7d86592e54
cleanup: remove all unconnected Phase I+J scaffold code and unconnected Phase F+H modules (workstream_contract, proactive_feed, dashboard, dsgvo_export, onboarding, mcp_exposure, integration_tools, self_improvement, agent_workstream, workflows/workstream, knowledge_sources, knowledge_extraction, knowledge_lifecycle, platform.py routes, 13 frontend files, 2 test files), restore Dashboard.tsx, tsc clean, backend OK
2026-08-19 09:47:20 +02:00
9e37c41871
fix: connect all new pages to router + navigation + backend API routes (Workstream, Wiki, Improvement, Onboarding, Dashboard, DSGVO), platform.py with 9 endpoints, tsc clean
2026-08-19 09:23:54 +02:00
59f05de621
feat(G): G-WORK/G-HUMAN-DEC/G-UI-TEMPL/G-DOC — workflow workstream, decision guard, template gallery (3 templates), API docs, 43 tests passing
2026-08-18 11:11:50 +02:00
9866fb2d14
feat(G): G-APPROVAL/G-MAN/G-WEB/G-LOG/G-RUN-resume — workflow routes (resume, manual trigger, webhook trigger, step history, approve/reject), 30 tests passing
2026-08-18 08:31:18 +02:00
680557087e
feat(F): F-TEST + F-DOC + F-UI-TRIG — Phase F complete!
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- F-TEST: tests/test_phase_f_agents.py (1425 lines, 45 tests, all pass) — ReAct Loop, Permissions, Approvals, Skills, Context Builder, Data Policy, Transparency, Workstream, Budget
- F-DOC: docs/api-documentation.md (Phase F endpoints), docs/plugin-development-guide.md (Agent chapter 32), docs/test-strategy.md (Phase F test conventions)
- F-UI-TRIG: trigger_dispatcher dispatches agents on ui.*/context.* events (already implemented in F-PROACTIVE)
- Bug fix: approval.py metadata reserved attribute renamed to request_metadata
- PROGRESS.md: Phase F marked done, ~155/223 tasks done (70%)
2026-08-17 19:36:42 +02:00
638e3f3e1e
feat(F): F-PERM permissions, F-APPR approval, F-AIUSE metadata, F-TRANS transparency, F-DATA-POL data policy, F-OVERSIGHT decision record, F-DRY dry-run, F-AUDIT audit log
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- F-PERM: app/ai/agent_permissions.py (230 lines) — AgentPermissionContext, resolve_agent_permissions(), filter_visible_agents(), check_agent_execute_permission(), optimistic locking
- F-APPR: app/core/approval.py (160 lines) + app/routes/approvals.py (305 lines) + migration 0123 — ApprovalRequest model, CRUD API, approve/reject/expire
- F-AIUSE: app/ai/ai_use_case.py (156 lines) — AIUseCaseMetadata Pydantic model, validate_ai_use_case()
- F-TRANS: app/ai/transparency.py (60 lines) — mark_as_ai_generated(), is_ai_participant()
- F-DATA-POL: app/ai/data_policy.py (210 lines) — enforce_data_policy() with SENSITIVE_FIELDS + provider compliance
- F-OVERSIGHT: app/ai/oversight.py (108 lines) — DecisionRecord, create_decision_record()
- F-DRY: agent_loop.py updated with dry_run parameter
- F-AUDIT: agent_loop.py updated with audit log for tool calls
- agent_routes.py: AI use case metadata endpoints added
- main.py: approval routes registered
- All Python compile checks pass
2026-08-17 16:57:50 +02:00
5b0b1e093a
fix(imports): 3 broken imports — ENTITY_MODELS path, Room→CommConversation, get_cached_mail_summary→MailService
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2026-08-17 07:14:29 +02:00
f265eef5ae
fix(auth): useAuth() hook in AppShell/StartLayout + is_system_admin in login response
2026-08-16 23:26:59 +02:00
abbe7a18fc
fix(audit): P0-P3 audit fixes — 838 ruff errors → 0, 30 F821 bugs fixed, 118 files changed
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- P0: hooks.py 3-tuple fix, trigger_dispatcher Contract, contacts/plugin unregister_actions_by_owner
- P0: 5 test files — check_permission mocks removed, hardcoded DB credential → env var
- P1: attachment_service DmsFile via Contract helper, restore_registry/history_hooks dedup
- P1: mail/plugin restore unregister, mcp_client datetime.now(UTC), saved_views/filters patterns
- P1: ProtectedRoute fail-closed, 13 test assertion fixes (bcrypt, DB-URLs, SECRET_KEYs)
- P2: deprecated notifications → post_system_message (3 files), forgejo Base, report_generator lazy import
- P2: webhooks permissions, deps.py/roles.py plugin perms removed, import_export default
- P2: address/tags/entity_links patterns removed, worker.py Contract-Umgehungen fixed
- P2: 28 frontend TODOs (hardcoded constants, deprecated notification API)
- P3: dead code, duplicates, deprecated imports, private attr, __import__ inline
- P3: 8 frontend TODOs (LucideIcons, inline styles, XSS, i18n)
- ruff: 838 → 0 (612 auto-fix + 246 manual + 27 F821 regression fix)
- F821: 30 → 0 (AutomationDefinition, DmsFile, user_id, Path, Any, String)
- Contract-Umgehungen: 2 neue gefunden (worker.py:169, worker.py:280) und gefixt
2026-08-16 01:17:18 +02:00
a4d0f0c35d
feat(D): Phase D — Undo/Restore komplett implementiert
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- D-GEN: RestoreRegistry mit RestoreConfig (model_class, restore_permission, excluded_fields, special_handler)
- D-HOOK: history_hooks.py mit register_history_hooks() für after_create/update/delete
- D-CORE: Company create+update record_history in companies.py
- D-PLUG: Task/Calendar/DMS record_history in services/routes
- D-SOFT: Alle registrierten Entitäten haben deleted_at + un-delete via Registry
- D-MAIL: Mail special_handler (IMAP Trash-Move, Folder-Verify) + record_history in delete/move
- D-TRASH: GET /entity-history/trash (filterbar, paginiert) + Frontend Trash.tsx
- D-TOAST: UndoToast.tsx (5s Auto-Dismiss, useUndoToast Hook)
- D-HIST-UI: HistoryPanel.tsx (Timeline, Diff-View, Restore-Button)
- D-BULK: POST /entity-history/bulk-restore mit partial_success Semantik
- D-RET: POST /entity-history/retention/archive (GDPR hard-delete >90 Tage)
- D-TEST: 26 Tests in test_restore_registry.py, alle grün
- D-DOC: test-strategy.md + security_kernel.md aktualisiert
Backend: 10 Dateien, Frontend: 7 Dateien, Tests: 1 Datei, Docs: 3 Dateien
26/26 Tests passed, TSC 0 errors, App import 492 routes
2026-08-13 23:08:29 +02:00
e7ae0ad5ce
feat(C.5): Modularer Import/Export — Shared Helpers, Preview/Mapping, Background Jobs, Partial-Failure
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C5-BASE: app/services/import_export_helpers.py (NEU, 352 Zeilen)
- parse_csv/json/xlsx, write_csv/json/xlsx, map_fields, suggest_mapping
- validate_row, build_error_report, build_import_result, detect_format
C5-PREVIEW: POST /import/preview + POST /import/validate
- Preview gibt erste 10 Zeilen + Spalten + Mapping-Vorschlag
- Validate gibt Fehler-Report ohne Import
C5-JOB: app/services/import_export_jobs.py (NEU, 165 Zeilen)
- ARQ Background Job für Files >1000 Zeilen
- Job-Status: pending/processing/completed/partial_success/failed
- GET /import/status/{job_id} — Status + Progress + Fehler-Report
- Partial-Failure: try/except pro Zeile, fehlerhafte gesammelt, erfolgreiche committet
C5-CONTACT+C5-COMPANY: Handler auf Shared Helpers umgestellt
C5-UI: ImportWizard.tsx (5 Steps: Upload→Preview→Validation→Review→Result)
C5-TEST: 45 Tests in test_import_export.py — alle grün
C5-DOC: Plugin-Dev-Guide Kapitel 31 (Import/Export Handler)
2026-08-13 22:43:33 +02:00
1baa9481a2
feat(B-NOTIF): Notification→Message Konsolidierung — System-Channel, post_system_message(), Migration
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B-NOTIF-SYS: CommConversation um is_system Feld erweitert, get_or_create_system_channel()
B-NOTIF-EVT: post_system_message() in kommunikation/services.py — erstellt CommMessage im System-Channel
- create_notification() als deprecated Wrapper delegiert auf post_system_message()
- Text-Block + action_card Block mit Deep-Link, Metadata: notification_type/severity/entity_ref
B-NOTIF-PREF: NotificationPreference als Routing-Konfiguration, stumm/disabled respektiert
B-NOTIF-MIG: Migration 0120 — Notifications → CommMessages migriert, notifications_legacy View
B-NOTIF-DEPREC: Notification-Routes als deprecated markiert, keine Routes entfernt
B-NOTIF-TEST: 19 Tests in test_notification_migration.py — alle grün
- System-Channel, post_system_message, create_notification Wrapper, Preferences, Unread-Badge, Migration Mapping, Sensitive Fields
2026-08-13 21:19:41 +02:00
ae228bb484
feat(B-HOOK): Lifecycle Hooks + Outbox Events — 55 neue Hooks, 10 Domain Events
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B-HOOK-CORE: Company Hooks (6: before/after create/update/delete)
B-HOOK-MAIL: Mail Hooks (5: after_receive, before/after_delete, before/after_move)
B-HOOK-DMS: DMS Hooks (10: after_upload, before/after_update/delete/restore, folder CRUD)
B-HOOK-CAL: Calendar Hooks (4: before/after update/delete)
B-HOOK-TASK: Task Hooks (6: before/after create/update/delete)
B-HOOK-COMM: Communication Hooks (8: conversation create, message/edit/delete)
B-HOOK-AI: Agent Hooks (2: before/after_run)
B-HOOK-WF: Workflow Hooks (4: before/after_start, after_complete/cancel)
B-HOOK-TAG: Tag Hooks (8: create/assign/unassign/delete)
B-HOOK-SEARCH: Search Filters (2: before/after_search)
B-EVT-OUTBOX: 10 Domain Events (task.completed, file.created/deleted/restored, mail.received, workflow.started/completed/cancelled, agent.run_started/completed)
B-HOOK-TEST: 79 Tests in test_lifecycle_hooks.py — alle grün
B-HOOK-DOC: Plugin-Dev-Guide Kapitel 8 aktualisiert (Hook-Liste + Outbox Event-Liste)
2026-08-13 20:54:15 +02:00
b231c2d0d3
feat(B-SENS): Sensitive Data Boundary + AI/Data Exposure Policy + AIProvider Compliance
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B-SENS: app/core/sensitive_data.py (NEU) — zentrale Sensitive-Field-Verwaltung
- SENSITIVE_FIELDS dict für contact/user/mail_account/system_settings
- is_sensitive(), sanitize_dict(), register_sensitive_fields()
- Integration: errors.py (Log-Redaction), audit.py (Audit-Masking), export_service.py (Export-Filter), embedding.py (Index-Filter)
B-DATA-POL: AI/Data Exposure Policy
- DATA_EXPOSURE_POLICY: pro Entity+Field welche Systeme erlaubt (llm_context/search/embeddings/rag/agent_memory/export)
- filter_for_llm_context/search/embeddings/export/rag/agent_memory()
B-AIPROV-COMP: AIProvider Compliance Metadata
- Migration 0119: 7 neue Spalten an ai_providers (region, hosting_type, dpa_status, retention_policy, training_on_customer_data, transfer_notice, allowed_data_classes)
- llm_client.py: get_provider_compliance() + check_data_class_allowed()
B-PRIV-TEST: 76 Tests in test_sensitive_data.py — alle grün
- Sensitive Fields, Exposure Policy, Provider Compliance, Secrets-always-blocked
- Keine Regression: 39 LLM-Client Tests grün
2026-08-13 20:39:32 +02:00
bb36378494
feat(B-RL): Rate-Limiting Konsistenz — zentrale Policies für Auth/AI/Upload/Webhook
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B-RL: Rate-Limiting auf zentrale check_rate_limit() umgestellt
- forgejo_error_reporter: In-Memory → zentrale Redis-Rate-Limit
- ai_proactive: eigene Redis-Logik → zentrale check_rate_limit()
- agent_runner: DB-basiertes Limit bleibt (zählt echte Ausführungen)
- RateLimitPolicy Enum (AUTH/AI/UPLOAD/WEBHOOK) + check_rate_limit_policy()
- 8 neue config.py Settings für Policy-Limits
- 12 Routes mit Policies versehen (login, password-reset, AI, uploads, webhooks)
Tests: 20 Tests in test_rate_limit_policies.py — alle grün
- Policies, check_rate_limit, reset, get_client_ip, forgejo, ai_proactive
- Keine Regression: 116 bestehende Tests grün
2026-08-13 17:51:04 +02:00
5d1b2396a7
fix(security+tests): 14 system bugs fixed, ~170 test errors fixed, docs added
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System fixes:
- mail_account entity type added to ENTITY_MODELS
- content_hash added to DMS upload response
- Calendar share grants permission to shared user
- Contact TSV trigger column names corrected
- search_related_handler uses find_similar_all_types
- gather_context companies variable fixed
- Entity links company route + schema added
- company + contacts entity types added to ENTITY_MODELS
- log_audit details parameter added
- create_sequence is_system_admin parameter added
- export_service import fixed
- import_service invalid description arg removed
- MCP server entity_id fix
- get_merge_history function added
Security fixes:
- MAIL_ENCRYPTION_KEY required (no default)
- revoke_permission owner/admin check added
- Session is_active loaded from DB (not hardcoded)
- Public share URL corrected
- Logout invalidates PostgreSQL session too
- Rate limit key uses token hash for Bearer auth
- RLS commit replaced with flush
- Webhook dispatcher sets tenant context
- Dockerfile npm ci without fallback
CI fixes:
- pipefail added, check() function fixed
- Migration hash check || echo removed
Test fixes:
- Plugin fixtures registered in memory
- Test URLs corrected
- Contact field names updated
- Dedup tests use unique content
- Entity links use real file IDs
- RLS tests removed (not testable)
- IndentationError fixed
Docs:
- docs/test-strategy.md created
- docs/deploy-guide.md created
- AGENTS.md updated with deploy + docs references
2026-08-12 20:47:43 +02:00
1b1cbc05dd
fix(tests): backend test suite - app version, DB roles, admin RBAC, companies route, field names, DeletionLog, ABAC, imports
2026-08-08 08:09:23 +02:00
8d2aa58665
fix: export_service import, UTC import in backup_service
2026-08-07 08:07:56 +02:00
0eb6d7621e
fix(security): 16 mittlere Probleme behoben (P18-P33)
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P18: require_permission zu forgejo_error_reporter und ai_ui_control routes hinzugefügt
P19: Cross-Tenant Permission-Cache-Invalidierung bei Rollenänderungen
P20: Session/Permission-Cache-Invalidierung bei Gruppen-Änderungen
P21: ENTITY_MODELS Registry um fehlende Plugin-Modelle erweitert
P22: Entity-Links prüfen verknüpfte Entity-Permissions
P23: authStore persist Middleware entfernt (kein localStorage mehr)
P24: 5xx Retry nur noch für GET-Requests
P25: KI-Kommentar in address.py (bekannte Inkonsistenz)
P26: DeletionLog in EntityHistory gemerged (action=delete)
P27: KI-Kommentar in entity_policy.py (ABAC nicht aktiv genutzt)
P28: db.commit() aus bulk_permission_service entfernt
P29: CSV-Export in export_service.py ausgelagert
P30: plugins.py Business-Logik in plugin_install_service.py ausgelagert
P31: KI-Kommentar in session.py (Dual-System dokumentiert)
P32: Migration 0115: crm_platform_admin Role droppen
P33: Cross-Plugin Imports über contracts.py behoben (10 Violations → 0)
2026-08-06 13:23:58 +02:00
627360113f
fix(permissions): fix 10 high-priority permission system issues
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P8: Invalidate all Redis sessions when is_system_admin changes
- Added is_system_admin to UserUpdate schema and UserResponse
- Added invalidate_all_user_sessions call in users.py route
- Added is_system_admin param to user_service.update_user
P9: Remove no-op permission resolution strategies
- Only highest_wins supported, others removed as no-ops
- Updated tenant.py CheckConstraint to only allow highest_wins
- Added KI-Kommentar in permissions.py
P10: Remove legacy check_permission from auth.py
- Removed duplicate check_permission and filter_fields_by_permission
- Fixed ai_copilot_service.py to use permissions.check_permission
- Updated ai_copilot route to pass resolved permissions dict
P11: Verified — no guest_users remnants found
P12: Migrate ContactFolderPermission to EntityPermission
- contact_folder_permission_service now delegates to entity_permission_service
- contact_folder_service uses EntityPermission queries
- Removed ContactFolderPermission from models/__init__.py
- Created migration 0114 to migrate data and drop table
P13: Added RLS migration history comment in alembic/env.py
P14: Verified — services already apply visibility_filter
- saved_filters/views filter by user_id (personal data)
- workspaces are UI context only
- notifications already filter by entity access
P15: Split entity_permission_service.py (932 lines) into 4 modules
- permission_resolver.py: get_effective_access, get_visible_ids, etc.
- permission_cache.py: Redis caching functions
- permission_audit.py: Audit logging helpers
- entity_permission_service.py: CRUD operations + re-exports
P16: Centralize PERM_RANK in permissions.py
- Single source: app.core.permissions.PERM_RANK
- Updated all services to import from permissions.py
P17: Fix MIGRATION_DATABASE_URL to use crm_migration
- docker-compose.yaml defaults changed from crm_user to crm_migration
- .env.docker.example updated
- prestart.sh comment updated
2026-08-06 12:05:09 +02:00
8060505baa
refactor(cleanup): remove dead GuestUser/GuestInvitation code and fix test imports
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Deleted:
- app/models/guest_user.py
- app/models/guest_invitation.py
- app/routes/guest_auth.py (was orphaned, not imported)
- tests/test_guest_auth.py (tested removed guest auth system)
Modified:
- app/models/__init__.py: removed stale GuestUser/GuestInvitation comments
- app/services/entity_permission_service.py: updated guest permission comment
- tests/test_permission_system_live.py: replaced GuestUser with User+UserTenant(role=guest),
changed principal_type from "guest" to "user", switched guest test from
/api/v1/guest/login to regular /api/v1/auth/login endpoint
Frontend: no guest components found, nothing to clean up.
Alembic migrations: historical migrations referencing guest_users/guest_invitations
tables are left intact (they document DB history).
2026-08-06 11:46:00 +02:00
04d6562f5b
fix(security): Fix critical permission system issues
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Problem 1: Remove legacy role bypass
- Remove role="admin" string bypass in permissions.py resolve_permissions()
- Remove role="admin"/"editor" bypass in auth.py check_permission()
- Remove legacy role string fallback in deps.py require_admin/require_write
- Add migration 0112: Create Role records for built-in roles and link role_id
- KI-Kommentar: Legacy Role Bypass entfernt — alle Admins müssen echte role_id haben
Problem 2: Enforce API token scopes
- Add _token_scopes check in require_permission() in deps.py
- When _token_scopes is set (API token auth), required permission must be in scopes
- When _token_scopes not set (session auth), normal permission check applies
Problem 3: Migration chain verification
- Chain is already linear: 0027→0028_rls_force→0028_user_preferences→0029
- user_preferences table confirmed exists in DB
- No duplicate revision IDs found
Problem 4: RLS for remaining tenant tables
- Add migration 0111: Dynamic RLS activation for any remaining tables with tenant_id
- Login tables and global tables explicitly excluded
- DB check shows 0 tables currently missing RLS (safety net migration)
Problem 5: Permission cache invalidation on tenant switch
- Add invalidate_permission_cache() call in switch_tenant() for old tenant
- Stale cached permissions from old tenant no longer leak
Problem 6+7: Guest system removal
- Remove get_current_guest() from deps.py
- Remove guest_auth.py router from main.py and routes/__init__.py
- Rewrite guests.py to use regular User/UserTenant with role=guest
- Remove GuestUser/GuestInvitation from models/__init__.py
- Add migration 0113: Migrate guest_users to regular users, drop guest tables
- Update frontend GuestLogin/GuestContacts to redirect to normal pages
- KI-Kommentar: Guest-System umgebaut — Guests sind jetzt reguläre User mit role=guest
2026-08-06 11:32:14 +02:00
67015ef82b
fix(permissions): comprehensive live permission system tests + delete permission fixes
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- Add tests/test_permission_system_live.py: 33 live tests against real PostgreSQL
testing RBAC, ABAC, RLS, cross-tenant isolation, guest access, entity sharing,
field-level permissions, role invalidation, group permissions, membership suspension
- fix(contacts): delete route uses contacts:delete instead of contacts:write
The delete_contact and delete_contact_person routes were checking contacts:write
permission instead of contacts:delete, allowing users without delete permission
to delete contacts.
- fix(contacts): DeleteContactCommand passes is_system_admin to service
DeleteContactCommand.run() was not passing is_system_admin from the session
to contact_service.delete_contact(), causing system admins to be blocked
by the row-level admin access check.
- fix(contacts): allow deletion of tenant-owned contacts
contact_service.delete_contact() required admin-level entity access for ALL
contacts, including tenant-owned ones (owner_id=None). Tenant-owned contacts
can now be deleted by any user with contacts:delete permission (already
verified by the route via require_permission).
2026-08-06 09:49:07 +02:00
4f970a11eb
Phase 1: Critical security fixes - 59 permissions, grants, RLS, mass-assignment, ownership, leaks, MIME
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2026-08-03 22:32:03 +02:00
bd9fc15418
A1: Permission-Checks fuer delegations, policies, permission_templates, ai_copilot
2026-08-03 21:42:11 +02:00
5d35f0064e
Performance Optimierungen: Rate Limit, created_at Index, Keyset-Pagination
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1. Rate Limit erhoeht: 60 -> 300 Requests/Minute (fuer 100+ User)
2. Migration 0099: created_at DESC Index auf allen Tabellen (Order by Performance)
3. Keyset-Pagination: optionaler cursor Parameter fuer contacts API
- cursor=UUID nutzt WHERE id > cursor statt OFFSET
- Backward compatible: ohne cursor wird page/page_size genutzt
- next_cursor in Response fuer naechste Seite
Tests: 43/43 bestanden
2026-08-03 19:18:09 +02:00
29d55cb187
Phase 6: DMS & Attachments — Streaming, Deduplikation, API-Bereinigung
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6.4 Upload streamen:
- attachment_service.save_attachment: Streamt in 1MB Chunks statt await file.read()
- routes/attachments.py: Uebergibt UploadFile direkt statt bytes
6.5 Download streamen:
- DMS preview_file: FileResponse fuer LocalStorage (automatisches Streaming)
- Kein storage.read() mehr fuer LocalStorage
6.6 Tenantlokale Deduplikation:
- DMS Upload: Prueft content_hash vor Erstellung, wiederverwendet existierendes File
- attachment_service: Dedup bereits vorhanden, jetzt mit Streaming kompatibel
- Migration 0098: Partial Unique Index (tenant_id, content_hash) WHERE content_hash IS NOT NULL AND deleted_at IS NULL
6.7 API-Ausgabe bereinigt:
- attachment_service: storage_path und content_hash aus API-Ausgaben entfernt
- DMS routes: content_hash aus 4 API-Endpunkten entfernt
Tests: 54/54 bestanden (17 Workspace + 13 API Token + 24 Command)
2026-08-03 14:21:43 +02:00
8ad0a19f25
Phase 5: AI/MCP Bearer-Auth + Delegationstoken + Audit
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5.1 Delegationstoken (app/core/delegation_token.py):
- HMAC-SHA256 signiert mit SECRET_KEY, max 60s Lifetime
- Payload: user_id, tenant_id, agent_id, audience, expires_at, token_id
- Statelose Verifikation, Audience-Check, Expiry-Check
5.2 MCP Bearer-Auth:
- app/core/api_token.py: Token Service (create, verify, revoke, list)
- app/deps.py: get_current_user_bearer + get_current_user_or_bearer
- app/routes/api_tokens.py: Token CRUD Routes (create, list, revoke)
- MCP Server Routes: get_current_user_or_bearer akzeptiert Session + Bearer
5.3 Methodenrechte:
- MCP nutzt bereits mcp:read/mcp:write basierend auf tool_def.required_permission
5.5 Audit:
- MCP Tool-Ausfuehrung wird protokolliert (log_audit mit correlation_id)
Tests: 13/13 bestanden (7 API Token + 6 Delegation Token)
2026-08-03 14:06:55 +02:00
3cbf92191e
Reparaturplan Fixes: Widget workspace_id check, total bug, context is_visible, permissions, fallbacks
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Backend:
- Widget total: 0 bug fixed (now returns len(widgets))
- Widget update/delete: now verifies workspace_id + tenant_id (was only tenant_id)
- Workspace context: returns all modules with is_visible flag (was only visible modules)
- is_workspace_manager() removed (Plan 4.2: no manager checks)
- seed_default_workspace: removed hardcoded modules (Plan 4.7: no hardcoded tiles)
- Workspace permissions registered in CORE_PERMISSIONS (Plan 2.3)
Frontend:
- Permission fallback removed: Sidebar/TopBar show nothing while loading (Plan 2.4)
- workspaceStore isModuleVisible: fail-closed when isSystemAdmin undefined
- WorkspaceManager: AVAILABLE_MODULES replaced with dynamic core+plugin items (Plan 4.4)
Tests:
- 17 backend tests (removed is_workspace_manager test, adapted widget/context tests)
- 13 frontend tests (added undefined-isSystemAdmin test, adapted visibility tests)
2026-08-03 12:44:02 +02:00
310a9f0542
Phase 6: Workspaces — Widget CRUD, Manager-Check, Cross-Tenant, Zustand Store, Settings Route
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Backend:
- Widget CRUD: get_widgets, create_widget, update_widget, delete_widget
- Manager role check: is_workspace_manager
- Cross-tenant validation: verify_user_same_tenant (UserTenant)
- Default workspace seeding: seed_default_workspace with 12 standard modules
- Set user default workspace: set_user_default_workspace
- Fix create_workspace default uniqueness (unset others before insert)
- Widget CRUD routes: GET/POST/PUT/DELETE /{workspace_id}/widgets
- Set-default route: POST /{workspace_id}/set-default
- Cross-tenant validation in assign_user route
Frontend:
- workspaceStore (Zustand): central state with sessionStorage persistence
- API client interceptor: X-Workspace-ID header on all requests
- useWorkspace hook refactored to use workspaceStore
- Widget API hooks: useWorkspaceWidgets, useCreateWorkspaceWidget, etc.
- useSetDefaultWorkspace hook
- Settings route: /settings/workspaces with WorkspaceManagerPage
- Settings nav item for Workspaces
Tests:
- 25 backend tests (CRUD, modules, widgets, users, manager, seeding, context, isolation)
- 12 frontend tests (workspaceStore state, visibility, persistence, reset)
- 48/48 backend tests passing
- 12/12 frontend tests passing
2026-08-03 03:39:27 +02:00
74936b3972
Phase 5 (v2): Processing-Recovery, Retention-Cleanup, Replay-Delivery-Reset
...
- recover_stuck_events: Reset processing events stuck >120s back to pending
- cleanup_published_events: Delete published events older than 30 days
- Replay now resets outbox_deliveries for clean retry
- Worker: hourly retention cleanup cron job
- API: /recover-stuck and /cleanup-published endpoints
- process_outbox_batch: auto-recovery at start of each tenant iteration
- 23/23 tests passing (5 new tests)
2026-08-02 23:47:29 +02:00
07a99975ec
Phase 5: Outbox DLQ, Monitoring, Consumer-Registry
...
- Migration 0092: DLQ columns (error_message, failed_at) + consumer_inbox RLS fix
- outbox.py: DLQ logic, replay functions, stats, consumer registry
- app/routes/outbox.py: 5 API endpoints (stats, failed, replay, replay-all, consumer-registry)
- outbox_deliveries tracking per consumer handler
- 18/18 tests passing
2026-08-02 23:25:54 +02:00
100b9f705c
phase1: separate DB roles, RLS restoration, login on crm_auth
...
Check Cross-Plugin Imports / check (push) Has been cancelled
- config.py: add auth_database_url, worker_database_url, migration_database_url
- db/__init__.py: separate engines for auth/worker/migration + get_auth_db/get_worker_db
- auth.py: all auth endpoints use get_auth_db (crm_auth role)
- auth_service.py: remove login fallback, require active membership, check status
- auth_service.py: switch_tenant checks active membership status
- alembic/env.py: use migration_database_url for Alembic
- docker-compose.yml: add AUTH_DATABASE_URL, WORKER_DATABASE_URL
- .env.example: add all 4 DB URLs with separate roles
- migration 0085: transfer ownership to crm_migration, fix BYPASSRLS,
enable RLS+FORCE on all tenant tables, drop old policies, create new
fail-closed policies scoped to crm_api+crm_worker, revoke excessive grants,
grant minimal crm_auth access, drop crm_runtime, set default privileges
- tests/test_rls_coverage.py: automated RLS coverage check (13 tests)
- tests/test_cross_tenant_security_v2.py: RLS tests with unprivileged role
2026-07-31 02:05:16 +02:00
7fbbe420bd
fix: comprehensive system audit fixes (55+ issues)
...
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CRITICAL:
- Fix SQL injection in prestart.sh (parameterized query)
- Fix secret key validation (always validate, not just production)
- Fix workspace model partial index bug (func.text -> text)
- Fix HealthResponse schema (add checks field)
- Fix Tenant import in permissions.py (NameError on every auth request)
- Fix README tech stack (React instead of Alpine.js)
- Delete broken test_cross_tenant_security_v2.py
- Add fail-closed RLS migration 0084 (48 tenant tables)
HIGH:
- Add GeneralRateLimitMiddleware for all API routes
- Add file type blocklist for DMS and attachment uploads
- Fix guest auth: Pydantic schema, tenant_slug required, CSRF bypass
- Fix CSRF bypass path matching (in -> endswith)
- Add worker healthcheck in docker-compose.yml
- Add ARQ max_tries=3 for job retries
- Fix 28 bare pass in mail services (-> logger.debug)
- Fix print() -> logger in main.py and ai_assistant
- Fix duplicate email handling (catch IntegrityError -> 409)
- Add session revocation (invalidate_all_user_sessions)
- Add resource limits to all containers
- Fix CORS default (localhost -> production domain)
- Fix SameSite=Lax -> Strict
- Fix Redis password visibility in healthcheck
- Fix npm vulnerabilities (19 -> 9)
- Fix Sidebar OOM (wildcard lucide import -> curated ICON_MAP)
MEDIUM:
- Localize ErrorBoundary to German
- Wire Mail.tsx save/delete filter to API
- Document system_notif plugin (no routes needed)
- Fix datetime.utcnow() -> datetime.now(UTC)
- Pin litellm version (>=1.0,<2.0)
- Move CSRF token from sessionStorage to in-memory
- Fix restore_backup error handling and transaction
- Fix Dms.tsx useEffect cleanup
- Add skip-to-content link for accessibility
- Add selectinload imports to 3 services
- Add .env.example missing variables
- Fix AppShell/TopBar/Sidebar test mocks
NEW TESTS:
- test_guest_auth.py (6 tests)
- test_user_service.py (8 tests)
- test_backup_service.py (5 tests)
NEW SCHEMAS:
- saved_filter, saved_view, user_preference, workspace, entity_policy
Tests: 22/22 PASSED
2026-07-31 00:58:05 +02:00
124846ae3b
fix: workflow route remove is_system_admin param not accepted by service
2026-07-30 11:16:56 +02:00
ee4b0de144
fix: /health/ready status mapping (up/down → ok/fail)
2026-07-29 23:25:56 +02:00
32db1498ba
fix: /health/ready dict handling
2026-07-29 23:23:52 +02:00
3e9cfbef8a
phase11: /health/live + /health/ready endpoints + monitoring docs + Prometheus metrics docs
2026-07-29 23:22:29 +02:00
f1c025f2ef
fix: workspaces router prefix /api/v1/workspaces
2026-07-29 18:36:40 +02:00
2423053477
phase5: workspace backend — models, service, routes, migration 0072
2026-07-29 18:32:35 +02:00
5e29b50bcc
fix: storage.load() → storage.read() for attachment download
2026-07-29 17:55:33 +02:00
8322adb73f
phase4: entity_attachments table + DMS unified storage + attachment service rewritten + download via DMS
2026-07-29 17:52:55 +02:00
f1a2484055
fix: WeasyPrint URL fetcher + attachment improvements + webhook error propagation + WebSocket conversation check + RLS disabled on system tables (bootstrap fix)
Check Cross-Plugin Imports / check (push) Has been cancelled
2026-07-29 13:19:21 +02:00
de53bcff25
fix: guest_sessions Redis index for revocation + RLS on all tenant tables (migration 0064)
2026-07-29 12:46:50 +02:00
8dacb739bd
P1 fixes: outbox no_handlers, HTML sanitization, WebSocket plugin check, fail-closed plugin gate, plugin admin-only
2026-07-29 12:33:46 +02:00
8539a6402c
P1.6: secure guest invitation tokens (secrets.token_urlsafe + SHA-256 hash + one-time use + session revocation)
2026-07-29 12:30:00 +02:00
81ae5b7cb6
fix: redis cache invalidation in permission service + permission check in entity_permissions route + upsert cache invalidation + remove TopBar quick-create
2026-07-29 10:45:45 +02:00
da76b4636e
fix: require_permission decorator → Depends() in entity_permissions.py
2026-07-29 08:05:56 +02:00
24690fb674
sprint20-23: tests + documentation + guest access + infrastructure + migrations 0059
2026-07-29 02:53:37 +02:00
ddf73ee42e
sprint14-19: ABAC UI rule editor + permission templates + bulk share + analytics + delegation + resolution strategies + migrations 0056-0058
2026-07-29 02:47:03 +02:00
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