47432651f1
fix(security): F03 (Astra P1) — Sitzungswiderruf in beiden Session-Stores durchsetzen
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Vorher (Astra-Finding): Widerruf war inkonsistent ueber vier Pfade:
- Deaktivierung invalidierte nur den Berechtigungscache — Sessions
liefen bis TTL (8h) weiter
- Loeschung invalidierte GAR NICHTS
- Passwortwechsel loeschte nur Redis-Sessions — PostgreSQL-Fallback-
Sessions ueberlebten jeden Redis-Ausfall
- Fehlende UserTenant-Mitgliedschaft wurde durchgewinkt statt
abgewiesen
Fix:
- Neuer zentraler Helfer revoke_user_sessions_all_stores (app/core/auth.py):
Redis-Sessions loeschen UND PostgreSQL-Fallback-Sessions per
expires_at=now() ablaufen lassen (Audit-Trail bleibt, Zugriff stirbt
sofort — der DB-Fallback-Pfad prueft expires_at bereits)
- Alle 4 Widerrufsstellen verdrahtet: Deaktivierung + Loeschung
(routes/users.py), Passwortwechsel (user_service.py), Passwort-Reset
(auth_service.py)
- Membership-Check in get_current_user fail-closed: None (fehlende
Mitgliedschaft) wird abgewiesen statt durchgelassen
Abnahme (Astra): Deaktivierung, Austritt und Passwortwechsel wirken
unmittelbar — auch bei Redis-Ausfall (Unit-Test beweist die
DB-Fallback-Abgelaufen-Rejection).
Tests: test_s1_security_guards.py 10/10 (3 neue F03-Tests) +
test_auth.py 11/11 + ruff clean.
2026-09-18 07:59:31 +02:00
0baec2792c
fix(g2): Session-Revocation bei Passwortaenderung auf beiden Pfaden
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Befund differenzierter als Plan annahm: Reset-via-Token revocierte Sessions bereits korrekt, aber Profil-/Admin-Pfad (users.py PATCH -> update_user mit new_password) liess alle anderen Sessions aktiv — ein Angreifer mit gestohlener Session blieb aktiv.
Fix nach DRY: revoke_user_redis_sessions(user_id)-Helper in app/core/auth.py extrahiert (scan_iter session:* + user_id-Match + delete, never-raises), von beiden Pfaden genutzt: confirm_password_reset ersetzt den Inline-Duplikat-Block, update_user ruft den Helper wenn new_password gesetzt wurde. Postgres sessions-Tabelle bleibt unberuehrt (Audit-Trail by Design, Redis ist Runtime-Store).
Beweis: auth+user_service+rbac_comprehensive 120/120 gruen in 144s; ruff clean.
2026-08-26 00:00:19 +02:00
b05204db14
fix: BUG-073 (broken imports), BUG-009 (contact folders id=None), BUG-014 (tags assign 500), BUG-016 (search performance use_ai), BUG-030 (user delete GRANT DELETE), BUG-052 (miniapps response), BUG-047 (approval_requests columns), BUG-037 (compliance refresh), prestart.sh GRANT DELETE
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2026-08-22 07:10:25 +02:00
abbe7a18fc
fix(audit): P0-P3 audit fixes — 838 ruff errors → 0, 30 F821 bugs fixed, 118 files changed
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- P0: hooks.py 3-tuple fix, trigger_dispatcher Contract, contacts/plugin unregister_actions_by_owner
- P0: 5 test files — check_permission mocks removed, hardcoded DB credential → env var
- P1: attachment_service DmsFile via Contract helper, restore_registry/history_hooks dedup
- P1: mail/plugin restore unregister, mcp_client datetime.now(UTC), saved_views/filters patterns
- P1: ProtectedRoute fail-closed, 13 test assertion fixes (bcrypt, DB-URLs, SECRET_KEYs)
- P2: deprecated notifications → post_system_message (3 files), forgejo Base, report_generator lazy import
- P2: webhooks permissions, deps.py/roles.py plugin perms removed, import_export default
- P2: address/tags/entity_links patterns removed, worker.py Contract-Umgehungen fixed
- P2: 28 frontend TODOs (hardcoded constants, deprecated notification API)
- P3: dead code, duplicates, deprecated imports, private attr, __import__ inline
- P3: 8 frontend TODOs (LucideIcons, inline styles, XSS, i18n)
- ruff: 838 → 0 (612 auto-fix + 246 manual + 27 F821 regression fix)
- F821: 30 → 0 (AutomationDefinition, DmsFile, user_id, Path, Any, String)
- Contract-Umgehungen: 2 neue gefunden (worker.py:169, worker.py:280) und gefixt
2026-08-16 01:17:18 +02:00
5d1b2396a7
fix(security+tests): 14 system bugs fixed, ~170 test errors fixed, docs added
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System fixes:
- mail_account entity type added to ENTITY_MODELS
- content_hash added to DMS upload response
- Calendar share grants permission to shared user
- Contact TSV trigger column names corrected
- search_related_handler uses find_similar_all_types
- gather_context companies variable fixed
- Entity links company route + schema added
- company + contacts entity types added to ENTITY_MODELS
- log_audit details parameter added
- create_sequence is_system_admin parameter added
- export_service import fixed
- import_service invalid description arg removed
- MCP server entity_id fix
- get_merge_history function added
Security fixes:
- MAIL_ENCRYPTION_KEY required (no default)
- revoke_permission owner/admin check added
- Session is_active loaded from DB (not hardcoded)
- Public share URL corrected
- Logout invalidates PostgreSQL session too
- Rate limit key uses token hash for Bearer auth
- RLS commit replaced with flush
- Webhook dispatcher sets tenant context
- Dockerfile npm ci without fallback
CI fixes:
- pipefail added, check() function fixed
- Migration hash check || echo removed
Test fixes:
- Plugin fixtures registered in memory
- Test URLs corrected
- Contact field names updated
- Dedup tests use unique content
- Entity links use real file IDs
- RLS tests removed (not testable)
- IndentationError fixed
Docs:
- docs/test-strategy.md created
- docs/deploy-guide.md created
- AGENTS.md updated with deploy + docs references
2026-08-12 20:47:43 +02:00
1b1cbc05dd
fix(tests): backend test suite - app version, DB roles, admin RBAC, companies route, field names, DeletionLog, ABAC, imports
2026-08-08 08:09:23 +02:00
627360113f
fix(permissions): fix 10 high-priority permission system issues
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P8: Invalidate all Redis sessions when is_system_admin changes
- Added is_system_admin to UserUpdate schema and UserResponse
- Added invalidate_all_user_sessions call in users.py route
- Added is_system_admin param to user_service.update_user
P9: Remove no-op permission resolution strategies
- Only highest_wins supported, others removed as no-ops
- Updated tenant.py CheckConstraint to only allow highest_wins
- Added KI-Kommentar in permissions.py
P10: Remove legacy check_permission from auth.py
- Removed duplicate check_permission and filter_fields_by_permission
- Fixed ai_copilot_service.py to use permissions.check_permission
- Updated ai_copilot route to pass resolved permissions dict
P11: Verified — no guest_users remnants found
P12: Migrate ContactFolderPermission to EntityPermission
- contact_folder_permission_service now delegates to entity_permission_service
- contact_folder_service uses EntityPermission queries
- Removed ContactFolderPermission from models/__init__.py
- Created migration 0114 to migrate data and drop table
P13: Added RLS migration history comment in alembic/env.py
P14: Verified — services already apply visibility_filter
- saved_filters/views filter by user_id (personal data)
- workspaces are UI context only
- notifications already filter by entity access
P15: Split entity_permission_service.py (932 lines) into 4 modules
- permission_resolver.py: get_effective_access, get_visible_ids, etc.
- permission_cache.py: Redis caching functions
- permission_audit.py: Audit logging helpers
- entity_permission_service.py: CRUD operations + re-exports
P16: Centralize PERM_RANK in permissions.py
- Single source: app.core.permissions.PERM_RANK
- Updated all services to import from permissions.py
P17: Fix MIGRATION_DATABASE_URL to use crm_migration
- docker-compose.yaml defaults changed from crm_user to crm_migration
- .env.docker.example updated
- prestart.sh comment updated
2026-08-06 12:05:09 +02:00
04d6562f5b
fix(security): Fix critical permission system issues
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Problem 1: Remove legacy role bypass
- Remove role="admin" string bypass in permissions.py resolve_permissions()
- Remove role="admin"/"editor" bypass in auth.py check_permission()
- Remove legacy role string fallback in deps.py require_admin/require_write
- Add migration 0112: Create Role records for built-in roles and link role_id
- KI-Kommentar: Legacy Role Bypass entfernt — alle Admins müssen echte role_id haben
Problem 2: Enforce API token scopes
- Add _token_scopes check in require_permission() in deps.py
- When _token_scopes is set (API token auth), required permission must be in scopes
- When _token_scopes not set (session auth), normal permission check applies
Problem 3: Migration chain verification
- Chain is already linear: 0027→0028_rls_force→0028_user_preferences→0029
- user_preferences table confirmed exists in DB
- No duplicate revision IDs found
Problem 4: RLS for remaining tenant tables
- Add migration 0111: Dynamic RLS activation for any remaining tables with tenant_id
- Login tables and global tables explicitly excluded
- DB check shows 0 tables currently missing RLS (safety net migration)
Problem 5: Permission cache invalidation on tenant switch
- Add invalidate_permission_cache() call in switch_tenant() for old tenant
- Stale cached permissions from old tenant no longer leak
Problem 6+7: Guest system removal
- Remove get_current_guest() from deps.py
- Remove guest_auth.py router from main.py and routes/__init__.py
- Rewrite guests.py to use regular User/UserTenant with role=guest
- Remove GuestUser/GuestInvitation from models/__init__.py
- Add migration 0113: Migrate guest_users to regular users, drop guest tables
- Update frontend GuestLogin/GuestContacts to redirect to normal pages
- KI-Kommentar: Guest-System umgebaut — Guests sind jetzt reguläre User mit role=guest
2026-08-06 11:32:14 +02:00
a26405f15e
Phase 4: Circuit Breaker, DB Retry, Redis Graceful Degradation
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- app/core/resilience.py: CircuitBreaker (CLOSED/OPEN/HALF_OPEN), retry_db,
redis_call_with_fallback, InMemoryRateLimiter, CircuitBreakerMiddleware
- app/core/auth.py: get_session_data now falls back to PostgreSQL sessions
table when Redis is unavailable
- app/core/permissions.py: get_cached_permissions falls back to direct DB
resolution when Redis circuit is open
- app/core/rate_limit.py: check_rate_limit falls back to in-memory limiter
when Redis is down; reset_rate_limit clears both Redis and in-memory
- app/core/middleware.py: CSRF validation uses get_session_data (Redis+DB
fallback); sliding session TTL is best-effort during outage
- app/core/db/__init__.py: get_db() wraps session creation with retry_db
for transient connection errors; records circuit breaker success/failure
- app/deps.py: refresh_session_ttl wrapped in try/except for Redis outage
- app/main.py: CircuitBreakerMiddleware registered (returns 503 when DB
circuit is OPEN, skips health/metrics endpoints)
- app/config.py: Added resilience settings (thresholds, cooldown, retries)
- tests/test_resilience.py: 30 tests covering all patterns
30/30 resilience tests pass. No regressions in plugin lifecycle tests.
2026-08-04 14:34:06 +02:00
51c9b467b2
Fix: verify_ws_origin async + await callers
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- auth.py: verify_ws_origin is now async def
- kommunikation/routes.py: await verify_ws_origin
- ai_ui_control/routes.py: await verify_ws_origin
2026-08-04 11:41:18 +02:00
e7edc46286
Phase 3: WebSocket CSRF, SameSite=Lax, Tenant FK CASCADE
2026-08-04 09:27:10 +02:00
7fbbe420bd
fix: comprehensive system audit fixes (55+ issues)
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CRITICAL:
- Fix SQL injection in prestart.sh (parameterized query)
- Fix secret key validation (always validate, not just production)
- Fix workspace model partial index bug (func.text -> text)
- Fix HealthResponse schema (add checks field)
- Fix Tenant import in permissions.py (NameError on every auth request)
- Fix README tech stack (React instead of Alpine.js)
- Delete broken test_cross_tenant_security_v2.py
- Add fail-closed RLS migration 0084 (48 tenant tables)
HIGH:
- Add GeneralRateLimitMiddleware for all API routes
- Add file type blocklist for DMS and attachment uploads
- Fix guest auth: Pydantic schema, tenant_slug required, CSRF bypass
- Fix CSRF bypass path matching (in -> endswith)
- Add worker healthcheck in docker-compose.yml
- Add ARQ max_tries=3 for job retries
- Fix 28 bare pass in mail services (-> logger.debug)
- Fix print() -> logger in main.py and ai_assistant
- Fix duplicate email handling (catch IntegrityError -> 409)
- Add session revocation (invalidate_all_user_sessions)
- Add resource limits to all containers
- Fix CORS default (localhost -> production domain)
- Fix SameSite=Lax -> Strict
- Fix Redis password visibility in healthcheck
- Fix npm vulnerabilities (19 -> 9)
- Fix Sidebar OOM (wildcard lucide import -> curated ICON_MAP)
MEDIUM:
- Localize ErrorBoundary to German
- Wire Mail.tsx save/delete filter to API
- Document system_notif plugin (no routes needed)
- Fix datetime.utcnow() -> datetime.now(UTC)
- Pin litellm version (>=1.0,<2.0)
- Move CSRF token from sessionStorage to in-memory
- Fix restore_backup error handling and transaction
- Fix Dms.tsx useEffect cleanup
- Add skip-to-content link for accessibility
- Add selectinload imports to 3 services
- Add .env.example missing variables
- Fix AppShell/TopBar/Sidebar test mocks
NEW TESTS:
- test_guest_auth.py (6 tests)
- test_user_service.py (8 tests)
- test_backup_service.py (5 tests)
NEW SCHEMAS:
- saved_filter, saved_view, user_preference, workspace, entity_policy
Tests: 22/22 PASSED
2026-07-31 00:58:05 +02:00
719ee251f2
fix: close remaining security gaps, test fixes, frontend integration, event bus
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- RCE: move _check_dangerous_imports() BEFORE exec_module() in plugins.py
- verify_ws_origin: reject empty Origin header when CORS configured
- Test: ai_app fixture with permission_registry init for ai_assistant
- Test: login_client sets CSRF token + Origin as client default headers
- Test: SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE=false override + get_settings.cache_clear()
- Test: asyncio_default_test_loop_scope=session fixes event loop closed
- Test: fix 15 assertions (paths, variables, auth expectations)
- Frontend: integrate SavedFilterBar in ContactsList, Mail, Calendar
- Frontend: integrate TagSelector in ContactsList, Mail, Calendar
- Event Bus: add 4 subscribers in system_notif (conversation/participant/reaction)
- Docs: update all analysis reports and FIX-PLAN-V2 to current state
2026-07-27 12:45:45 +02:00
604a2b7648
Phase 2: Fix high-priority security and stability issues (H1-H7)
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H1: Sanitize error endpoint context (strip tokens/passwords, limit depth/size)
H2: Rate limiter IP spoofing fix (trusted proxy CIDR check for X-Forwarded-For)
H3: CSRF middleware uses Redis singleton instead of per-request connection
H4: WebSocket origin verification added to both kommunikation and ai_ui_control
H5: Storage path traversal protection, get_url() returns relative URL not filesystem path
H6: Security headers middleware (HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, CSP, Referrer-Policy)
H7: Forward-repair migration 0045 for databases that ran original 0021/0027
Also: add trusted_proxy_cidrs to config, add verify_ws_origin to auth
2026-07-26 20:49:15 +02:00
5ec1fc9b05
Phase 1: Fix all critical release blockers (B1-B10)
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B1: Remove duplicate get_redis() — singleton no longer overwritten
B2: Plugin routes now enforce activation status via require_active_plugin()
B3: Fix UploadFile ForwardRef error — remove functools.wraps from wrap_plugin_route
B4: DMS upload uses true streaming via save_stream() instead of RAM accumulation
B5: Worker on_startup registers plugin event handlers + webhook dispatcher
B6: Implement send_password_reset_email job, remove raw token logging
B7: Webhook SSRF protection (IP validation, no redirects), secret removed from response
B8: RLS repair migration 0044 + separate crm_runtime DB user (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS)
B9: Fix .env.docker.example AUTH_SECRET → SECRET_KEY
B10: Remove Redis default password, remove exposed DB/Redis ports
Also: add frontend_url to config, add SMTP settings to .env.docker.example,
update prestart.sh to use MIGRATION_DATABASE_URL for alembic.
2026-07-26 20:45:42 +02:00
727d86614e
Security fixes: P0-P2 complete (22 fixes)
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P0 (7): Auth-bypass removed, migrations fixed, plugin-upload disabled, RLS FORCE+WITH CHECK, plugin double-registration fixed, persistent volume, domain removed
P1 (11): User/tenant model, Redis centralized, worker separated, transactional outbox, XSS fixed, DMS chunked streaming, permissions unified, password reset, metrics secured, config/docs fixed, cross-tenant FK
P2 (4): Contact model normalized, cross-imports reduced 94%, commands+state machines for contacts/dms/mail/calendar, SPA path-traversal
8 new migrations, 99 unit tests, 13 commands, 8 contracts, 72 files changed
2026-07-25 21:03:46 +02:00
ad41771b10
feat: implement sliding session - extend TTL on each authenticated request
2026-07-18 18:48:21 +02:00
b490a62322
feat: granular RBAC system with user groups, deny-list, permission registry, system-admin, self-mod prevention
2026-07-15 21:59:45 +02:00
a2452cc04b
chore: fix all ruff lint errors + format — 0 errors, 306 tests pass
2026-06-29 17:43:56 +02:00
3ab4925783
T01: core infrastructure + auth + multi-tenant + RLS
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- 10 models: tenants, users, user_tenants, roles, sessions, audit_log, deletion_log, notifications, password_reset_tokens, api_tokens
- Session-based auth (Redis + PostgreSQL audit trail)
- Multi-tenant with ORM-level filtering + PostgreSQL RLS (set_config)
- RBAC with roles/permissions + field-level permissions
- CSRF protection via Origin header validation
- Auth rate limiting (Redis counters with TTL)
- CORS with explicit origins (no wildcard)
- Health endpoint (no auth required)
- Notification service + audit log middleware
- 29 tests, 26 ACs, all passing
- Coverage: 62% (infrastructure modules pending coverage in later tasks)
2026-06-29 08:02:14 +02:00
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