3c496f4b6a
feat(M4): System-Rueckbau — Dashboard-Inhalte als MiniApps, Core = reiner Host ( #362 )
...
Check Cross-Plugin Imports / check (push) Has been cancelled
- system_miniapps.py: audit_activity (audit:read, settings max_items) + system_metrics (settings:read) als Core-Apps in Registry
- base.py-Fix: native Manifest-MiniApps reichen component durch (M1-Luecke)
- contacts-Manifest: contacts_stats (ContactsStatsWidget, contacts:read, show_companies/show_persons)
- Seed-Fix: nur renderbare Apps (component) landen im Dashboard-Layout
- Frontend: ContactsStatsWidget, AuditActivityWidget, SystemMetricsWidget; MiniAppHost-Registry +3
- Dashboard.tsx = reiner Host (26 Z.); Page-Tests auf Pure-Host umgeschrieben
- Tests: M4 7/7 (TDD rot->gruen), Backend-Regression 46/46, Vitest 22/22, tsc clean, build OK
2026-08-30 22:22:20 +02:00
b3e259fc25
feat(M2): Persönliche Dashboards — Tabelle, CRUD, Lazy-Seed, RLS ( #360 )
...
Check Cross-Plugin Imports / check (push) Has been cancelled
- dashboards-Tabelle (Layout JSONB, Tabs, is_default, partial unique name index)
- 6 CRUD-Endpoints /api/v1/dashboards, Owner-only (saved_views-Präzedenz), Audit
- Lazy Default-Seed aus MiniApp-Registry (permission-gefiltert, 12-Spalten-Flow)
- CORE_PERMISSIONS dashboard:read/write (fixt Phantom-Permission in dashboard.py)
- Migration 0144: RLS crm_api+crm_worker + konvergenter Fix der 3 Phase-L-Policies
- Tests: test_dashboards_backend.py 23/23 (TDD rot->grün); Regression 162/163
2026-08-30 16:21:34 +02:00
cd8ef7500c
feat( #359 ): W4a Phase 1 — Import/Export Contribution-Architektur Kern
...
Check Cross-Plugin Imports / check (push) Has been cancelled
- Format-Registry (app/core/importexport_registry.py): FormatHandler-Protokoll,
available_for() Schnittmenge, Singleton + Testing-Reset
- importexport_formats-Plugin (csv/json/xlsx), lifecycle-korrekt: on_activate
registriert Handler in der Core-Registry, on_deactivate unregistriert
- ContactsContract: importexport-Beitrag (ie_*-Methoden) — Contacts besitzt
seine Import/Export-Fachlogik jetzt selbst
- import_export_service.py: generische Engine, delegiert generisch ueber
registry.list_discovered() an den besitzenden Contract (keine hartcodierten
Plugin-Namen mehr); Signaturen identisch
- Funktionserhalt bewiesen: 45/45 import_export-Suite passed (inkl.
Fehler-Multiplizitaet: 2 failed rows -> 3 total_errors, erreicht via
ie_required-Weitergabe + ie_row_valid-Nur-contacts-Early-Return)
fixes #359 (Phase 1)
2026-08-27 21:11:14 +02:00
ad5601eb7d
refactor( #356 ): DSAR-Fachlogik vollstaendig aus dem Core extrahiert — dsar_collect/dsar_erase in die 5 beteiligten Contracts (contacts, mail, tasks, calendar, kommunikation); core/jobs.py sammelt/loescht nur Core-eigene Daten und iteriert generisch ueber die Plugin-Registry; neue Plugins liefern DSAR-Kategorien ohne Core-Aenderung; Counts-/Category-Keys unveraendert; tasks/contracts.py von Patch-Artefakt bereinigt
...
Check Cross-Plugin Imports / check (push) Has been cancelled
fixes #356
2026-08-27 18:09:15 +02:00
092c2d20fb
fix( #356 ): DSAR-Sammlung auf Contract-Zugriff umgestellt — 4 Core→Plugin-Imports (mail/tasks/calendar/kommunikation) nutzen jetzt get_contract(); MailContract exponiert MailAccount; ImportError-Fallback-Semantik unverändert; Checker 4→0 Verstöße; DSAR-Suite 4/4 passed
...
Check Cross-Plugin Imports / check (push) Has been cancelled
fixes #356
2026-08-27 17:38:06 +02:00
2d17746194
feat(g1-b): dsgvo-export um fehlende Kategorien erweitert — Mail/Tasks/Calendar/Comm
...
Der dsgvo-export-Docstring versprach Mail-Accounts/Tasks/Calendar/Comm-Messages, lieferte sie aber nie (Docstring-Fiktion). _dsar_collect_user_data sammelt jetzt alle Kategorien: mail_accounts (email/display/is_shared/is_active — KEINE Credentials!), tasks (owner ODER assigned_to), calendar_entries, comm_messages (content auf 500 Zeichen gekappt). Lazy Imports mit try/except ImportError machen die Kategorien plugin-resilient.
Beweis: test_g1_dsar 4/4 gruen; py_compile OK.
2026-08-26 00:19:20 +02:00
0baec2792c
fix(g2): Session-Revocation bei Passwortaenderung auf beiden Pfaden
...
Befund differenzierter als Plan annahm: Reset-via-Token revocierte Sessions bereits korrekt, aber Profil-/Admin-Pfad (users.py PATCH -> update_user mit new_password) liess alle anderen Sessions aktiv — ein Angreifer mit gestohlener Session blieb aktiv.
Fix nach DRY: revoke_user_redis_sessions(user_id)-Helper in app/core/auth.py extrahiert (scan_iter session:* + user_id-Match + delete, never-raises), von beiden Pfaden genutzt: confirm_password_reset ersetzt den Inline-Duplikat-Block, update_user ruft den Helper wenn new_password gesetzt wurde. Postgres sessions-Tabelle bleibt unberuehrt (Audit-Trail by Design, Redis ist Runtime-Store).
Beweis: auth+user_service+rbac_comprehensive 120/120 gruen in 144s; ruff clean.
2026-08-26 00:00:19 +02:00
f4a5937a4b
feat(g1): DSGVO Art.15/17 funktionsfaehig — fehlender process_dsar Worker-Job implementiert
...
Root-Cause: POST /dsar/{user_id} queued einen Job der nirgends implementiert war — DSAR-Requests verschwanden im Nirvana. Implementiert in app/core/jobs.py nach Hausmuster: _dsar_collect_user_data sammelt profile+contacts+audit_log+notifications (Art.15/20), _dsar_execute_deletion fuehrt Art.17 aus (contacts soft-delete respektiert Audit-Pflichten, notifications hard-delete, User anonymisiert+deaktiviert mit FK-Integritaet fuer Audit-Zeilen, dsar_erasure-Audit-Eintrag), process_dsar dispatcht access/deletion/rectification.
Beweis: test_g1_dsar 4/4 gruen; ruff clean.
2026-08-25 23:48:22 +02:00
46c909c226
feat(e1): AuditMiddleware als systematisches Safety-Net — alle erfolgreichen POST/PATCH/DELETE erzeugen Audit-Eintrag (Session-basierte user/tenant-Attribuierung, entity_type aus Pfad, source=middleware in changes); schließt Lücke von 349 mutierenden Endpoints in 59 Dateien ohne Audit; Skip-Liste auth/health/errors/audit/external; best-effort; Beweistest test_audit_middleware.py grün (POST ohne explizites log_audit → Audit-Zeile); Regressionssmoke 23/23 grün
2026-08-24 13:55:25 +02:00
197b0d3bab
fix(e7): CI-Gate-Vorbereitung — ruff über app/ von 105 auf 0 Findings bereinigt; 8 echte F821-NameError-Produktionsbugs behoben (external_api stream_chat-Call-Signatur an stream_chat_comm angepasst, agent_runner uuid vor lokalem Import, automation/plugin UserTenant-Import, tasks delete-audit user_id, workflows/engine timedelta, unified_search/contracts Any); py311-kompatibles StepHandler-Alias statt type-Statement; E402/F841 bereinigt; Verifikation 85/89 grün (4 Failures = bekannter Vorbestand BUG-099)
Check Cross-Plugin Imports / check (push) Has been cancelled
2026-08-24 13:36:17 +02:00
d89044d8f7
fix(d2): datetime.now(UTC) everywhere + SQLITE-001 automation tests on ephemeral postgres
Check Cross-Plugin Imports / check (push) Has been cancelled
2026-08-24 01:22:42 +02:00
e3fb4728d7
refactor(b3): dynamic entity registry, custom_fields permissions decoupled from contacts, write perms generated from registry
2026-08-23 20:54:04 +02:00
7467c01d38
refactor(b2): eliminate all cross-plugin imports - contracts for worker/agent_runner/workstream, declared dependency for wiki
Check Cross-Plugin Imports / check (push) Has been cancelled
2026-08-23 20:29:09 +02:00
c21634b323
fix(arch-a2): deactivation cleanup - container services, search provider, hook deregistration, notification sync, task state, activation order
Check Cross-Plugin Imports / check (push) Has been cancelled
2026-08-23 19:24:12 +02:00
17516d2783
fix(arch-043,arch-052): deterministic system tenant lookup; async-safe file metadata
Check Cross-Plugin Imports / check (push) Has been cancelled
2026-08-23 16:39:09 +02:00
b04cda774b
fix(arch-014,arch-020): no contract lazy-resurrect after unregister; event bus dedupes handlers
...
Check Cross-Plugin Imports / check (push) Has been cancelled
Also fixes ARCH-029/041: none-check before attribute access in trigger dispatcher.
2026-08-23 15:30:12 +02:00
44511a8fd7
refactor(block-h): knowledge retention job lives with plugin; compliance via contract
2026-08-23 12:18:02 +02:00
b05204db14
fix: BUG-073 (broken imports), BUG-009 (contact folders id=None), BUG-014 (tags assign 500), BUG-016 (search performance use_ai), BUG-030 (user delete GRANT DELETE), BUG-052 (miniapps response), BUG-047 (approval_requests columns), BUG-037 (compliance refresh), prestart.sh GRANT DELETE
Check Cross-Plugin Imports / check (push) Has been cancelled
2026-08-22 07:10:25 +02:00
3f8a8c93a7
fix(critical): permission cache returns None causing 500 on every authenticated API call
...
- get_cached_permissions() returned None when _get_current_permission_version failed
- deps.py get_current_user() crashed with AttributeError: NoneType.get()
- Fix: fall through to DB resolution instead of returning None
- Fix: add None guard in deps.py as safety net
2026-08-21 02:16:24 +02:00
a9e7195b93
feat: H-CITE + H-RET + H-DATA-LIFE — evidence references in ask_knowledge, knowledge retention ARQ cron job (daily 05:00), re-extraction hook on wiki.article.updated
Check Cross-Plugin Imports / check (push) Has been cancelled
2026-08-20 23:06:16 +02:00
ce08f2464a
feat: punkt 8 (trash cleanup) — ARQ cron job daily 04:00, 90 days retention, soft-deleted contacts + attachments
2026-08-20 13:52:35 +02:00
2a173c9909
feat: punkt 7 (audit log) — export route (CSV/JSON), retention cleanup ARQ cron job (daily 03:00, 365 days default)
2026-08-20 13:50:38 +02:00
10b1f83fb3
feat: punkt 6 (backup) — ARQ cron job, backup config in settings, backup-now trigger, backup history, migration 0130
2026-08-20 13:47:35 +02:00
45ebbee26f
fix(audit): P2 frontend any→concrete types (181→61), heroicons→lucide-react, missing type exports, toast API, Select options, TaskStatus types; P2-9 hooks.py type annotations
2026-08-17 22:24:24 +02:00
680557087e
feat(F): F-TEST + F-DOC + F-UI-TRIG — Phase F complete!
...
- F-TEST: tests/test_phase_f_agents.py (1425 lines, 45 tests, all pass) — ReAct Loop, Permissions, Approvals, Skills, Context Builder, Data Policy, Transparency, Workstream, Budget
- F-DOC: docs/api-documentation.md (Phase F endpoints), docs/plugin-development-guide.md (Agent chapter 32), docs/test-strategy.md (Phase F test conventions)
- F-UI-TRIG: trigger_dispatcher dispatches agents on ui.*/context.* events (already implemented in F-PROACTIVE)
- Bug fix: approval.py metadata reserved attribute renamed to request_metadata
- PROGRESS.md: Phase F marked done, ~155/223 tasks done (70%)
2026-08-17 19:36:42 +02:00
06b281ba74
feat(F): F-PROACTIVE consolidate proactive AI — trigger_dispatcher dispatches agents on context/UI events
Check Cross-Plugin Imports / check (push) Has been cancelled
2026-08-17 18:40:41 +02:00
638e3f3e1e
feat(F): F-PERM permissions, F-APPR approval, F-AIUSE metadata, F-TRANS transparency, F-DATA-POL data policy, F-OVERSIGHT decision record, F-DRY dry-run, F-AUDIT audit log
...
Check Cross-Plugin Imports / check (push) Has been cancelled
- F-PERM: app/ai/agent_permissions.py (230 lines) — AgentPermissionContext, resolve_agent_permissions(), filter_visible_agents(), check_agent_execute_permission(), optimistic locking
- F-APPR: app/core/approval.py (160 lines) + app/routes/approvals.py (305 lines) + migration 0123 — ApprovalRequest model, CRUD API, approve/reject/expire
- F-AIUSE: app/ai/ai_use_case.py (156 lines) — AIUseCaseMetadata Pydantic model, validate_ai_use_case()
- F-TRANS: app/ai/transparency.py (60 lines) — mark_as_ai_generated(), is_ai_participant()
- F-DATA-POL: app/ai/data_policy.py (210 lines) — enforce_data_policy() with SENSITIVE_FIELDS + provider compliance
- F-OVERSIGHT: app/ai/oversight.py (108 lines) — DecisionRecord, create_decision_record()
- F-DRY: agent_loop.py updated with dry_run parameter
- F-AUDIT: agent_loop.py updated with audit log for tool calls
- agent_routes.py: AI use case metadata endpoints added
- main.py: approval routes registered
- All Python compile checks pass
2026-08-17 16:57:50 +02:00
e25a1b4fec
fix(ui): CommandPalette outside Router context — white page fix; remove PWA; fix CSP for Google Fonts
2026-08-16 13:50:39 +02:00
abbe7a18fc
fix(audit): P0-P3 audit fixes — 838 ruff errors → 0, 30 F821 bugs fixed, 118 files changed
...
- P0: hooks.py 3-tuple fix, trigger_dispatcher Contract, contacts/plugin unregister_actions_by_owner
- P0: 5 test files — check_permission mocks removed, hardcoded DB credential → env var
- P1: attachment_service DmsFile via Contract helper, restore_registry/history_hooks dedup
- P1: mail/plugin restore unregister, mcp_client datetime.now(UTC), saved_views/filters patterns
- P1: ProtectedRoute fail-closed, 13 test assertion fixes (bcrypt, DB-URLs, SECRET_KEYs)
- P2: deprecated notifications → post_system_message (3 files), forgejo Base, report_generator lazy import
- P2: webhooks permissions, deps.py/roles.py plugin perms removed, import_export default
- P2: address/tags/entity_links patterns removed, worker.py Contract-Umgehungen fixed
- P2: 28 frontend TODOs (hardcoded constants, deprecated notification API)
- P3: dead code, duplicates, deprecated imports, private attr, __import__ inline
- P3: 8 frontend TODOs (LucideIcons, inline styles, XSS, i18n)
- ruff: 838 → 0 (612 auto-fix + 246 manual + 27 F821 regression fix)
- F821: 30 → 0 (AutomationDefinition, DmsFile, user_id, Path, Any, String)
- Contract-Umgehungen: 2 neue gefunden (worker.py:169, worker.py:280) und gefixt
2026-08-16 01:17:18 +02:00
a4d0f0c35d
feat(D): Phase D — Undo/Restore komplett implementiert
...
Check Cross-Plugin Imports / check (push) Has been cancelled
- D-GEN: RestoreRegistry mit RestoreConfig (model_class, restore_permission, excluded_fields, special_handler)
- D-HOOK: history_hooks.py mit register_history_hooks() für after_create/update/delete
- D-CORE: Company create+update record_history in companies.py
- D-PLUG: Task/Calendar/DMS record_history in services/routes
- D-SOFT: Alle registrierten Entitäten haben deleted_at + un-delete via Registry
- D-MAIL: Mail special_handler (IMAP Trash-Move, Folder-Verify) + record_history in delete/move
- D-TRASH: GET /entity-history/trash (filterbar, paginiert) + Frontend Trash.tsx
- D-TOAST: UndoToast.tsx (5s Auto-Dismiss, useUndoToast Hook)
- D-HIST-UI: HistoryPanel.tsx (Timeline, Diff-View, Restore-Button)
- D-BULK: POST /entity-history/bulk-restore mit partial_success Semantik
- D-RET: POST /entity-history/retention/archive (GDPR hard-delete >90 Tage)
- D-TEST: 26 Tests in test_restore_registry.py, alle grün
- D-DOC: test-strategy.md + security_kernel.md aktualisiert
Backend: 10 Dateien, Frontend: 7 Dateien, Tests: 1 Datei, Docs: 3 Dateien
26/26 Tests passed, TSC 0 errors, App import 492 routes
2026-08-13 23:08:29 +02:00
e7ae0ad5ce
feat(C.5): Modularer Import/Export — Shared Helpers, Preview/Mapping, Background Jobs, Partial-Failure
...
C5-BASE: app/services/import_export_helpers.py (NEU, 352 Zeilen)
- parse_csv/json/xlsx, write_csv/json/xlsx, map_fields, suggest_mapping
- validate_row, build_error_report, build_import_result, detect_format
C5-PREVIEW: POST /import/preview + POST /import/validate
- Preview gibt erste 10 Zeilen + Spalten + Mapping-Vorschlag
- Validate gibt Fehler-Report ohne Import
C5-JOB: app/services/import_export_jobs.py (NEU, 165 Zeilen)
- ARQ Background Job für Files >1000 Zeilen
- Job-Status: pending/processing/completed/partial_success/failed
- GET /import/status/{job_id} — Status + Progress + Fehler-Report
- Partial-Failure: try/except pro Zeile, fehlerhafte gesammelt, erfolgreiche committet
C5-CONTACT+C5-COMPANY: Handler auf Shared Helpers umgestellt
C5-UI: ImportWizard.tsx (5 Steps: Upload→Preview→Validation→Review→Result)
C5-TEST: 45 Tests in test_import_export.py — alle grün
C5-DOC: Plugin-Dev-Guide Kapitel 31 (Import/Export Handler)
2026-08-13 22:43:33 +02:00
b5546ea7bd
feat(B.13-B.17+B.16): Error-Handling-Infra, Observability, Graceful Shutdown, Cost-Cap, API Versioning
...
B.13 Error-Handling-Infrastruktur:
- ErrorCategory Enum (TRANSIENT/PERMANENT/PARTIAL), ApiError erweitert
- Einheitliches Error-Response-Format: {code, detail, field, trace_id, retryable, category}
- 3 FastAPI Exception-Handler (ApiError, HTTPException, unhandled)
- classify_exception() Helper, 6 neue Error-Codes
- 28 Tests in test_error_handling.py
B.14 Observability & trace_id-Korrelation:
- trace_id pro Request (UUID4 short) in structlog contextvars
- X-Trace-Id Response-Header
- Sensitive Fields structlog processor
- llm_complete()/llm_embed() akzeptieren trace_id kwarg
- 12 Tests in test_observability.py
B.15 Graceful Shutdown & Connection Draining:
- _shutdown_event + _inflight_requests Tracking in main.py
- drain_all_connections() in ws_helpers.py
- Worker on_shutdown pausiert WorkflowInstances (status=paused)
- 8 Tests in test_graceful_shutdown.py
B.16 API Versioning Strategie:
- Plugin-Dev-Guide Kapitel 30: URL-basiertes Versioning, Breaking Change Prozess
B.17 Cost Overrun Protection:
- llm_monthly_budget_usd + llm_hard_cutoff Settings
- _check_tenant_budget() vor jedem LLM-Call
- _track_tenant_cost() in Redis (INCRBYFLOAT)
- _check_cost_alerts() bei 50%/80%/100% -> post_system_message()
- 20 Tests in test_cost_protection.py
Total: 68 neue Tests, alle grün. Keine Regressionen.
2026-08-13 21:33:14 +02:00
1baa9481a2
feat(B-NOTIF): Notification→Message Konsolidierung — System-Channel, post_system_message(), Migration
...
Check Cross-Plugin Imports / check (push) Has been cancelled
B-NOTIF-SYS: CommConversation um is_system Feld erweitert, get_or_create_system_channel()
B-NOTIF-EVT: post_system_message() in kommunikation/services.py — erstellt CommMessage im System-Channel
- create_notification() als deprecated Wrapper delegiert auf post_system_message()
- Text-Block + action_card Block mit Deep-Link, Metadata: notification_type/severity/entity_ref
B-NOTIF-PREF: NotificationPreference als Routing-Konfiguration, stumm/disabled respektiert
B-NOTIF-MIG: Migration 0120 — Notifications → CommMessages migriert, notifications_legacy View
B-NOTIF-DEPREC: Notification-Routes als deprecated markiert, keine Routes entfernt
B-NOTIF-TEST: 19 Tests in test_notification_migration.py — alle grün
- System-Channel, post_system_message, create_notification Wrapper, Preferences, Unread-Badge, Migration Mapping, Sensitive Fields
2026-08-13 21:19:41 +02:00
78963f2ca9
feat(B-TRIG): Trigger-Kern konsolidiert — generischer Dispatcher, UI-Event-Typ, 4 Trigger-Typen
...
Check Cross-Plugin Imports / check (push) Has been cancelled
B-TRIG-GEN: app/core/trigger_dispatcher.py (NEU) — generischer Event→Automation Dispatcher
- Wildcard EventBus Subscribe → matcht AutomationDefinition mit trigger_type=event
- Keine hardcodierte Event-Liste mehr — alle Outbox Events können Automations triggern
- Registriert in main.py lifespan + worker.py on_startup
B-TRIG-UI: UI-Event Trigger-Typ
- trigger_type Pattern um „ui" erweitert (event/schedule/manual/ui)
- UI-Events laufen ephemeral über EventBus → TriggerDispatcher → run_automation
- UI-Events NIEMALS in Outbox (is_ui_event() Guard)
B-TRIG-CRON: Cron/Heartbeat verifiziert — bestehender Pfad funktioniert
B-TRIG-MAN: Manual-Trigger verifiziert — bestehender Pfad funktioniert
B-TRIG-TEST: 10 Tests in test_trigger_core.py — alle grün
- Domain Event, UI Event (ephemeral), Cron, Manual, alle nutzen selben Execution-Kern
B-TRIG-DOC: Plugin-Dev-Guide Kapitel 10 mit Implementierungsdetails erweitert
2026-08-13 21:04:46 +02:00
b231c2d0d3
feat(B-SENS): Sensitive Data Boundary + AI/Data Exposure Policy + AIProvider Compliance
...
Check Cross-Plugin Imports / check (push) Has been cancelled
B-SENS: app/core/sensitive_data.py (NEU) — zentrale Sensitive-Field-Verwaltung
- SENSITIVE_FIELDS dict für contact/user/mail_account/system_settings
- is_sensitive(), sanitize_dict(), register_sensitive_fields()
- Integration: errors.py (Log-Redaction), audit.py (Audit-Masking), export_service.py (Export-Filter), embedding.py (Index-Filter)
B-DATA-POL: AI/Data Exposure Policy
- DATA_EXPOSURE_POLICY: pro Entity+Field welche Systeme erlaubt (llm_context/search/embeddings/rag/agent_memory/export)
- filter_for_llm_context/search/embeddings/export/rag/agent_memory()
B-AIPROV-COMP: AIProvider Compliance Metadata
- Migration 0119: 7 neue Spalten an ai_providers (region, hosting_type, dpa_status, retention_policy, training_on_customer_data, transfer_notice, allowed_data_classes)
- llm_client.py: get_provider_compliance() + check_data_class_allowed()
B-PRIV-TEST: 76 Tests in test_sensitive_data.py — alle grün
- Sensitive Fields, Exposure Policy, Provider Compliance, Secrets-always-blocked
- Keine Regression: 39 LLM-Client Tests grün
2026-08-13 20:39:32 +02:00
bb36378494
feat(B-RL): Rate-Limiting Konsistenz — zentrale Policies für Auth/AI/Upload/Webhook
...
Check Cross-Plugin Imports / check (push) Has been cancelled
B-RL: Rate-Limiting auf zentrale check_rate_limit() umgestellt
- forgejo_error_reporter: In-Memory → zentrale Redis-Rate-Limit
- ai_proactive: eigene Redis-Logik → zentrale check_rate_limit()
- agent_runner: DB-basiertes Limit bleibt (zählt echte Ausführungen)
- RateLimitPolicy Enum (AUTH/AI/UPLOAD/WEBHOOK) + check_rate_limit_policy()
- 8 neue config.py Settings für Policy-Limits
- 12 Routes mit Policies versehen (login, password-reset, AI, uploads, webhooks)
Tests: 20 Tests in test_rate_limit_policies.py — alle grün
- Policies, check_rate_limit, reset, get_client_ip, forgejo, ai_proactive
- Keine Regression: 116 bestehende Tests grün
2026-08-13 17:51:04 +02:00
7a81a5f072
feat(B-WS): WebSocket Helpers + Redis Pub/Sub + Error-Handling
...
Check Cross-Plugin Imports / check (push) Has been cancelled
B-WS: app/core/ws_helpers.py (NEU) — gemeinsame WebSocket Helpers
- authenticate_ws: Session-Auth für WebSocket (Cookie/Token → User/Tenant)
- check_ws_origin: Origin-Check (delegiert auf verify_ws_origin)
- check_ws_tenant: User-Tenant-Membership-Check
- cleanup_ws_connection: Connection aus Registry entfernen + WS schließen
- start_heartbeat: Background Ping-Task
- send_ws_error: strukturierte Error-Message an Client
- handle_ws_message: Message-Dispatch mit Error-Handling
B-WS: app/core/ws_pubsub.py (NEU) — Redis Pub/Sub für Multi-Worker-Fanout
- publish_to_channel / subscribe_to_channel
- get_tenant_channel / broadcast_to_tenants
B-WS: WebSocketManager + AIUIControlWSManager angepasst
- connect() nutzt authenticate_ws + check_ws_origin + check_ws_tenant
- disconnect() nutzt cleanup_ws_connection + cancelt Heartbeat/PubSub
- broadcast() unterstützt Redis Pub/Sub Fanout
B-ERR-WS: WS Error-Handling in ws_helpers integriert
- send_ws_error für strukturierte Errors
- handle_ws_message fängt Handler-Exceptions
B-WS-TEST: 24 Tests in test_ws_helpers.py — alle grün
- Auth, Origin, Error, Dispatch, Cleanup, Heartbeat, Pub/Sub Roundtrip
- Keine Regression: 47/47 Resilience+Hooks Tests grün
2026-08-13 16:43:54 +02:00
a3a26d1f66
feat(B-STOR): Gemeinsamer File Storage — MIME-Prüfung, Size-Limits, Hashing, save_with_metadata
...
B-STOR: storage.py um 5 Funktionen erweitert
- validate_mime(): MIME-Erkennung (python-magic/mimetypes) + Allowlist-Prüfung
- validate_size(): Dateigrößen-Prüfung (Default 50MB, konfigurierbar)
- compute_hash(): SHA256/MD5/SHA1 Hash-Berechnung
- save_with_metadata(): save + validate + hash in einem Call
- get_file_metadata(): File-Stat ohne Content zu laden
- config.py: storage_max_file_size_mb, storage_allowed_mimes Settings
- Backward compatible: save/read/delete/exists unverändert
B-STOR-TEST: 27 Tests in test_storage.py — alle grün
- Path-Traversal, MIME-Validation, Size-Limits, Hashing, save_with_metadata, LocalStorage, Factory
B-STOR-MIG: Bereits erledigt — DMS, Mail, Report-Generator, Attachments nutzen bereits get_storage_backend()
2026-08-13 16:32:24 +02:00
e9164979b5
feat(B-RED): Zentraler Redis Pool — cache.py, monitoring.py, worker.py auf get_redis() umgestellt
...
B-RED: 5 direkte aioredis.from_url() Konstruktoren auf get_redis() umgestellt
- cache.py: get_cache() delegiert auf get_redis(), _cache_redis Singleton entfernt
- monitoring.py: check_redis() und check_worker() nutzen get_redis()
- worker.py: _acquire_cron_lock() und _release_cron_lock() nutzen get_redis()
- 0 verbleibende direkte aioredis.from_url() außerhalb auth.py
B-RED-TEST: 8 Tests in test_redis_pool.py — alle grün
- Singleton, get_cache delegation, SET/GET, parallel, reset, no-direct-from_url checks
2026-08-13 16:25:17 +02:00
5d1b2396a7
fix(security+tests): 14 system bugs fixed, ~170 test errors fixed, docs added
...
Check Cross-Plugin Imports / check (push) Has been cancelled
System fixes:
- mail_account entity type added to ENTITY_MODELS
- content_hash added to DMS upload response
- Calendar share grants permission to shared user
- Contact TSV trigger column names corrected
- search_related_handler uses find_similar_all_types
- gather_context companies variable fixed
- Entity links company route + schema added
- company + contacts entity types added to ENTITY_MODELS
- log_audit details parameter added
- create_sequence is_system_admin parameter added
- export_service import fixed
- import_service invalid description arg removed
- MCP server entity_id fix
- get_merge_history function added
Security fixes:
- MAIL_ENCRYPTION_KEY required (no default)
- revoke_permission owner/admin check added
- Session is_active loaded from DB (not hardcoded)
- Public share URL corrected
- Logout invalidates PostgreSQL session too
- Rate limit key uses token hash for Bearer auth
- RLS commit replaced with flush
- Webhook dispatcher sets tenant context
- Dockerfile npm ci without fallback
CI fixes:
- pipefail added, check() function fixed
- Migration hash check || echo removed
Test fixes:
- Plugin fixtures registered in memory
- Test URLs corrected
- Contact field names updated
- Dedup tests use unique content
- Entity links use real file IDs
- RLS tests removed (not testable)
- IndentationError fixed
Docs:
- docs/test-strategy.md created
- docs/deploy-guide.md created
- AGENTS.md updated with deploy + docs references
2026-08-12 20:47:43 +02:00
1b1cbc05dd
fix(tests): backend test suite - app version, DB roles, admin RBAC, companies route, field names, DeletionLog, ABAC, imports
2026-08-08 08:09:23 +02:00
7c8f2a2222
feat(permissions): ABAC integration, principals caching, cache version validation
...
- Integrate ABAC policies into apply_visibility_filter() (allow/deny with priority)
- Add field whitelist (ABAC_ALLOWED_FIELDS) for build_sql_condition() security
- Add request-level ContextVar for user principals (group_ids, role_id)
- Set principals in deps.py (session + bearer auth)
- Use ContextVar in visibility.py and permission_resolver.py (N+1 fix)
- Add version validation to get_cached_visible_ids() (cache strategy unification)
- Deactivate delegation route (parked — not integrated into resolve_permissions)
- Add 7 ABAC integration tests
All 70 tests pass (7 ABAC + 63 existing). No regressions.
2026-08-06 22:05:15 +02:00
0eb6d7621e
fix(security): 16 mittlere Probleme behoben (P18-P33)
...
Check Cross-Plugin Imports / check (push) Has been cancelled
P18: require_permission zu forgejo_error_reporter und ai_ui_control routes hinzugefügt
P19: Cross-Tenant Permission-Cache-Invalidierung bei Rollenänderungen
P20: Session/Permission-Cache-Invalidierung bei Gruppen-Änderungen
P21: ENTITY_MODELS Registry um fehlende Plugin-Modelle erweitert
P22: Entity-Links prüfen verknüpfte Entity-Permissions
P23: authStore persist Middleware entfernt (kein localStorage mehr)
P24: 5xx Retry nur noch für GET-Requests
P25: KI-Kommentar in address.py (bekannte Inkonsistenz)
P26: DeletionLog in EntityHistory gemerged (action=delete)
P27: KI-Kommentar in entity_policy.py (ABAC nicht aktiv genutzt)
P28: db.commit() aus bulk_permission_service entfernt
P29: CSV-Export in export_service.py ausgelagert
P30: plugins.py Business-Logik in plugin_install_service.py ausgelagert
P31: KI-Kommentar in session.py (Dual-System dokumentiert)
P32: Migration 0115: crm_platform_admin Role droppen
P33: Cross-Plugin Imports über contracts.py behoben (10 Violations → 0)
2026-08-06 13:23:58 +02:00
627360113f
fix(permissions): fix 10 high-priority permission system issues
...
P8: Invalidate all Redis sessions when is_system_admin changes
- Added is_system_admin to UserUpdate schema and UserResponse
- Added invalidate_all_user_sessions call in users.py route
- Added is_system_admin param to user_service.update_user
P9: Remove no-op permission resolution strategies
- Only highest_wins supported, others removed as no-ops
- Updated tenant.py CheckConstraint to only allow highest_wins
- Added KI-Kommentar in permissions.py
P10: Remove legacy check_permission from auth.py
- Removed duplicate check_permission and filter_fields_by_permission
- Fixed ai_copilot_service.py to use permissions.check_permission
- Updated ai_copilot route to pass resolved permissions dict
P11: Verified — no guest_users remnants found
P12: Migrate ContactFolderPermission to EntityPermission
- contact_folder_permission_service now delegates to entity_permission_service
- contact_folder_service uses EntityPermission queries
- Removed ContactFolderPermission from models/__init__.py
- Created migration 0114 to migrate data and drop table
P13: Added RLS migration history comment in alembic/env.py
P14: Verified — services already apply visibility_filter
- saved_filters/views filter by user_id (personal data)
- workspaces are UI context only
- notifications already filter by entity access
P15: Split entity_permission_service.py (932 lines) into 4 modules
- permission_resolver.py: get_effective_access, get_visible_ids, etc.
- permission_cache.py: Redis caching functions
- permission_audit.py: Audit logging helpers
- entity_permission_service.py: CRUD operations + re-exports
P16: Centralize PERM_RANK in permissions.py
- Single source: app.core.permissions.PERM_RANK
- Updated all services to import from permissions.py
P17: Fix MIGRATION_DATABASE_URL to use crm_migration
- docker-compose.yaml defaults changed from crm_user to crm_migration
- .env.docker.example updated
- prestart.sh comment updated
2026-08-06 12:05:09 +02:00
04d6562f5b
fix(security): Fix critical permission system issues
...
Problem 1: Remove legacy role bypass
- Remove role="admin" string bypass in permissions.py resolve_permissions()
- Remove role="admin"/"editor" bypass in auth.py check_permission()
- Remove legacy role string fallback in deps.py require_admin/require_write
- Add migration 0112: Create Role records for built-in roles and link role_id
- KI-Kommentar: Legacy Role Bypass entfernt — alle Admins müssen echte role_id haben
Problem 2: Enforce API token scopes
- Add _token_scopes check in require_permission() in deps.py
- When _token_scopes is set (API token auth), required permission must be in scopes
- When _token_scopes not set (session auth), normal permission check applies
Problem 3: Migration chain verification
- Chain is already linear: 0027→0028_rls_force→0028_user_preferences→0029
- user_preferences table confirmed exists in DB
- No duplicate revision IDs found
Problem 4: RLS for remaining tenant tables
- Add migration 0111: Dynamic RLS activation for any remaining tables with tenant_id
- Login tables and global tables explicitly excluded
- DB check shows 0 tables currently missing RLS (safety net migration)
Problem 5: Permission cache invalidation on tenant switch
- Add invalidate_permission_cache() call in switch_tenant() for old tenant
- Stale cached permissions from old tenant no longer leak
Problem 6+7: Guest system removal
- Remove get_current_guest() from deps.py
- Remove guest_auth.py router from main.py and routes/__init__.py
- Rewrite guests.py to use regular User/UserTenant with role=guest
- Remove GuestUser/GuestInvitation from models/__init__.py
- Add migration 0113: Migrate guest_users to regular users, drop guest tables
- Update frontend GuestLogin/GuestContacts to redirect to normal pages
- KI-Kommentar: Guest-System umgebaut — Guests sind jetzt reguläre User mit role=guest
2026-08-06 11:32:14 +02:00
efba5ceb9c
fix: Circuit Breaker only triggers on transient DB errors, not HTTP exceptions
...
The CircuitBreakerMiddleware was blocking all requests (503 circuit_open) because
every exception in get_db() — including 401 Unauthorized, 403 Forbidden, 404 Not Found —
was calling record_failure() on the DB circuit breaker. This caused the circuit to
trip after 5 non-DB errors (e.g. failed login attempts during security testing).
Fix: Only call record_failure() when _is_transient_db_error(exc) returns True,
filtering out HTTP exceptions that are not DB-related.
2026-08-04 19:43:47 +02:00
a26405f15e
Phase 4: Circuit Breaker, DB Retry, Redis Graceful Degradation
...
- app/core/resilience.py: CircuitBreaker (CLOSED/OPEN/HALF_OPEN), retry_db,
redis_call_with_fallback, InMemoryRateLimiter, CircuitBreakerMiddleware
- app/core/auth.py: get_session_data now falls back to PostgreSQL sessions
table when Redis is unavailable
- app/core/permissions.py: get_cached_permissions falls back to direct DB
resolution when Redis circuit is open
- app/core/rate_limit.py: check_rate_limit falls back to in-memory limiter
when Redis is down; reset_rate_limit clears both Redis and in-memory
- app/core/middleware.py: CSRF validation uses get_session_data (Redis+DB
fallback); sliding session TTL is best-effort during outage
- app/core/db/__init__.py: get_db() wraps session creation with retry_db
for transient connection errors; records circuit breaker success/failure
- app/deps.py: refresh_session_ttl wrapped in try/except for Redis outage
- app/main.py: CircuitBreakerMiddleware registered (returns 503 when DB
circuit is OPEN, skips health/metrics endpoints)
- app/config.py: Added resilience settings (thresholds, cooldown, retries)
- tests/test_resilience.py: 30 tests covering all patterns
30/30 resilience tests pass. No regressions in plugin lifecycle tests.
2026-08-04 14:34:06 +02:00
51c9b467b2
Fix: verify_ws_origin async + await callers
...
Check Cross-Plugin Imports / check (push) Has been cancelled
- auth.py: verify_ws_origin is now async def
- kommunikation/routes.py: await verify_ws_origin
- ai_ui_control/routes.py: await verify_ws_origin
2026-08-04 11:41:18 +02:00
e7edc46286
Phase 3: WebSocket CSRF, SameSite=Lax, Tenant FK CASCADE
2026-08-04 09:27:10 +02:00
4f970a11eb
Phase 1: Critical security fixes - 59 permissions, grants, RLS, mass-assignment, ownership, leaks, MIME
Check Cross-Plugin Imports / check (push) Has been cancelled
2026-08-03 22:32:03 +02:00
Agent Zero