092c2d20fb
fix( #356 ): DSAR-Sammlung auf Contract-Zugriff umgestellt — 4 Core→Plugin-Imports (mail/tasks/calendar/kommunikation) nutzen jetzt get_contract(); MailContract exponiert MailAccount; ImportError-Fallback-Semantik unverändert; Checker 4→0 Verstöße; DSAR-Suite 4/4 passed
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Check Cross-Plugin Imports / check (push) Has been cancelled
fixes #356
2026-08-27 17:38:06 +02:00
2d17746194
feat(g1-b): dsgvo-export um fehlende Kategorien erweitert — Mail/Tasks/Calendar/Comm
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Der dsgvo-export-Docstring versprach Mail-Accounts/Tasks/Calendar/Comm-Messages, lieferte sie aber nie (Docstring-Fiktion). _dsar_collect_user_data sammelt jetzt alle Kategorien: mail_accounts (email/display/is_shared/is_active — KEINE Credentials!), tasks (owner ODER assigned_to), calendar_entries, comm_messages (content auf 500 Zeichen gekappt). Lazy Imports mit try/except ImportError machen die Kategorien plugin-resilient.
Beweis: test_g1_dsar 4/4 gruen; py_compile OK.
2026-08-26 00:19:20 +02:00
f4a5937a4b
feat(g1): DSGVO Art.15/17 funktionsfaehig — fehlender process_dsar Worker-Job implementiert
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Root-Cause: POST /dsar/{user_id} queued einen Job der nirgends implementiert war — DSAR-Requests verschwanden im Nirvana. Implementiert in app/core/jobs.py nach Hausmuster: _dsar_collect_user_data sammelt profile+contacts+audit_log+notifications (Art.15/20), _dsar_execute_deletion fuehrt Art.17 aus (contacts soft-delete respektiert Audit-Pflichten, notifications hard-delete, User anonymisiert+deaktiviert mit FK-Integritaet fuer Audit-Zeilen, dsar_erasure-Audit-Eintrag), process_dsar dispatcht access/deletion/rectification.
Beweis: test_g1_dsar 4/4 gruen; ruff clean.
2026-08-25 23:48:22 +02:00
abbe7a18fc
fix(audit): P0-P3 audit fixes — 838 ruff errors → 0, 30 F821 bugs fixed, 118 files changed
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- P0: hooks.py 3-tuple fix, trigger_dispatcher Contract, contacts/plugin unregister_actions_by_owner
- P0: 5 test files — check_permission mocks removed, hardcoded DB credential → env var
- P1: attachment_service DmsFile via Contract helper, restore_registry/history_hooks dedup
- P1: mail/plugin restore unregister, mcp_client datetime.now(UTC), saved_views/filters patterns
- P1: ProtectedRoute fail-closed, 13 test assertion fixes (bcrypt, DB-URLs, SECRET_KEYs)
- P2: deprecated notifications → post_system_message (3 files), forgejo Base, report_generator lazy import
- P2: webhooks permissions, deps.py/roles.py plugin perms removed, import_export default
- P2: address/tags/entity_links patterns removed, worker.py Contract-Umgehungen fixed
- P2: 28 frontend TODOs (hardcoded constants, deprecated notification API)
- P3: dead code, duplicates, deprecated imports, private attr, __import__ inline
- P3: 8 frontend TODOs (LucideIcons, inline styles, XSS, i18n)
- ruff: 838 → 0 (612 auto-fix + 246 manual + 27 F821 regression fix)
- F821: 30 → 0 (AutomationDefinition, DmsFile, user_id, Path, Any, String)
- Contract-Umgehungen: 2 neue gefunden (worker.py:169, worker.py:280) und gefixt
2026-08-16 01:17:18 +02:00
ce0e9ab12a
gate4: fix SMTP TLS mode for port 465 (implicit TLS instead of STARTTLS)
2026-07-31 11:37:11 +02:00
5ec1fc9b05
Phase 1: Fix all critical release blockers (B1-B10)
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B1: Remove duplicate get_redis() — singleton no longer overwritten
B2: Plugin routes now enforce activation status via require_active_plugin()
B3: Fix UploadFile ForwardRef error — remove functools.wraps from wrap_plugin_route
B4: DMS upload uses true streaming via save_stream() instead of RAM accumulation
B5: Worker on_startup registers plugin event handlers + webhook dispatcher
B6: Implement send_password_reset_email job, remove raw token logging
B7: Webhook SSRF protection (IP validation, no redirects), secret removed from response
B8: RLS repair migration 0044 + separate crm_runtime DB user (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS)
B9: Fix .env.docker.example AUTH_SECRET → SECRET_KEY
B10: Remove Redis default password, remove exposed DB/Redis ports
Also: add frontend_url to config, add SMTP settings to .env.docker.example,
update prestart.sh to use MIGRATION_DATABASE_URL for alembic.
2026-07-26 20:45:42 +02:00
727d86614e
Security fixes: P0-P2 complete (22 fixes)
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P0 (7): Auth-bypass removed, migrations fixed, plugin-upload disabled, RLS FORCE+WITH CHECK, plugin double-registration fixed, persistent volume, domain removed
P1 (11): User/tenant model, Redis centralized, worker separated, transactional outbox, XSS fixed, DMS chunked streaming, permissions unified, password reset, metrics secured, config/docs fixed, cross-tenant FK
P2 (4): Contact model normalized, cross-imports reduced 94%, commands+state machines for contacts/dms/mail/calendar, SPA path-traversal
8 new migrations, 99 unit tests, 13 commands, 8 contracts, 72 files changed
2026-07-25 21:03:46 +02:00
3ab4925783
T01: core infrastructure + auth + multi-tenant + RLS
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- 10 models: tenants, users, user_tenants, roles, sessions, audit_log, deletion_log, notifications, password_reset_tokens, api_tokens
- Session-based auth (Redis + PostgreSQL audit trail)
- Multi-tenant with ORM-level filtering + PostgreSQL RLS (set_config)
- RBAC with roles/permissions + field-level permissions
- CSRF protection via Origin header validation
- Auth rate limiting (Redis counters with TTL)
- CORS with explicit origins (no wildcard)
- Health endpoint (no auth required)
- Notification service + audit log middleware
- 29 tests, 26 ACs, all passing
- Coverage: 62% (infrastructure modules pending coverage in later tasks)
2026-06-29 08:02:14 +02:00
Agent Zero