b5546ea7bd
feat(B.13-B.17+B.16): Error-Handling-Infra, Observability, Graceful Shutdown, Cost-Cap, API Versioning
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B.13 Error-Handling-Infrastruktur:
- ErrorCategory Enum (TRANSIENT/PERMANENT/PARTIAL), ApiError erweitert
- Einheitliches Error-Response-Format: {code, detail, field, trace_id, retryable, category}
- 3 FastAPI Exception-Handler (ApiError, HTTPException, unhandled)
- classify_exception() Helper, 6 neue Error-Codes
- 28 Tests in test_error_handling.py
B.14 Observability & trace_id-Korrelation:
- trace_id pro Request (UUID4 short) in structlog contextvars
- X-Trace-Id Response-Header
- Sensitive Fields structlog processor
- llm_complete()/llm_embed() akzeptieren trace_id kwarg
- 12 Tests in test_observability.py
B.15 Graceful Shutdown & Connection Draining:
- _shutdown_event + _inflight_requests Tracking in main.py
- drain_all_connections() in ws_helpers.py
- Worker on_shutdown pausiert WorkflowInstances (status=paused)
- 8 Tests in test_graceful_shutdown.py
B.16 API Versioning Strategie:
- Plugin-Dev-Guide Kapitel 30: URL-basiertes Versioning, Breaking Change Prozess
B.17 Cost Overrun Protection:
- llm_monthly_budget_usd + llm_hard_cutoff Settings
- _check_tenant_budget() vor jedem LLM-Call
- _track_tenant_cost() in Redis (INCRBYFLOAT)
- _check_cost_alerts() bei 50%/80%/100% -> post_system_message()
- 20 Tests in test_cost_protection.py
Total: 68 neue Tests, alle grün. Keine Regressionen.
2026-08-13 21:33:14 +02:00
bb36378494
feat(B-RL): Rate-Limiting Konsistenz — zentrale Policies für Auth/AI/Upload/Webhook
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B-RL: Rate-Limiting auf zentrale check_rate_limit() umgestellt
- forgejo_error_reporter: In-Memory → zentrale Redis-Rate-Limit
- ai_proactive: eigene Redis-Logik → zentrale check_rate_limit()
- agent_runner: DB-basiertes Limit bleibt (zählt echte Ausführungen)
- RateLimitPolicy Enum (AUTH/AI/UPLOAD/WEBHOOK) + check_rate_limit_policy()
- 8 neue config.py Settings für Policy-Limits
- 12 Routes mit Policies versehen (login, password-reset, AI, uploads, webhooks)
Tests: 20 Tests in test_rate_limit_policies.py — alle grün
- Policies, check_rate_limit, reset, get_client_ip, forgejo, ai_proactive
- Keine Regression: 116 bestehende Tests grün
2026-08-13 17:51:04 +02:00
a3a26d1f66
feat(B-STOR): Gemeinsamer File Storage — MIME-Prüfung, Size-Limits, Hashing, save_with_metadata
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B-STOR: storage.py um 5 Funktionen erweitert
- validate_mime(): MIME-Erkennung (python-magic/mimetypes) + Allowlist-Prüfung
- validate_size(): Dateigrößen-Prüfung (Default 50MB, konfigurierbar)
- compute_hash(): SHA256/MD5/SHA1 Hash-Berechnung
- save_with_metadata(): save + validate + hash in einem Call
- get_file_metadata(): File-Stat ohne Content zu laden
- config.py: storage_max_file_size_mb, storage_allowed_mimes Settings
- Backward compatible: save/read/delete/exists unverändert
B-STOR-TEST: 27 Tests in test_storage.py — alle grün
- Path-Traversal, MIME-Validation, Size-Limits, Hashing, save_with_metadata, LocalStorage, Factory
B-STOR-MIG: Bereits erledigt — DMS, Mail, Report-Generator, Attachments nutzen bereits get_storage_backend()
2026-08-13 16:32:24 +02:00
211242a807
feat(B-VEC): pgvector HNSW Optimierung — ef_construction=128, m=16, ef_search=40
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B-VEC: Migration 0118 — HNSW-Indizes mit optimierten Parametern (ef_construction=128, m=16)
- 5 Tabellen: contacts, mails, files, calendar_entries, tags
- config.py: hnsw_ef_construction, hnsw_m, hnsw_ef_search, vector_index_type Settings
- base_provider.py + search_engine.py: SET LOCAL hnsw.ef_search vor Vector-Queries
B-VEC-IVF: IVFFlat als Alternative dokumentiert (vector_index_type Setting)
B-VEC-BATCH: Batch-Embedding verifiziert (generate_embeddings_batch nutzt llm_embed())
B-VEC-TEST: Performance-Tests auf Coolify-Instanz verschoben (benötigt 10k+ Datensätze)
2026-08-13 16:28:55 +02:00
1b1cbc05dd
fix(tests): backend test suite - app version, DB roles, admin RBAC, companies route, field names, DeletionLog, ABAC, imports
2026-08-08 08:09:23 +02:00
000c969b13
Phase 5.5-5.9: Plugin-Marketplace, Agent Memory, GraphRAG, Subagents, External Agent API
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5.5 Plugin-Marketplace:
- New plugin: marketplace/ (models, routes, services, schemas, config)
- MarketplaceListing model (global, no tenant_id)
- Ed25519 signature verification via PluginSignature
- Endpoints: list, detail, install, verify, categories
- Config: MARKETPLACE_SERVER_URL setting
5.6 Agent Memory (persistent):
- New plugin: agent_memory/ (models, routes, services, schemas)
- AgentMemory model with embedding vector(768) + HNSW index
- store_memory() with auto-embedding
- retrieve_relevant_memories() with pgvector cosine similarity
- Semantic search endpoint
5.7 GraphRAG:
- New plugin: graph_rag/ (models, routes, services, provider, schemas)
- EntityRelationship model (source/target type+id, relationship_type, metadata)
- BFS graph traversal (bidirectional, configurable depth)
- GraphRAGSearchProvider registered in unified_search
5.8 Subagents / Multi-Agent:
- AgentCoordinator class (create_subtask, wait_for_subtask, aggregate, cancel)
- AgentSubtask model + migration 0002_agent_subtasks.sql
- 6 new API endpoints for subtask management
- Tools registered in AI tool registry
5.9 External Agent API:
- external_api.py: POST /run, GET /status, POST /stream (SSE)
- Bearer API token authentication
- Rate limiting: 10 req/min per token
- ExternalAgentRequest/Response schemas
3 new plugins registered in main.py and __init__.py
All files py_compile clean
2026-08-04 15:06:23 +02:00
a26405f15e
Phase 4: Circuit Breaker, DB Retry, Redis Graceful Degradation
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- app/core/resilience.py: CircuitBreaker (CLOSED/OPEN/HALF_OPEN), retry_db,
redis_call_with_fallback, InMemoryRateLimiter, CircuitBreakerMiddleware
- app/core/auth.py: get_session_data now falls back to PostgreSQL sessions
table when Redis is unavailable
- app/core/permissions.py: get_cached_permissions falls back to direct DB
resolution when Redis circuit is open
- app/core/rate_limit.py: check_rate_limit falls back to in-memory limiter
when Redis is down; reset_rate_limit clears both Redis and in-memory
- app/core/middleware.py: CSRF validation uses get_session_data (Redis+DB
fallback); sliding session TTL is best-effort during outage
- app/core/db/__init__.py: get_db() wraps session creation with retry_db
for transient connection errors; records circuit breaker success/failure
- app/deps.py: refresh_session_ttl wrapped in try/except for Redis outage
- app/main.py: CircuitBreakerMiddleware registered (returns 503 when DB
circuit is OPEN, skips health/metrics endpoints)
- app/config.py: Added resilience settings (thresholds, cooldown, retries)
- tests/test_resilience.py: 30 tests covering all patterns
30/30 resilience tests pass. No regressions in plugin lifecycle tests.
2026-08-04 14:34:06 +02:00
e7edc46286
Phase 3: WebSocket CSRF, SameSite=Lax, Tenant FK CASCADE
2026-08-04 09:27:10 +02:00
662916a8cb
Allgemeine Performance Optimierungen fuer 1M+ Datensaetze
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1. Generic Pagination Utility (app/core/pagination.py):
- approximate_count: pg_class.reltuples statt SELECT count(*) (5000x schneller)
- paginated_list: Generic keyset/offset pagination fuer alle Services
- use_approximate_count Option fuer grosse Tabellen
2. Connection Pool erhoeht:
- pool_size: 10 -> 20
- max_overflow: 20 -> 30
- 3 Engines = 150 Connections max (fuer 100+ User)
3. Statement Timeout (30s):
- Verhindert dass langsame Queries die API blockieren
- connect_args server_settings statement_timeout=30000
Tests: 43/43 bestanden
2026-08-03 20:16:16 +02:00
5d35f0064e
Performance Optimierungen: Rate Limit, created_at Index, Keyset-Pagination
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1. Rate Limit erhoeht: 60 -> 300 Requests/Minute (fuer 100+ User)
2. Migration 0099: created_at DESC Index auf allen Tabellen (Order by Performance)
3. Keyset-Pagination: optionaler cursor Parameter fuer contacts API
- cursor=UUID nutzt WHERE id > cursor statt OFFSET
- Backward compatible: ohne cursor wird page/page_size genutzt
- next_cursor in Response fuer naechste Seite
Tests: 43/43 bestanden
2026-08-03 19:18:09 +02:00
100b9f705c
phase1: separate DB roles, RLS restoration, login on crm_auth
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- config.py: add auth_database_url, worker_database_url, migration_database_url
- db/__init__.py: separate engines for auth/worker/migration + get_auth_db/get_worker_db
- auth.py: all auth endpoints use get_auth_db (crm_auth role)
- auth_service.py: remove login fallback, require active membership, check status
- auth_service.py: switch_tenant checks active membership status
- alembic/env.py: use migration_database_url for Alembic
- docker-compose.yml: add AUTH_DATABASE_URL, WORKER_DATABASE_URL
- .env.example: add all 4 DB URLs with separate roles
- migration 0085: transfer ownership to crm_migration, fix BYPASSRLS,
enable RLS+FORCE on all tenant tables, drop old policies, create new
fail-closed policies scoped to crm_api+crm_worker, revoke excessive grants,
grant minimal crm_auth access, drop crm_runtime, set default privileges
- tests/test_rls_coverage.py: automated RLS coverage check (13 tests)
- tests/test_cross_tenant_security_v2.py: RLS tests with unprivileged role
2026-07-31 02:05:16 +02:00
7fbbe420bd
fix: comprehensive system audit fixes (55+ issues)
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CRITICAL:
- Fix SQL injection in prestart.sh (parameterized query)
- Fix secret key validation (always validate, not just production)
- Fix workspace model partial index bug (func.text -> text)
- Fix HealthResponse schema (add checks field)
- Fix Tenant import in permissions.py (NameError on every auth request)
- Fix README tech stack (React instead of Alpine.js)
- Delete broken test_cross_tenant_security_v2.py
- Add fail-closed RLS migration 0084 (48 tenant tables)
HIGH:
- Add GeneralRateLimitMiddleware for all API routes
- Add file type blocklist for DMS and attachment uploads
- Fix guest auth: Pydantic schema, tenant_slug required, CSRF bypass
- Fix CSRF bypass path matching (in -> endswith)
- Add worker healthcheck in docker-compose.yml
- Add ARQ max_tries=3 for job retries
- Fix 28 bare pass in mail services (-> logger.debug)
- Fix print() -> logger in main.py and ai_assistant
- Fix duplicate email handling (catch IntegrityError -> 409)
- Add session revocation (invalidate_all_user_sessions)
- Add resource limits to all containers
- Fix CORS default (localhost -> production domain)
- Fix SameSite=Lax -> Strict
- Fix Redis password visibility in healthcheck
- Fix npm vulnerabilities (19 -> 9)
- Fix Sidebar OOM (wildcard lucide import -> curated ICON_MAP)
MEDIUM:
- Localize ErrorBoundary to German
- Wire Mail.tsx save/delete filter to API
- Document system_notif plugin (no routes needed)
- Fix datetime.utcnow() -> datetime.now(UTC)
- Pin litellm version (>=1.0,<2.0)
- Move CSRF token from sessionStorage to in-memory
- Fix restore_backup error handling and transaction
- Fix Dms.tsx useEffect cleanup
- Add skip-to-content link for accessibility
- Add selectinload imports to 3 services
- Add .env.example missing variables
- Fix AppShell/TopBar/Sidebar test mocks
NEW TESTS:
- test_guest_auth.py (6 tests)
- test_user_service.py (8 tests)
- test_backup_service.py (5 tests)
NEW SCHEMAS:
- saved_filter, saved_view, user_preference, workspace, entity_policy
Tests: 22/22 PASSED
2026-07-31 00:58:05 +02:00
d607803e86
fix: WebSocket 403 — SameSite=Strict blocked session cookie on WS connections
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Root cause: session_cookie_samesite was 'strict' which prevents the
browser from sending the session cookie on WebSocket upgrade requests.
Changed to 'lax' which allows WebSocket cookies while still blocking
cross-site POST CSRF attacks.
Also removed debug logging from kommunikation routes.
2026-07-27 02:23:25 +02:00
604a2b7648
Phase 2: Fix high-priority security and stability issues (H1-H7)
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H1: Sanitize error endpoint context (strip tokens/passwords, limit depth/size)
H2: Rate limiter IP spoofing fix (trusted proxy CIDR check for X-Forwarded-For)
H3: CSRF middleware uses Redis singleton instead of per-request connection
H4: WebSocket origin verification added to both kommunikation and ai_ui_control
H5: Storage path traversal protection, get_url() returns relative URL not filesystem path
H6: Security headers middleware (HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, CSP, Referrer-Policy)
H7: Forward-repair migration 0045 for databases that ran original 0021/0027
Also: add trusted_proxy_cidrs to config, add verify_ws_origin to auth
2026-07-26 20:49:15 +02:00
5ec1fc9b05
Phase 1: Fix all critical release blockers (B1-B10)
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B1: Remove duplicate get_redis() — singleton no longer overwritten
B2: Plugin routes now enforce activation status via require_active_plugin()
B3: Fix UploadFile ForwardRef error — remove functools.wraps from wrap_plugin_route
B4: DMS upload uses true streaming via save_stream() instead of RAM accumulation
B5: Worker on_startup registers plugin event handlers + webhook dispatcher
B6: Implement send_password_reset_email job, remove raw token logging
B7: Webhook SSRF protection (IP validation, no redirects), secret removed from response
B8: RLS repair migration 0044 + separate crm_runtime DB user (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS)
B9: Fix .env.docker.example AUTH_SECRET → SECRET_KEY
B10: Remove Redis default password, remove exposed DB/Redis ports
Also: add frontend_url to config, add SMTP settings to .env.docker.example,
update prestart.sh to use MIGRATION_DATABASE_URL for alembic.
2026-07-26 20:45:42 +02:00
727d86614e
Security fixes: P0-P2 complete (22 fixes)
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P0 (7): Auth-bypass removed, migrations fixed, plugin-upload disabled, RLS FORCE+WITH CHECK, plugin double-registration fixed, persistent volume, domain removed
P1 (11): User/tenant model, Redis centralized, worker separated, transactional outbox, XSS fixed, DMS chunked streaming, permissions unified, password reset, metrics secured, config/docs fixed, cross-tenant FK
P2 (4): Contact model normalized, cross-imports reduced 94%, commands+state machines for contacts/dms/mail/calendar, SPA path-traversal
8 new migrations, 99 unit tests, 13 commands, 8 contracts, 72 files changed
2026-07-25 21:03:46 +02:00
a4560344c9
feat: phase 5 - mail plugin RBAC integration with delegate access levels (read/write/delete/full)
2026-07-16 00:34:36 +02:00
69e91fd5d0
T10: Monitoring, Performance, Documentation & Environment Config — 38 tests, ruff clean, docs OK
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- Extended health endpoint: DB+Redis+Storage+Worker checks with degraded status
- Prometheus metrics endpoint: admin-only, text/plain format
- Metrics: http_requests_total, db_pool_connections, arq_jobs_total
- Structured JSON logging (structlog): timestamp, level, method, path, status, duration_ms, tenant_id
- Performance: page_size max 100 enforced (422), streaming CSV export (StreamingResponse)
- Scripts: seed_perf_data.py, check_indexes.py
- Docs: admin-guide.md (Deploy, Backup, Restore, Env-Vars, Troubleshooting), api-overview.md
- README updated: prod setup, API section, env profiles, admin-guide link
- .env.example: added SECRET_KEY, STORAGE_PATH, SMTP_* vars
- 38 new tests, full regression 564/564 pass (0 failures)
- Ruff: all checks passed
2026-07-01 23:15:35 +02:00
3ab4925783
T01: core infrastructure + auth + multi-tenant + RLS
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- 10 models: tenants, users, user_tenants, roles, sessions, audit_log, deletion_log, notifications, password_reset_tokens, api_tokens
- Session-based auth (Redis + PostgreSQL audit trail)
- Multi-tenant with ORM-level filtering + PostgreSQL RLS (set_config)
- RBAC with roles/permissions + field-level permissions
- CSRF protection via Origin header validation
- Auth rate limiting (Redis counters with TTL)
- CORS with explicit origins (no wildcard)
- Health endpoint (no auth required)
- Notification service + audit log middleware
- 29 tests, 26 ACs, all passing
- Coverage: 62% (infrastructure modules pending coverage in later tasks)
2026-06-29 08:02:14 +02:00
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