Leopoldadmin/leocrm
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155 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Agent Zero 1b1cbc05dd fix(tests): backend test suite - app version, DB roles, admin RBAC, companies route, field names, DeletionLog, ABAC, imports 2026-08-08 08:09:23 +02:00
Agent Zero 8d2aa58665 fix: export_service import, UTC import in backup_service 2026-08-07 08:07:56 +02:00
Agent Zero 0eb6d7621e fix(security): 16 mittlere Probleme behoben (P18-P33)
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P18: require_permission zu forgejo_error_reporter und ai_ui_control routes hinzugefügt
P19: Cross-Tenant Permission-Cache-Invalidierung bei Rollenänderungen
P20: Session/Permission-Cache-Invalidierung bei Gruppen-Änderungen
P21: ENTITY_MODELS Registry um fehlende Plugin-Modelle erweitert
P22: Entity-Links prüfen verknüpfte Entity-Permissions
P23: authStore persist Middleware entfernt (kein localStorage mehr)
P24: 5xx Retry nur noch für GET-Requests
P25: KI-Kommentar in address.py (bekannte Inkonsistenz)
P26: DeletionLog in EntityHistory gemerged (action=delete)
P27: KI-Kommentar in entity_policy.py (ABAC nicht aktiv genutzt)
P28: db.commit() aus bulk_permission_service entfernt
P29: CSV-Export in export_service.py ausgelagert
P30: plugins.py Business-Logik in plugin_install_service.py ausgelagert
P31: KI-Kommentar in session.py (Dual-System dokumentiert)
P32: Migration 0115: crm_platform_admin Role droppen
P33: Cross-Plugin Imports über contracts.py behoben (10 Violations → 0)
 2026-08-06 13:23:58 +02:00
Agent Zero 627360113f fix(permissions): fix 10 high-priority permission system issues 
P8: Invalidate all Redis sessions when is_system_admin changes
- Added is_system_admin to UserUpdate schema and UserResponse
- Added invalidate_all_user_sessions call in users.py route
- Added is_system_admin param to user_service.update_user

P9: Remove no-op permission resolution strategies
- Only highest_wins supported, others removed as no-ops
- Updated tenant.py CheckConstraint to only allow highest_wins
- Added KI-Kommentar in permissions.py

P10: Remove legacy check_permission from auth.py
- Removed duplicate check_permission and filter_fields_by_permission
- Fixed ai_copilot_service.py to use permissions.check_permission
- Updated ai_copilot route to pass resolved permissions dict

P11: Verified — no guest_users remnants found

P12: Migrate ContactFolderPermission to EntityPermission
- contact_folder_permission_service now delegates to entity_permission_service
- contact_folder_service uses EntityPermission queries
- Removed ContactFolderPermission from models/__init__.py
- Created migration 0114 to migrate data and drop table

P13: Added RLS migration history comment in alembic/env.py

P14: Verified — services already apply visibility_filter
- saved_filters/views filter by user_id (personal data)
- workspaces are UI context only
- notifications already filter by entity access

P15: Split entity_permission_service.py (932 lines) into 4 modules
- permission_resolver.py: get_effective_access, get_visible_ids, etc.
- permission_cache.py: Redis caching functions
- permission_audit.py: Audit logging helpers
- entity_permission_service.py: CRUD operations + re-exports

P16: Centralize PERM_RANK in permissions.py
- Single source: app.core.permissions.PERM_RANK
- Updated all services to import from permissions.py

P17: Fix MIGRATION_DATABASE_URL to use crm_migration
- docker-compose.yaml defaults changed from crm_user to crm_migration
- .env.docker.example updated
- prestart.sh comment updated
 2026-08-06 12:05:09 +02:00
Agent Zero 8060505baa refactor(cleanup): remove dead GuestUser/GuestInvitation code and fix test imports 
Deleted:
- app/models/guest_user.py
- app/models/guest_invitation.py
- app/routes/guest_auth.py (was orphaned, not imported)
- tests/test_guest_auth.py (tested removed guest auth system)

Modified:
- app/models/__init__.py: removed stale GuestUser/GuestInvitation comments
- app/services/entity_permission_service.py: updated guest permission comment
- tests/test_permission_system_live.py: replaced GuestUser with User+UserTenant(role=guest),
  changed principal_type from "guest" to "user", switched guest test from
  /api/v1/guest/login to regular /api/v1/auth/login endpoint

Frontend: no guest components found, nothing to clean up.
Alembic migrations: historical migrations referencing guest_users/guest_invitations
  tables are left intact (they document DB history).
 2026-08-06 11:46:00 +02:00
Agent Zero 04d6562f5b fix(security): Fix critical permission system issues 
Problem 1: Remove legacy role bypass
- Remove role="admin" string bypass in permissions.py resolve_permissions()
- Remove role="admin"/"editor" bypass in auth.py check_permission()
- Remove legacy role string fallback in deps.py require_admin/require_write
- Add migration 0112: Create Role records for built-in roles and link role_id
- KI-Kommentar: Legacy Role Bypass entfernt — alle Admins müssen echte role_id haben

Problem 2: Enforce API token scopes
- Add _token_scopes check in require_permission() in deps.py
- When _token_scopes is set (API token auth), required permission must be in scopes
- When _token_scopes not set (session auth), normal permission check applies

Problem 3: Migration chain verification
- Chain is already linear: 0027→0028_rls_force→0028_user_preferences→0029
- user_preferences table confirmed exists in DB
- No duplicate revision IDs found

Problem 4: RLS for remaining tenant tables
- Add migration 0111: Dynamic RLS activation for any remaining tables with tenant_id
- Login tables and global tables explicitly excluded
- DB check shows 0 tables currently missing RLS (safety net migration)

Problem 5: Permission cache invalidation on tenant switch
- Add invalidate_permission_cache() call in switch_tenant() for old tenant
- Stale cached permissions from old tenant no longer leak

Problem 6+7: Guest system removal
- Remove get_current_guest() from deps.py
- Remove guest_auth.py router from main.py and routes/__init__.py
- Rewrite guests.py to use regular User/UserTenant with role=guest
- Remove GuestUser/GuestInvitation from models/__init__.py
- Add migration 0113: Migrate guest_users to regular users, drop guest tables
- Update frontend GuestLogin/GuestContacts to redirect to normal pages
- KI-Kommentar: Guest-System umgebaut — Guests sind jetzt reguläre User mit role=guest
 2026-08-06 11:32:14 +02:00
Agent Zero 67015ef82b fix(permissions): comprehensive live permission system tests + delete permission fixes 
- Add tests/test_permission_system_live.py: 33 live tests against real PostgreSQL
  testing RBAC, ABAC, RLS, cross-tenant isolation, guest access, entity sharing,
  field-level permissions, role invalidation, group permissions, membership suspension

- fix(contacts): delete route uses contacts:delete instead of contacts:write
  The delete_contact and delete_contact_person routes were checking contacts:write
  permission instead of contacts:delete, allowing users without delete permission
  to delete contacts.

- fix(contacts): DeleteContactCommand passes is_system_admin to service
  DeleteContactCommand.run() was not passing is_system_admin from the session
  to contact_service.delete_contact(), causing system admins to be blocked
  by the row-level admin access check.

- fix(contacts): allow deletion of tenant-owned contacts
  contact_service.delete_contact() required admin-level entity access for ALL
  contacts, including tenant-owned ones (owner_id=None). Tenant-owned contacts
  can now be deleted by any user with contacts:delete permission (already
  verified by the route via require_permission).
 2026-08-06 09:49:07 +02:00
Agent Zero 4f970a11eb Phase 1: Critical security fixes - 59 permissions, grants, RLS, mass-assignment, ownership, leaks, MIME
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2026-08-03 22:32:03 +02:00
Agent Zero bd9fc15418 A1: Permission-Checks fuer delegations, policies, permission_templates, ai_copilot 2026-08-03 21:42:11 +02:00
Agent Zero 5d35f0064e Performance Optimierungen: Rate Limit, created_at Index, Keyset-Pagination 
1. Rate Limit erhoeht: 60 -> 300 Requests/Minute (fuer 100+ User)
2. Migration 0099: created_at DESC Index auf allen Tabellen (Order by Performance)
3. Keyset-Pagination: optionaler cursor Parameter fuer contacts API
   - cursor=UUID nutzt WHERE id > cursor statt OFFSET
   - Backward compatible: ohne cursor wird page/page_size genutzt
   - next_cursor in Response fuer naechste Seite

Tests: 43/43 bestanden
 2026-08-03 19:18:09 +02:00
Agent Zero 29d55cb187 Phase 6: DMS & Attachments — Streaming, Deduplikation, API-Bereinigung
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6.4 Upload streamen:
- attachment_service.save_attachment: Streamt in 1MB Chunks statt await file.read()
- routes/attachments.py: Uebergibt UploadFile direkt statt bytes

6.5 Download streamen:
- DMS preview_file: FileResponse fuer LocalStorage (automatisches Streaming)
- Kein storage.read() mehr fuer LocalStorage

6.6 Tenantlokale Deduplikation:
- DMS Upload: Prueft content_hash vor Erstellung, wiederverwendet existierendes File
- attachment_service: Dedup bereits vorhanden, jetzt mit Streaming kompatibel
- Migration 0098: Partial Unique Index (tenant_id, content_hash) WHERE content_hash IS NOT NULL AND deleted_at IS NULL

6.7 API-Ausgabe bereinigt:
- attachment_service: storage_path und content_hash aus API-Ausgaben entfernt
- DMS routes: content_hash aus 4 API-Endpunkten entfernt

Tests: 54/54 bestanden (17 Workspace + 13 API Token + 24 Command)
 2026-08-03 14:21:43 +02:00
Agent Zero 8ad0a19f25 Phase 5: AI/MCP Bearer-Auth + Delegationstoken + Audit
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5.1 Delegationstoken (app/core/delegation_token.py):
- HMAC-SHA256 signiert mit SECRET_KEY, max 60s Lifetime
- Payload: user_id, tenant_id, agent_id, audience, expires_at, token_id
- Statelose Verifikation, Audience-Check, Expiry-Check

5.2 MCP Bearer-Auth:
- app/core/api_token.py: Token Service (create, verify, revoke, list)
- app/deps.py: get_current_user_bearer + get_current_user_or_bearer
- app/routes/api_tokens.py: Token CRUD Routes (create, list, revoke)
- MCP Server Routes: get_current_user_or_bearer akzeptiert Session + Bearer

5.3 Methodenrechte:
- MCP nutzt bereits mcp:read/mcp:write basierend auf tool_def.required_permission

5.5 Audit:
- MCP Tool-Ausfuehrung wird protokolliert (log_audit mit correlation_id)

Tests: 13/13 bestanden (7 API Token + 6 Delegation Token)
 2026-08-03 14:06:55 +02:00
Agent Zero 3cbf92191e Reparaturplan Fixes: Widget workspace_id check, total bug, context is_visible, permissions, fallbacks
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Backend:
- Widget total: 0 bug fixed (now returns len(widgets))
- Widget update/delete: now verifies workspace_id + tenant_id (was only tenant_id)
- Workspace context: returns all modules with is_visible flag (was only visible modules)
- is_workspace_manager() removed (Plan 4.2: no manager checks)
- seed_default_workspace: removed hardcoded modules (Plan 4.7: no hardcoded tiles)
- Workspace permissions registered in CORE_PERMISSIONS (Plan 2.3)

Frontend:
- Permission fallback removed: Sidebar/TopBar show nothing while loading (Plan 2.4)
- workspaceStore isModuleVisible: fail-closed when isSystemAdmin undefined
- WorkspaceManager: AVAILABLE_MODULES replaced with dynamic core+plugin items (Plan 4.4)

Tests:
- 17 backend tests (removed is_workspace_manager test, adapted widget/context tests)
- 13 frontend tests (added undefined-isSystemAdmin test, adapted visibility tests)
 2026-08-03 12:44:02 +02:00
Agent Zero 310a9f0542 Phase 6: Workspaces — Widget CRUD, Manager-Check, Cross-Tenant, Zustand Store, Settings Route 
Backend:
- Widget CRUD: get_widgets, create_widget, update_widget, delete_widget
- Manager role check: is_workspace_manager
- Cross-tenant validation: verify_user_same_tenant (UserTenant)
- Default workspace seeding: seed_default_workspace with 12 standard modules
- Set user default workspace: set_user_default_workspace
- Fix create_workspace default uniqueness (unset others before insert)
- Widget CRUD routes: GET/POST/PUT/DELETE /{workspace_id}/widgets
- Set-default route: POST /{workspace_id}/set-default
- Cross-tenant validation in assign_user route

Frontend:
- workspaceStore (Zustand): central state with sessionStorage persistence
- API client interceptor: X-Workspace-ID header on all requests
- useWorkspace hook refactored to use workspaceStore
- Widget API hooks: useWorkspaceWidgets, useCreateWorkspaceWidget, etc.
- useSetDefaultWorkspace hook
- Settings route: /settings/workspaces with WorkspaceManagerPage
- Settings nav item for Workspaces

Tests:
- 25 backend tests (CRUD, modules, widgets, users, manager, seeding, context, isolation)
- 12 frontend tests (workspaceStore state, visibility, persistence, reset)
- 48/48 backend tests passing
- 12/12 frontend tests passing
 2026-08-03 03:39:27 +02:00
Agent Zero 74936b3972 Phase 5 (v2): Processing-Recovery, Retention-Cleanup, Replay-Delivery-Reset 
- recover_stuck_events: Reset processing events stuck >120s back to pending
- cleanup_published_events: Delete published events older than 30 days
- Replay now resets outbox_deliveries for clean retry
- Worker: hourly retention cleanup cron job
- API: /recover-stuck and /cleanup-published endpoints
- process_outbox_batch: auto-recovery at start of each tenant iteration
- 23/23 tests passing (5 new tests)
 2026-08-02 23:47:29 +02:00
Agent Zero 07a99975ec Phase 5: Outbox DLQ, Monitoring, Consumer-Registry 
- Migration 0092: DLQ columns (error_message, failed_at) + consumer_inbox RLS fix
- outbox.py: DLQ logic, replay functions, stats, consumer registry
- app/routes/outbox.py: 5 API endpoints (stats, failed, replay, replay-all, consumer-registry)
- outbox_deliveries tracking per consumer handler
- 18/18 tests passing
 2026-08-02 23:25:54 +02:00
Agent Zero 100b9f705c phase1: separate DB roles, RLS restoration, login on crm_auth
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- config.py: add auth_database_url, worker_database_url, migration_database_url
- db/__init__.py: separate engines for auth/worker/migration + get_auth_db/get_worker_db
- auth.py: all auth endpoints use get_auth_db (crm_auth role)
- auth_service.py: remove login fallback, require active membership, check status
- auth_service.py: switch_tenant checks active membership status
- alembic/env.py: use migration_database_url for Alembic
- docker-compose.yml: add AUTH_DATABASE_URL, WORKER_DATABASE_URL
- .env.example: add all 4 DB URLs with separate roles
- migration 0085: transfer ownership to crm_migration, fix BYPASSRLS,
  enable RLS+FORCE on all tenant tables, drop old policies, create new
  fail-closed policies scoped to crm_api+crm_worker, revoke excessive grants,
  grant minimal crm_auth access, drop crm_runtime, set default privileges
- tests/test_rls_coverage.py: automated RLS coverage check (13 tests)
- tests/test_cross_tenant_security_v2.py: RLS tests with unprivileged role
 2026-07-31 02:05:16 +02:00
Agent Zero 7fbbe420bd fix: comprehensive system audit fixes (55+ issues)
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CRITICAL:
- Fix SQL injection in prestart.sh (parameterized query)
- Fix secret key validation (always validate, not just production)
- Fix workspace model partial index bug (func.text -> text)
- Fix HealthResponse schema (add checks field)
- Fix Tenant import in permissions.py (NameError on every auth request)
- Fix README tech stack (React instead of Alpine.js)
- Delete broken test_cross_tenant_security_v2.py
- Add fail-closed RLS migration 0084 (48 tenant tables)

HIGH:
- Add GeneralRateLimitMiddleware for all API routes
- Add file type blocklist for DMS and attachment uploads
- Fix guest auth: Pydantic schema, tenant_slug required, CSRF bypass
- Fix CSRF bypass path matching (in -> endswith)
- Add worker healthcheck in docker-compose.yml
- Add ARQ max_tries=3 for job retries
- Fix 28 bare pass in mail services (-> logger.debug)
- Fix print() -> logger in main.py and ai_assistant
- Fix duplicate email handling (catch IntegrityError -> 409)
- Add session revocation (invalidate_all_user_sessions)
- Add resource limits to all containers
- Fix CORS default (localhost -> production domain)
- Fix SameSite=Lax -> Strict
- Fix Redis password visibility in healthcheck
- Fix npm vulnerabilities (19 -> 9)
- Fix Sidebar OOM (wildcard lucide import -> curated ICON_MAP)

MEDIUM:
- Localize ErrorBoundary to German
- Wire Mail.tsx save/delete filter to API
- Document system_notif plugin (no routes needed)
- Fix datetime.utcnow() -> datetime.now(UTC)
- Pin litellm version (>=1.0,<2.0)
- Move CSRF token from sessionStorage to in-memory
- Fix restore_backup error handling and transaction
- Fix Dms.tsx useEffect cleanup
- Add skip-to-content link for accessibility
- Add selectinload imports to 3 services
- Add .env.example missing variables
- Fix AppShell/TopBar/Sidebar test mocks

NEW TESTS:
- test_guest_auth.py (6 tests)
- test_user_service.py (8 tests)
- test_backup_service.py (5 tests)

NEW SCHEMAS:
- saved_filter, saved_view, user_preference, workspace, entity_policy

Tests: 22/22 PASSED
 2026-07-31 00:58:05 +02:00
Agent Zero 124846ae3b fix: workflow route remove is_system_admin param not accepted by service 2026-07-30 11:16:56 +02:00
Agent Zero ee4b0de144 fix: /health/ready status mapping (up/down → ok/fail) 2026-07-29 23:25:56 +02:00
Agent Zero 32db1498ba fix: /health/ready dict handling 2026-07-29 23:23:52 +02:00
Agent Zero 3e9cfbef8a phase11: /health/live + /health/ready endpoints + monitoring docs + Prometheus metrics docs 2026-07-29 23:22:29 +02:00
Agent Zero f1c025f2ef fix: workspaces router prefix /api/v1/workspaces 2026-07-29 18:36:40 +02:00
Agent Zero 2423053477 phase5: workspace backend — models, service, routes, migration 0072 2026-07-29 18:32:35 +02:00
Agent Zero 5e29b50bcc fix: storage.load() → storage.read() for attachment download 2026-07-29 17:55:33 +02:00
Agent Zero 8322adb73f phase4: entity_attachments table + DMS unified storage + attachment service rewritten + download via DMS 2026-07-29 17:52:55 +02:00
Agent Zero f1a2484055 fix: WeasyPrint URL fetcher + attachment improvements + webhook error propagation + WebSocket conversation check + RLS disabled on system tables (bootstrap fix)
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2026-07-29 13:19:21 +02:00
Agent Zero de53bcff25 fix: guest_sessions Redis index for revocation + RLS on all tenant tables (migration 0064) 2026-07-29 12:46:50 +02:00
Agent Zero 8dacb739bd P1 fixes: outbox no_handlers, HTML sanitization, WebSocket plugin check, fail-closed plugin gate, plugin admin-only 2026-07-29 12:33:46 +02:00
Agent Zero 8539a6402c P1.6: secure guest invitation tokens (secrets.token_urlsafe + SHA-256 hash + one-time use + session revocation) 2026-07-29 12:30:00 +02:00
Agent Zero 81ae5b7cb6 fix: redis cache invalidation in permission service + permission check in entity_permissions route + upsert cache invalidation + remove TopBar quick-create 2026-07-29 10:45:45 +02:00
Agent Zero da76b4636e fix: require_permission decorator → Depends() in entity_permissions.py 2026-07-29 08:05:56 +02:00
Agent Zero 24690fb674 sprint20-23: tests + documentation + guest access + infrastructure + migrations 0059 2026-07-29 02:53:37 +02:00
Agent Zero ddf73ee42e sprint14-19: ABAC UI rule editor + permission templates + bulk share + analytics + delegation + resolution strategies + migrations 0056-0058 2026-07-29 02:47:03 +02:00
Agent Zero e0003b9384 sprint12+13: zentrale rechte settings page + ABAC engine backend (model, migration 0055, service, routes) 2026-07-29 02:42:16 +02:00
Agent Zero 2c14368b90 sprint10+11: AI permission filter + API token scopes + merge check + owner transfer service + auto-transfer on deactivation 2026-07-29 02:37:51 +02:00
Agent Zero 88c04286af sprint6+7: permission notifications + audit trail + notification entity filter + mail account permissions + migration 0053
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2026-07-29 02:18:17 +02:00
Agent Zero b06aeeb720 sprint3: dashboard counts per user + import owner_id + export visibility filter 2026-07-29 02:11:29 +02:00
Agent Zero 9fc84b7905 sprint2: 8 services + 8 routes visibility filter + BaseSearchProvider + owned_mixin on models
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2026-07-29 01:52:47 +02:00
Agent Zero 479ee04834 sprint2: visibility filter + contact service access checks + contacts route integration 2026-07-29 01:38:18 +02:00
Agent Zero ea1c1d5113 sprint1 complete: rate limiting on permission changes + sprint1 fully done 2026-07-29 01:31:09 +02:00
Agent Zero 5afa1fa927 sprint1: entity_permissions table + owned_mixin + universal permission service + API + migrations 0049+0050 2026-07-29 01:28:13 +02:00
Agent Zero cc021cda99 feat: folder permissions (ACLs) - share folders with users/groups, inherit to subfolders, permission dialog UI 2026-07-28 23:58:19 +02:00
Agent Zero 58b163ba78 feat: saved_views backend API + model + migration + frontend hooks 2026-07-28 14:36:52 +02:00
Agent Zero 719ee251f2 fix: close remaining security gaps, test fixes, frontend integration, event bus
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- RCE: move _check_dangerous_imports() BEFORE exec_module() in plugins.py
- verify_ws_origin: reject empty Origin header when CORS configured
- Test: ai_app fixture with permission_registry init for ai_assistant
- Test: login_client sets CSRF token + Origin as client default headers
- Test: SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE=false override + get_settings.cache_clear()
- Test: asyncio_default_test_loop_scope=session fixes event loop closed
- Test: fix 15 assertions (paths, variables, auth expectations)
- Frontend: integrate SavedFilterBar in ContactsList, Mail, Calendar
- Frontend: integrate TagSelector in ContactsList, Mail, Calendar
- Event Bus: add 4 subscribers in system_notif (conversation/participant/reaction)
- Docs: update all analysis reports and FIX-PLAN-V2 to current state
 2026-07-27 12:45:45 +02:00
Agent Zero 98eb1d0d89 feat: Plugin-System Umbau — 6 Phasen komplett abgeschlossen
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Phase 1: Contracts konsequent nutzen
- 12 neue contracts.py erstellt (alle 19 Plugins haben jetzt contracts)
- 4 bestehende contracts.py an zentrale ContractRegistry angepasst
- Alle 19 Plugins haben on_deactivate mit Contract-Unregister
- 0 echte problematische INTER-Plugin Imports

Phase 2: Hooks/Filters-System
- app/core/hooks.py (HookRegistry mit actions + filters)
- 15 Hook-Punkte in Core-Services (contact, auth, mail, calendar, user, dms)
- BasePlugin.on_deactivate meldet alle Hooks ab

Phase 3: Plugin-Isolation
- scripts/check_cross_plugin_imports.py (Linting-Regel)
- .github/workflows/check-cross-plugin-imports.yml (CI/CD)
- .pre-commit-cross-plugin.yaml (Pre-commit Hook)
- 155 Dateien geprueft, 0 Verstoesse

Phase 4: Plugin-Versioning
- app/plugins/semver.py (SemVer mit Parse, Compare, Pre-release)
- migration_runner.py erweitert: run_migration_down, rollback_to_version
- manifest.py: min_app_version Feld
- registry.py: App-Version-Compatibility-Check bei Installation
- GET /api/v1/plugins/updates Endpoint

Phase 5: Marketplace-Vorbereitung
- app/plugins/signature.py (Ed25519 Signatur-Validierung)
- app/plugins/quarantine.py (Plugin-Quarantine mit Validierung)
- app/models/plugin_allowlist.py + Migration 0046
- manifest.py: author, license, homepage, icon, screenshots, changelog, marketplace_tags, price
- registry.py: discover_external(), discover_all()
- POST /api/v1/plugins/install-marketplace (deaktiviert)

Phase 6: Manifest-Anpassung
- manifest.py: 12 neue Felder + SemVer/Hook-Name Validierung
- MANIFEST_SCHEMA_DOC aktualisiert
- Alle 19 Plugin-Manifeste aktualisiert
- Frontend PluginUiManifest Typ erweitert

Zusaetzliche Bug-Fixes:
- test_sample-Modul erstellt
- conftest.py Deadlock-Prevention
- SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE=true
- dump.rdb aus Git entfernt + .gitignore
- backup.py datetime.utcnow -> func.now()
- system_settings.py JSONB-Import nach oben
- tax.py Mapped[float] -> Mapped[Decimal]
- notification.py type_key-Laengen vereinheitlicht

Tests: 91 neue Tests, alle bestanden
 2026-07-26 23:15:34 +02:00
Agent Zero 825d638130 Phase 3: Fix medium-priority issues (M1-M4, M6) 
M1: Password complexity validation (min 8 chars, uppercase, lowercase, digit)
M2: Remove is_system_admin from login response (prevent role leaking)
M3: Permission cache invalidates on DB error instead of using stale data
M4: .env.docker.example already fixed in B9 (SECRET_KEY, FRONTEND_URL, SMTP)
M6: Frontend test setup auto-wraps with QueryClientProvider (fixes ~29 test failures)

Remaining: M5 (frontend component integration — WelcomeDialog, SavedFilterBar, etc.)
 2026-07-26 20:51:40 +02:00
Agent Zero 604a2b7648 Phase 2: Fix high-priority security and stability issues (H1-H7) 
H1: Sanitize error endpoint context (strip tokens/passwords, limit depth/size)
H2: Rate limiter IP spoofing fix (trusted proxy CIDR check for X-Forwarded-For)
H3: CSRF middleware uses Redis singleton instead of per-request connection
H4: WebSocket origin verification added to both kommunikation and ai_ui_control
H5: Storage path traversal protection, get_url() returns relative URL not filesystem path
H6: Security headers middleware (HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, CSP, Referrer-Policy)
H7: Forward-repair migration 0045 for databases that ran original 0021/0027

Also: add trusted_proxy_cidrs to config, add verify_ws_origin to auth
 2026-07-26 20:49:15 +02:00
Agent Zero c3e41906bf feat: add forgejo_error_reporter plugin for automatic error reporting to Forgejo issues 2026-07-26 12:49:39 +02:00
Agent Zero 808da564f3 fix: improve error handling and stability - no logout on transient errors, add ErrorBoundary, global error logging 2026-07-26 12:18:52 +02:00