
# ─── Files ───
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.post("/files/upload", status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED, dependencies=[Depends(require_permission("dms:write"))])
|
||||
@router.post("/files/upload", status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED, response_model=None, dependencies=[Depends(require_permission("dms:write"))])
|
||||
async def upload_file(
|
||||
file: UploadFile = File(...),
|
||||
folder_id: str | None = Form(None),
|
||||
@@ -441,35 +441,35 @@ async def upload_file(
|
||||
if folder_result.scalar_one_or_none() is None:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(404, detail={"detail": "Folder not found", "code": "not_found"})
|
||||
|
||||
# Stream file in chunks — avoid loading entire file into RAM
|
||||
# Stream file to storage — avoid loading entire file into RAM
|
||||
import hashlib
|
||||
CHUNK_SIZE = 1024 * 1024 # 1MB chunks
|
||||
sha256 = hashlib.sha256()
|
||||
file_size = 0
|
||||
chunks: list[bytes] = []
|
||||
|
||||
while True:
|
||||
chunk = await file.read(CHUNK_SIZE)
|
||||
if not chunk:
|
||||
break
|
||||
file_size += len(chunk)
|
||||
if file_size > MAX_FILE_SIZE:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
413, detail={"detail": "File too large (max 100MB)", "code": "file_too_large"}
|
||||
)
|
||||
sha256.update(chunk)
|
||||
chunks.append(chunk)
|
||||
|
||||
content_hash = sha256.hexdigest()
|
||||
async def chunk_stream():
|
||||
nonlocal file_size
|
||||
while True:
|
||||
chunk = await file.read(CHUNK_SIZE)
|
||||
if not chunk:
|
||||
break
|
||||
file_size += len(chunk)
|
||||
if file_size > MAX_FILE_SIZE:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
413, detail={"detail": "File too large (max 100MB)", "code": "file_too_large"}
|
||||
)
|
||||
sha256.update(chunk)
|
||||
yield chunk
|
||||
|
||||
# Create file record
|
||||
file_id = uuid.uuid4()
|
||||
storage_path = _file_storage_path(tenant_id, file_id)
|
||||
|
||||
# Save file via storage backend
|
||||
# Save file via storage backend (true streaming, no RAM accumulation)
|
||||
storage = get_storage_backend()
|
||||
await storage.save(storage_path, b"".join(chunks))
|
||||
del chunks # Free memory
|
||||
await storage.save_stream(storage_path, chunk_stream())
|
||||
|
||||
content_hash = sha256.hexdigest()
|
||||
|
||||
mime_type = file.content_type or "application/octet-stream"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ async def delete_msg(
|
||||
|
||||
# ─── Attachments ───
|
||||
|
||||
@router.post("/messages/{message_id}/attachments", dependencies=[Depends(require_permission("comm:write"))])
|
||||
@router.post("/messages/{message_id}/attachments", response_model=None, dependencies=[Depends(require_permission("comm:write"))])
|
||||
async def upload_attachment(
|
||||
message_id: str,
|
||||
file: UploadFile = File(...),
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -722,7 +722,7 @@ async def sync_folder(
|
||||
# ─── Attachment Upload (F-MAIL-04) ───
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.post("/upload-attachment")
|
||||
@router.post("/upload-attachment", response_model=None)
|
||||
async def upload_attachment(
|
||||
file: UploadFile = File(...),
|
||||
db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
|
||||
"""Test sample plugin for LeoCRM plugin system testing."""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
from typing import Any
|
||||
|
||||
from app.plugins.base import BasePlugin
|
||||
from app.plugins.manifest import PluginManifest
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestSamplePlugin(BasePlugin):
|
||||
"""A sample plugin for testing the plugin lifecycle."""
|
||||
|
||||
manifest = PluginManifest(
|
||||
name="test_sample",
|
||||
version="1.0.0",
|
||||
display_name="Test Sample Plugin",
|
||||
description="A sample plugin for testing install/activate/deactivate/uninstall lifecycle.",
|
||||
dependencies=[],
|
||||
routes=[],
|
||||
events=["contact.created"],
|
||||
migrations=["0001_test_plugin.sql"],
|
||||
permissions=[],
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self) -> None:
|
||||
super().__init__()
|
||||
self.install_called = False
|
||||
self.activate_called = False
|
||||
self.deactivate_called = False
|
||||
self.uninstall_called = False
|
||||
self.event_log: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
|
||||
|
||||
async def on_install(self, db, service_container) -> None:
|
||||
self.install_called = True
|
||||
|
||||
async def on_activate(self, db, service_container, event_bus) -> None:
|
||||
self.activate_called = True
|
||||
await super().on_activate(db, service_container, event_bus)
|
||||
|
||||
async def on_deactivate(self, db, service_container, event_bus) -> None:
|
||||
self.deactivate_called = True
|
||||
await super().on_deactivate(db, service_container, event_bus)
|
||||
|
||||
async def on_uninstall(self, db, service_container) -> None:
|
||||
self.uninstall_called = True
|
||||
|
||||
async def on_contact_created(self, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
|
||||
self.event_log.append({"event": "contact.created", "payload": payload})
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
|
||||
-- Test sample plugin migration: creates a test table with tenant_id
|
||||
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS test_sample_items (
|
||||
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
|
||||
tenant_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES tenants(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
|
||||
name VARCHAR(100) NOT NULL,
|
||||
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_test_sample_items_tenant ON test_sample_items(tenant_id);
|
||||
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ class WebhookResponse(BaseModel):
|
||||
tenant_id: uuid.UUID
|
||||
url: str
|
||||
events: list[str]
|
||||
secret: str | None = None
|
||||
has_secret: bool = False # Only indicate if a secret is set, never return it
|
||||
is_active: bool = True
|
||||
retry_count: int = 3
|
||||
timeout_seconds: int = 30
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -237,8 +237,7 @@ class AuthService:
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
logger.warning(
|
||||
"ARQ enqueue failed for password reset email — "
|
||||
"raw_token for development: %s",
|
||||
raw_token,
|
||||
"email will not be sent. Check Redis/ARQ connectivity.",
|
||||
exc_info=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,10 +4,13 @@ from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import hashlib
|
||||
import hmac
|
||||
import ipaddress
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import logging
|
||||
import socket
|
||||
import uuid
|
||||
from typing import Any
|
||||
from urllib.parse import urlparse
|
||||
|
||||
import httpx
|
||||
from sqlalchemy import select, delete
|
||||
@@ -18,6 +21,45 @@ from app.models.webhook import Webhook
|
||||
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _validate_webhook_url(url: str) -> None:
|
||||
"""Validate a webhook URL to prevent SSRF attacks.
|
||||
|
||||
Blocks:
|
||||
- Non-http(s) schemes
|
||||
- Private/internal IP ranges (10.x, 172.16-31.x, 192.168.x, 127.x, 169.254.x, ::1)
|
||||
- Hostnames that resolve to private IPs (DNS rebinding)
|
||||
- Redirects (handled by httpx follow_redirects=False)
|
||||
"""
|
||||
parsed = urlparse(url)
|
||||
|
||||
# Protocol allowlist
|
||||
if parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https"):
|
||||
raise ValueError(f"Webhook URL must use http or https, got: {parsed.scheme}")
|
||||
|
||||
hostname = parsed.hostname
|
||||
if not hostname:
|
||||
raise ValueError("Webhook URL has no hostname")
|
||||
|
||||
# Check if hostname is an IP address
|
||||
try:
|
||||
ip = ipaddress.ip_address(hostname)
|
||||
if ip.is_private or ip.is_loopback or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_reserved:
|
||||
raise ValueError(f"Webhook URL points to private/reserved IP: {ip}")
|
||||
except ValueError as exc:
|
||||
if "points to private" in str(exc) or "must use" in str(exc):
|
||||
raise
|
||||
# Not an IP — resolve hostname and check
|
||||
try:
|
||||
resolved = socket.getaddrinfo(hostname, None)
|
||||
for family, _, _, _, sockaddr in resolved:
|
||||
addr = sockaddr[0]
|
||||
ip_obj = ipaddress.ip_address(addr)
|
||||
if ip_obj.is_private or ip_obj.is_loopback or ip_obj.is_link_local or ip_obj.is_reserved:
|
||||
raise ValueError(f"Webhook hostname '{hostname}' resolves to private IP: {addr}")
|
||||
except socket.gaierror:
|
||||
raise ValueError(f"Cannot resolve webhook hostname: {hostname}")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def list_webhooks(
|
||||
db: AsyncSession,
|
||||
tenant_id: uuid.UUID,
|
||||
@@ -151,8 +193,18 @@ async def send_webhook(
|
||||
signature = _sign_payload(body_bytes, webhook.secret)
|
||||
headers["X-Webhook-Signature"] = f"sha256={signature}"
|
||||
|
||||
# SSRF protection: validate URL before sending
|
||||
try:
|
||||
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=webhook.timeout_seconds) as client:
|
||||
_validate_webhook_url(webhook.url)
|
||||
except ValueError as exc:
|
||||
logger.warning("Webhook URL validation failed for %s: %s", webhook.url, exc)
|
||||
return {"success": False, "status_code": None, "error": f"URL validation failed: {exc}"}
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
async with httpx.AsyncClient(
|
||||
timeout=webhook.timeout_seconds,
|
||||
follow_redirects=False, # Prevent SSRF via redirect
|
||||
) as client:
|
||||
response = await client.post(
|
||||
webhook.url,
|
||||
content=body_bytes,
|
||||
|
||||
+15
-8
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ services:
|
||||
PGDATA: /var/lib/postgresql/data/pgdata
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
- pgdata:/var/lib/postgresql/data
|
||||
ports:
|
||||
- "5432:5432" # local-only; remove for prod-like runs
|
||||
# No exposed ports — only internal Docker network access
|
||||
# For local debugging, uncomment: ports: ["127.0.0.1:5432:5432"]
|
||||
healthcheck:
|
||||
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U ${POSTGRES_USER:-crm_user} -d ${POSTGRES_DB:-crm_db}"]
|
||||
interval: 10s
|
||||
@@ -50,13 +50,13 @@ services:
|
||||
image: redis:7-alpine
|
||||
container_name: crm-redis
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
command: redis-server --requirepass ${REDIS_PASSWORD:-changeme}
|
||||
command: redis-server --requirepass ${REDIS_PASSWORD:?REDIS_PASSWORD is required}
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
- redisdata:/data
|
||||
ports:
|
||||
- "6379:6379" # local-only; remove for prod-like runs
|
||||
# No exposed ports — only internal Docker network access
|
||||
# For local debugging, uncomment: ports: ["127.0.0.1:6379:6379"]
|
||||
healthcheck:
|
||||
test: ["CMD", "redis-cli", "-a", "${REDIS_PASSWORD:-changeme}", "ping"]
|
||||
test: ["CMD", "redis-cli", "-a", "${REDIS_PASSWORD}", "ping"]
|
||||
interval: 10s
|
||||
timeout: 5s
|
||||
retries: 5
|
||||
@@ -76,10 +76,14 @@ services:
|
||||
redis:
|
||||
condition: service_healthy
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
# App/worker uses crm_runtime (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS) — RLS enforced
|
||||
DATABASE_URL: ${DATABASE_URL:?DATABASE_URL is required}
|
||||
REDIS_URL: ${REDIS_URL:-redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD:-changeme}@redis:6379/0}
|
||||
# Migration/DDL uses crm_user (owner, can bypass RLS for DDL)
|
||||
MIGRATION_DATABASE_URL: ${MIGRATION_DATABASE_URL:-postgresql+asyncpg://${POSTGRES_USER:-crm_user}:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}@postgres:5432/${POSTGRES_DB:-crm_db}}
|
||||
REDIS_URL: ${REDIS_URL:-redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD}@redis:6379/0}
|
||||
SECRET_KEY: ${SECRET_KEY:?SECRET_KEY is required (min 32 chars)}
|
||||
CORS_ORIGINS: ${CORS_ORIGINS:-http://localhost:8000,http://localhost:5173}
|
||||
FRONTEND_URL: ${FRONTEND_URL:-http://localhost:8000}
|
||||
ENVIRONMENT: ${ENVIRONMENT:-production}
|
||||
LOG_LEVEL: ${LOG_LEVEL:-INFO}
|
||||
SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE: ${SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE:-true}
|
||||
@@ -120,9 +124,12 @@ services:
|
||||
condition: service_healthy
|
||||
entrypoint: ["/app/worker.sh"]
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
# Worker uses crm_runtime too — RLS enforced
|
||||
DATABASE_URL: ${DATABASE_URL:?DATABASE_URL is required}
|
||||
REDIS_URL: ${REDIS_URL:-redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD:-changeme}@redis:6379/0}
|
||||
MIGRATION_DATABASE_URL: ${MIGRATION_DATABASE_URL:-postgresql+asyncpg://${POSTGRES_USER:-crm_user}:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}@postgres:5432/${POSTGRES_DB:-crm_db}}
|
||||
REDIS_URL: ${REDIS_URL:-redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD}@redis:6379/0}
|
||||
SECRET_KEY: ${SECRET_KEY:?SECRET_KEY is required (min 32 chars)}
|
||||
FRONTEND_URL: ${FRONTEND_URL:-http://localhost:8000}
|
||||
ENVIRONMENT: ${ENVIRONMENT:-production}
|
||||
LOG_LEVEL: ${LOG_LEVEL:-INFO}
|
||||
SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE: ${SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE:-true}
|
||||
|
||||
+29
-4
@@ -3,20 +3,45 @@
|
||||
# prestart.sh — Container entrypoint for CRM API container
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Responsibilities:
|
||||
# 1. Run Alembic DB migrations (alembic upgrade head).
|
||||
# 2. Start uvicorn as PID 1 (so signals like SIGTERM are forwarded correctly).
|
||||
# 1. Run Alembic DB migrations (alembic upgrade head) using the owner user.
|
||||
# 2. Set the crm_runtime password (for RLS-enforced app access).
|
||||
# 3. Start uvicorn as PID 1 (so signals like SIGTERM are forwarded correctly).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Notes:
|
||||
# - `set -e` ensures the container crashes loudly if migrations fail.
|
||||
# - The ARQ worker runs in a separate container (see worker.sh / docker-compose).
|
||||
# - Migrations use MIGRATION_DATABASE_URL (crm_user, owner, can bypass RLS).
|
||||
# - The app uses DATABASE_URL (crm_runtime, NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS).
|
||||
# =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
set -e
|
||||
|
||||
echo "[prestart] $(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ) - Running alembic upgrade head..."
|
||||
alembic upgrade head
|
||||
# Use MIGRATION_DATABASE_URL for alembic (falls back to DATABASE_URL for backwards compat)
|
||||
export ALEMBIC_DATABASE_URL="${MIGRATION_DATABASE_URL:-$DATABASE_URL}"
|
||||
|
||||
# Configure alembic to use the migration database URL
|
||||
export ALEMBIC_DATABASE_URL
|
||||
|
||||
echo "[prestart] $(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ) - Running alembic upgrade head (owner user)..."
|
||||
# Temporarily override DATABASE_URL for alembic
|
||||
DATABASE_URL="$ALEMBIC_DATABASE_URL" alembic upgrade head
|
||||
echo "[prestart] DB migrations completed successfully."
|
||||
|
||||
# Set crm_runtime password if RUNTIME_DB_PASSWORD is set
|
||||
if [ -n "$RUNTIME_DB_PASSWORD" ]; then
|
||||
echo "[prestart] Setting crm_runtime password..."
|
||||
# Parse the migration DB URL to get psql connection params
|
||||
PGHOST=postgres
|
||||
PGUSER="${POSTGRES_USER:-crm_user}"
|
||||
PGDATABASE="${POSTGRES_DB:-crm_db}"
|
||||
PGPASSWORD="$POSTGRES_PASSWORD"
|
||||
export PGHOST PGUSER PGDATABASE PGPASSWORD
|
||||
psql -c "ALTER ROLE crm_runtime WITH LOGIN PASSWORD '${RUNTIME_DB_PASSWORD}' NOSUPERUSER NOBYPASSRLS;" 2>/dev/null || \
|
||||
echo "[prestart] WARNING: Could not set crm_runtime password (role may not exist yet)"
|
||||
unset PGPASSWORD
|
||||
echo "[prestart] crm_runtime password set."
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
echo "[prestart] Starting uvicorn on 0.0.0.0:8000 (workers=1)..."
|
||||
exec uvicorn app.main:app \
|
||||
--host 0.0.0.0 \
|
||||
|
||||
+32
-9
@@ -106,13 +106,29 @@ def _get_sync_engine():
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.fixture(scope="session", autouse=True)
|
||||
def db_setup():
|
||||
"""Drop and recreate all tables once per test session."""
|
||||
"""Drop and recreate all tables once per test session.
|
||||
|
||||
Uses SET lock_timeout to prevent deadlocks when multiple test processes
|
||||
try to DROP SCHEMA simultaneously. Falls back to TRUNCATE if DROP fails.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
sync_eng = _get_sync_engine()
|
||||
with sync_eng.connect() as conn:
|
||||
# Drop all tables and types
|
||||
conn.execute(text("DROP SCHEMA public CASCADE;"))
|
||||
conn.execute(text("CREATE SCHEMA public;"))
|
||||
conn.execute(text("GRANT ALL ON SCHEMA public TO leocrm;"))
|
||||
# Set a short lock timeout to prevent deadlocks
|
||||
conn.execute(text("SET lock_timeout = '5s';"))
|
||||
try:
|
||||
conn.execute(text("DROP SCHEMA IF EXISTS public CASCADE;"))
|
||||
conn.execute(text("CREATE SCHEMA public;"))
|
||||
conn.execute(text("GRANT ALL ON SCHEMA public TO leocrm;"))
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
# If DROP SCHEMA deadlocks, fall back to TRUNCATE all tables
|
||||
conn.rollback()
|
||||
conn.execute(text("SET lock_timeout = '5s';"))
|
||||
conn.execute(text(
|
||||
"DO $$ DECLARE r RECORD; BEGIN "
|
||||
"FOR r IN (SELECT tablename FROM pg_tables WHERE schemaname='public') "
|
||||
"LOOP EXECUTE 'TRUNCATE TABLE public.' || quote_ident(r.tablename) || ' CASCADE'; "
|
||||
"END LOOP; END $$;"
|
||||
))
|
||||
conn.commit()
|
||||
sync_eng.dispose()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -126,12 +142,19 @@ def db_setup():
|
||||
asyncio.get_event_loop().run_until_complete(_create())
|
||||
yield
|
||||
|
||||
# Cleanup after session
|
||||
# Cleanup after session — use TRUNCATE instead of DROP to avoid deadlocks
|
||||
sync_eng = _get_sync_engine()
|
||||
with sync_eng.connect() as conn:
|
||||
conn.execute(text("DROP SCHEMA public CASCADE;"))
|
||||
conn.execute(text("CREATE SCHEMA public;"))
|
||||
conn.execute(text("GRANT ALL ON SCHEMA public TO leocrm;"))
|
||||
conn.execute(text("SET lock_timeout = '5s';"))
|
||||
try:
|
||||
conn.execute(text(
|
||||
"DO $$ DECLARE r RECORD; BEGIN "
|
||||
"FOR r IN (SELECT tablename FROM pg_tables WHERE schemaname='public') "
|
||||
"LOOP EXECUTE 'TRUNCATE TABLE public.' || quote_ident(r.tablename) || ' CASCADE'; "
|
||||
"END LOOP; END $$;"
|
||||
))
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
conn.commit()
|
||||
sync_eng.dispose()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user