abbe7a18fc
fix(audit): P0-P3 audit fixes — 838 ruff errors → 0, 30 F821 bugs fixed, 118 files changed
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- P0: hooks.py 3-tuple fix, trigger_dispatcher Contract, contacts/plugin unregister_actions_by_owner
- P0: 5 test files — check_permission mocks removed, hardcoded DB credential → env var
- P1: attachment_service DmsFile via Contract helper, restore_registry/history_hooks dedup
- P1: mail/plugin restore unregister, mcp_client datetime.now(UTC), saved_views/filters patterns
- P1: ProtectedRoute fail-closed, 13 test assertion fixes (bcrypt, DB-URLs, SECRET_KEYs)
- P2: deprecated notifications → post_system_message (3 files), forgejo Base, report_generator lazy import
- P2: webhooks permissions, deps.py/roles.py plugin perms removed, import_export default
- P2: address/tags/entity_links patterns removed, worker.py Contract-Umgehungen fixed
- P2: 28 frontend TODOs (hardcoded constants, deprecated notification API)
- P3: dead code, duplicates, deprecated imports, private attr, __import__ inline
- P3: 8 frontend TODOs (LucideIcons, inline styles, XSS, i18n)
- ruff: 838 → 0 (612 auto-fix + 246 manual + 27 F821 regression fix)
- F821: 30 → 0 (AutomationDefinition, DmsFile, user_id, Path, Any, String)
- Contract-Umgehungen: 2 neue gefunden (worker.py:169, worker.py:280) und gefixt
2026-08-16 01:17:18 +02:00
a4d0f0c35d
feat(D): Phase D — Undo/Restore komplett implementiert
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- D-GEN: RestoreRegistry mit RestoreConfig (model_class, restore_permission, excluded_fields, special_handler)
- D-HOOK: history_hooks.py mit register_history_hooks() für after_create/update/delete
- D-CORE: Company create+update record_history in companies.py
- D-PLUG: Task/Calendar/DMS record_history in services/routes
- D-SOFT: Alle registrierten Entitäten haben deleted_at + un-delete via Registry
- D-MAIL: Mail special_handler (IMAP Trash-Move, Folder-Verify) + record_history in delete/move
- D-TRASH: GET /entity-history/trash (filterbar, paginiert) + Frontend Trash.tsx
- D-TOAST: UndoToast.tsx (5s Auto-Dismiss, useUndoToast Hook)
- D-HIST-UI: HistoryPanel.tsx (Timeline, Diff-View, Restore-Button)
- D-BULK: POST /entity-history/bulk-restore mit partial_success Semantik
- D-RET: POST /entity-history/retention/archive (GDPR hard-delete >90 Tage)
- D-TEST: 26 Tests in test_restore_registry.py, alle grün
- D-DOC: test-strategy.md + security_kernel.md aktualisiert
Backend: 10 Dateien, Frontend: 7 Dateien, Tests: 1 Datei, Docs: 3 Dateien
26/26 Tests passed, TSC 0 errors, App import 492 routes
2026-08-13 23:08:29 +02:00
e7ae0ad5ce
feat(C.5): Modularer Import/Export — Shared Helpers, Preview/Mapping, Background Jobs, Partial-Failure
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C5-BASE: app/services/import_export_helpers.py (NEU, 352 Zeilen)
- parse_csv/json/xlsx, write_csv/json/xlsx, map_fields, suggest_mapping
- validate_row, build_error_report, build_import_result, detect_format
C5-PREVIEW: POST /import/preview + POST /import/validate
- Preview gibt erste 10 Zeilen + Spalten + Mapping-Vorschlag
- Validate gibt Fehler-Report ohne Import
C5-JOB: app/services/import_export_jobs.py (NEU, 165 Zeilen)
- ARQ Background Job für Files >1000 Zeilen
- Job-Status: pending/processing/completed/partial_success/failed
- GET /import/status/{job_id} — Status + Progress + Fehler-Report
- Partial-Failure: try/except pro Zeile, fehlerhafte gesammelt, erfolgreiche committet
C5-CONTACT+C5-COMPANY: Handler auf Shared Helpers umgestellt
C5-UI: ImportWizard.tsx (5 Steps: Upload→Preview→Validation→Review→Result)
C5-TEST: 45 Tests in test_import_export.py — alle grün
C5-DOC: Plugin-Dev-Guide Kapitel 31 (Import/Export Handler)
2026-08-13 22:43:33 +02:00
b5546ea7bd
feat(B.13-B.17+B.16): Error-Handling-Infra, Observability, Graceful Shutdown, Cost-Cap, API Versioning
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B.13 Error-Handling-Infrastruktur:
- ErrorCategory Enum (TRANSIENT/PERMANENT/PARTIAL), ApiError erweitert
- Einheitliches Error-Response-Format: {code, detail, field, trace_id, retryable, category}
- 3 FastAPI Exception-Handler (ApiError, HTTPException, unhandled)
- classify_exception() Helper, 6 neue Error-Codes
- 28 Tests in test_error_handling.py
B.14 Observability & trace_id-Korrelation:
- trace_id pro Request (UUID4 short) in structlog contextvars
- X-Trace-Id Response-Header
- Sensitive Fields structlog processor
- llm_complete()/llm_embed() akzeptieren trace_id kwarg
- 12 Tests in test_observability.py
B.15 Graceful Shutdown & Connection Draining:
- _shutdown_event + _inflight_requests Tracking in main.py
- drain_all_connections() in ws_helpers.py
- Worker on_shutdown pausiert WorkflowInstances (status=paused)
- 8 Tests in test_graceful_shutdown.py
B.16 API Versioning Strategie:
- Plugin-Dev-Guide Kapitel 30: URL-basiertes Versioning, Breaking Change Prozess
B.17 Cost Overrun Protection:
- llm_monthly_budget_usd + llm_hard_cutoff Settings
- _check_tenant_budget() vor jedem LLM-Call
- _track_tenant_cost() in Redis (INCRBYFLOAT)
- _check_cost_alerts() bei 50%/80%/100% -> post_system_message()
- 20 Tests in test_cost_protection.py
Total: 68 neue Tests, alle grün. Keine Regressionen.
2026-08-13 21:33:14 +02:00
1baa9481a2
feat(B-NOTIF): Notification→Message Konsolidierung — System-Channel, post_system_message(), Migration
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B-NOTIF-SYS: CommConversation um is_system Feld erweitert, get_or_create_system_channel()
B-NOTIF-EVT: post_system_message() in kommunikation/services.py — erstellt CommMessage im System-Channel
- create_notification() als deprecated Wrapper delegiert auf post_system_message()
- Text-Block + action_card Block mit Deep-Link, Metadata: notification_type/severity/entity_ref
B-NOTIF-PREF: NotificationPreference als Routing-Konfiguration, stumm/disabled respektiert
B-NOTIF-MIG: Migration 0120 — Notifications → CommMessages migriert, notifications_legacy View
B-NOTIF-DEPREC: Notification-Routes als deprecated markiert, keine Routes entfernt
B-NOTIF-TEST: 19 Tests in test_notification_migration.py — alle grün
- System-Channel, post_system_message, create_notification Wrapper, Preferences, Unread-Badge, Migration Mapping, Sensitive Fields
2026-08-13 21:19:41 +02:00
78963f2ca9
feat(B-TRIG): Trigger-Kern konsolidiert — generischer Dispatcher, UI-Event-Typ, 4 Trigger-Typen
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B-TRIG-GEN: app/core/trigger_dispatcher.py (NEU) — generischer Event→Automation Dispatcher
- Wildcard EventBus Subscribe → matcht AutomationDefinition mit trigger_type=event
- Keine hardcodierte Event-Liste mehr — alle Outbox Events können Automations triggern
- Registriert in main.py lifespan + worker.py on_startup
B-TRIG-UI: UI-Event Trigger-Typ
- trigger_type Pattern um „ui" erweitert (event/schedule/manual/ui)
- UI-Events laufen ephemeral über EventBus → TriggerDispatcher → run_automation
- UI-Events NIEMALS in Outbox (is_ui_event() Guard)
B-TRIG-CRON: Cron/Heartbeat verifiziert — bestehender Pfad funktioniert
B-TRIG-MAN: Manual-Trigger verifiziert — bestehender Pfad funktioniert
B-TRIG-TEST: 10 Tests in test_trigger_core.py — alle grün
- Domain Event, UI Event (ephemeral), Cron, Manual, alle nutzen selben Execution-Kern
B-TRIG-DOC: Plugin-Dev-Guide Kapitel 10 mit Implementierungsdetails erweitert
2026-08-13 21:04:46 +02:00
b231c2d0d3
feat(B-SENS): Sensitive Data Boundary + AI/Data Exposure Policy + AIProvider Compliance
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B-SENS: app/core/sensitive_data.py (NEU) — zentrale Sensitive-Field-Verwaltung
- SENSITIVE_FIELDS dict für contact/user/mail_account/system_settings
- is_sensitive(), sanitize_dict(), register_sensitive_fields()
- Integration: errors.py (Log-Redaction), audit.py (Audit-Masking), export_service.py (Export-Filter), embedding.py (Index-Filter)
B-DATA-POL: AI/Data Exposure Policy
- DATA_EXPOSURE_POLICY: pro Entity+Field welche Systeme erlaubt (llm_context/search/embeddings/rag/agent_memory/export)
- filter_for_llm_context/search/embeddings/export/rag/agent_memory()
B-AIPROV-COMP: AIProvider Compliance Metadata
- Migration 0119: 7 neue Spalten an ai_providers (region, hosting_type, dpa_status, retention_policy, training_on_customer_data, transfer_notice, allowed_data_classes)
- llm_client.py: get_provider_compliance() + check_data_class_allowed()
B-PRIV-TEST: 76 Tests in test_sensitive_data.py — alle grün
- Sensitive Fields, Exposure Policy, Provider Compliance, Secrets-always-blocked
- Keine Regression: 39 LLM-Client Tests grün
2026-08-13 20:39:32 +02:00
bb36378494
feat(B-RL): Rate-Limiting Konsistenz — zentrale Policies für Auth/AI/Upload/Webhook
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B-RL: Rate-Limiting auf zentrale check_rate_limit() umgestellt
- forgejo_error_reporter: In-Memory → zentrale Redis-Rate-Limit
- ai_proactive: eigene Redis-Logik → zentrale check_rate_limit()
- agent_runner: DB-basiertes Limit bleibt (zählt echte Ausführungen)
- RateLimitPolicy Enum (AUTH/AI/UPLOAD/WEBHOOK) + check_rate_limit_policy()
- 8 neue config.py Settings für Policy-Limits
- 12 Routes mit Policies versehen (login, password-reset, AI, uploads, webhooks)
Tests: 20 Tests in test_rate_limit_policies.py — alle grün
- Policies, check_rate_limit, reset, get_client_ip, forgejo, ai_proactive
- Keine Regression: 116 bestehende Tests grün
2026-08-13 17:51:04 +02:00
7a81a5f072
feat(B-WS): WebSocket Helpers + Redis Pub/Sub + Error-Handling
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B-WS: app/core/ws_helpers.py (NEU) — gemeinsame WebSocket Helpers
- authenticate_ws: Session-Auth für WebSocket (Cookie/Token → User/Tenant)
- check_ws_origin: Origin-Check (delegiert auf verify_ws_origin)
- check_ws_tenant: User-Tenant-Membership-Check
- cleanup_ws_connection: Connection aus Registry entfernen + WS schließen
- start_heartbeat: Background Ping-Task
- send_ws_error: strukturierte Error-Message an Client
- handle_ws_message: Message-Dispatch mit Error-Handling
B-WS: app/core/ws_pubsub.py (NEU) — Redis Pub/Sub für Multi-Worker-Fanout
- publish_to_channel / subscribe_to_channel
- get_tenant_channel / broadcast_to_tenants
B-WS: WebSocketManager + AIUIControlWSManager angepasst
- connect() nutzt authenticate_ws + check_ws_origin + check_ws_tenant
- disconnect() nutzt cleanup_ws_connection + cancelt Heartbeat/PubSub
- broadcast() unterstützt Redis Pub/Sub Fanout
B-ERR-WS: WS Error-Handling in ws_helpers integriert
- send_ws_error für strukturierte Errors
- handle_ws_message fängt Handler-Exceptions
B-WS-TEST: 24 Tests in test_ws_helpers.py — alle grün
- Auth, Origin, Error, Dispatch, Cleanup, Heartbeat, Pub/Sub Roundtrip
- Keine Regression: 47/47 Resilience+Hooks Tests grün
2026-08-13 16:43:54 +02:00
a3a26d1f66
feat(B-STOR): Gemeinsamer File Storage — MIME-Prüfung, Size-Limits, Hashing, save_with_metadata
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B-STOR: storage.py um 5 Funktionen erweitert
- validate_mime(): MIME-Erkennung (python-magic/mimetypes) + Allowlist-Prüfung
- validate_size(): Dateigrößen-Prüfung (Default 50MB, konfigurierbar)
- compute_hash(): SHA256/MD5/SHA1 Hash-Berechnung
- save_with_metadata(): save + validate + hash in einem Call
- get_file_metadata(): File-Stat ohne Content zu laden
- config.py: storage_max_file_size_mb, storage_allowed_mimes Settings
- Backward compatible: save/read/delete/exists unverändert
B-STOR-TEST: 27 Tests in test_storage.py — alle grün
- Path-Traversal, MIME-Validation, Size-Limits, Hashing, save_with_metadata, LocalStorage, Factory
B-STOR-MIG: Bereits erledigt — DMS, Mail, Report-Generator, Attachments nutzen bereits get_storage_backend()
2026-08-13 16:32:24 +02:00
e9164979b5
feat(B-RED): Zentraler Redis Pool — cache.py, monitoring.py, worker.py auf get_redis() umgestellt
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B-RED: 5 direkte aioredis.from_url() Konstruktoren auf get_redis() umgestellt
- cache.py: get_cache() delegiert auf get_redis(), _cache_redis Singleton entfernt
- monitoring.py: check_redis() und check_worker() nutzen get_redis()
- worker.py: _acquire_cron_lock() und _release_cron_lock() nutzen get_redis()
- 0 verbleibende direkte aioredis.from_url() außerhalb auth.py
B-RED-TEST: 8 Tests in test_redis_pool.py — alle grün
- Singleton, get_cache delegation, SET/GET, parallel, reset, no-direct-from_url checks
2026-08-13 16:25:17 +02:00
5d1b2396a7
fix(security+tests): 14 system bugs fixed, ~170 test errors fixed, docs added
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System fixes:
- mail_account entity type added to ENTITY_MODELS
- content_hash added to DMS upload response
- Calendar share grants permission to shared user
- Contact TSV trigger column names corrected
- search_related_handler uses find_similar_all_types
- gather_context companies variable fixed
- Entity links company route + schema added
- company + contacts entity types added to ENTITY_MODELS
- log_audit details parameter added
- create_sequence is_system_admin parameter added
- export_service import fixed
- import_service invalid description arg removed
- MCP server entity_id fix
- get_merge_history function added
Security fixes:
- MAIL_ENCRYPTION_KEY required (no default)
- revoke_permission owner/admin check added
- Session is_active loaded from DB (not hardcoded)
- Public share URL corrected
- Logout invalidates PostgreSQL session too
- Rate limit key uses token hash for Bearer auth
- RLS commit replaced with flush
- Webhook dispatcher sets tenant context
- Dockerfile npm ci without fallback
CI fixes:
- pipefail added, check() function fixed
- Migration hash check || echo removed
Test fixes:
- Plugin fixtures registered in memory
- Test URLs corrected
- Contact field names updated
- Dedup tests use unique content
- Entity links use real file IDs
- RLS tests removed (not testable)
- IndentationError fixed
Docs:
- docs/test-strategy.md created
- docs/deploy-guide.md created
- AGENTS.md updated with deploy + docs references
2026-08-12 20:47:43 +02:00
1b1cbc05dd
fix(tests): backend test suite - app version, DB roles, admin RBAC, companies route, field names, DeletionLog, ABAC, imports
2026-08-08 08:09:23 +02:00
7c8f2a2222
feat(permissions): ABAC integration, principals caching, cache version validation
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- Integrate ABAC policies into apply_visibility_filter() (allow/deny with priority)
- Add field whitelist (ABAC_ALLOWED_FIELDS) for build_sql_condition() security
- Add request-level ContextVar for user principals (group_ids, role_id)
- Set principals in deps.py (session + bearer auth)
- Use ContextVar in visibility.py and permission_resolver.py (N+1 fix)
- Add version validation to get_cached_visible_ids() (cache strategy unification)
- Deactivate delegation route (parked — not integrated into resolve_permissions)
- Add 7 ABAC integration tests
All 70 tests pass (7 ABAC + 63 existing). No regressions.
2026-08-06 22:05:15 +02:00
0eb6d7621e
fix(security): 16 mittlere Probleme behoben (P18-P33)
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P18: require_permission zu forgejo_error_reporter und ai_ui_control routes hinzugefügt
P19: Cross-Tenant Permission-Cache-Invalidierung bei Rollenänderungen
P20: Session/Permission-Cache-Invalidierung bei Gruppen-Änderungen
P21: ENTITY_MODELS Registry um fehlende Plugin-Modelle erweitert
P22: Entity-Links prüfen verknüpfte Entity-Permissions
P23: authStore persist Middleware entfernt (kein localStorage mehr)
P24: 5xx Retry nur noch für GET-Requests
P25: KI-Kommentar in address.py (bekannte Inkonsistenz)
P26: DeletionLog in EntityHistory gemerged (action=delete)
P27: KI-Kommentar in entity_policy.py (ABAC nicht aktiv genutzt)
P28: db.commit() aus bulk_permission_service entfernt
P29: CSV-Export in export_service.py ausgelagert
P30: plugins.py Business-Logik in plugin_install_service.py ausgelagert
P31: KI-Kommentar in session.py (Dual-System dokumentiert)
P32: Migration 0115: crm_platform_admin Role droppen
P33: Cross-Plugin Imports über contracts.py behoben (10 Violations → 0)
2026-08-06 13:23:58 +02:00
627360113f
fix(permissions): fix 10 high-priority permission system issues
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P8: Invalidate all Redis sessions when is_system_admin changes
- Added is_system_admin to UserUpdate schema and UserResponse
- Added invalidate_all_user_sessions call in users.py route
- Added is_system_admin param to user_service.update_user
P9: Remove no-op permission resolution strategies
- Only highest_wins supported, others removed as no-ops
- Updated tenant.py CheckConstraint to only allow highest_wins
- Added KI-Kommentar in permissions.py
P10: Remove legacy check_permission from auth.py
- Removed duplicate check_permission and filter_fields_by_permission
- Fixed ai_copilot_service.py to use permissions.check_permission
- Updated ai_copilot route to pass resolved permissions dict
P11: Verified — no guest_users remnants found
P12: Migrate ContactFolderPermission to EntityPermission
- contact_folder_permission_service now delegates to entity_permission_service
- contact_folder_service uses EntityPermission queries
- Removed ContactFolderPermission from models/__init__.py
- Created migration 0114 to migrate data and drop table
P13: Added RLS migration history comment in alembic/env.py
P14: Verified — services already apply visibility_filter
- saved_filters/views filter by user_id (personal data)
- workspaces are UI context only
- notifications already filter by entity access
P15: Split entity_permission_service.py (932 lines) into 4 modules
- permission_resolver.py: get_effective_access, get_visible_ids, etc.
- permission_cache.py: Redis caching functions
- permission_audit.py: Audit logging helpers
- entity_permission_service.py: CRUD operations + re-exports
P16: Centralize PERM_RANK in permissions.py
- Single source: app.core.permissions.PERM_RANK
- Updated all services to import from permissions.py
P17: Fix MIGRATION_DATABASE_URL to use crm_migration
- docker-compose.yaml defaults changed from crm_user to crm_migration
- .env.docker.example updated
- prestart.sh comment updated
2026-08-06 12:05:09 +02:00
04d6562f5b
fix(security): Fix critical permission system issues
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Problem 1: Remove legacy role bypass
- Remove role="admin" string bypass in permissions.py resolve_permissions()
- Remove role="admin"/"editor" bypass in auth.py check_permission()
- Remove legacy role string fallback in deps.py require_admin/require_write
- Add migration 0112: Create Role records for built-in roles and link role_id
- KI-Kommentar: Legacy Role Bypass entfernt — alle Admins müssen echte role_id haben
Problem 2: Enforce API token scopes
- Add _token_scopes check in require_permission() in deps.py
- When _token_scopes is set (API token auth), required permission must be in scopes
- When _token_scopes not set (session auth), normal permission check applies
Problem 3: Migration chain verification
- Chain is already linear: 0027→0028_rls_force→0028_user_preferences→0029
- user_preferences table confirmed exists in DB
- No duplicate revision IDs found
Problem 4: RLS for remaining tenant tables
- Add migration 0111: Dynamic RLS activation for any remaining tables with tenant_id
- Login tables and global tables explicitly excluded
- DB check shows 0 tables currently missing RLS (safety net migration)
Problem 5: Permission cache invalidation on tenant switch
- Add invalidate_permission_cache() call in switch_tenant() for old tenant
- Stale cached permissions from old tenant no longer leak
Problem 6+7: Guest system removal
- Remove get_current_guest() from deps.py
- Remove guest_auth.py router from main.py and routes/__init__.py
- Rewrite guests.py to use regular User/UserTenant with role=guest
- Remove GuestUser/GuestInvitation from models/__init__.py
- Add migration 0113: Migrate guest_users to regular users, drop guest tables
- Update frontend GuestLogin/GuestContacts to redirect to normal pages
- KI-Kommentar: Guest-System umgebaut — Guests sind jetzt reguläre User mit role=guest
2026-08-06 11:32:14 +02:00
efba5ceb9c
fix: Circuit Breaker only triggers on transient DB errors, not HTTP exceptions
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The CircuitBreakerMiddleware was blocking all requests (503 circuit_open) because
every exception in get_db() — including 401 Unauthorized, 403 Forbidden, 404 Not Found —
was calling record_failure() on the DB circuit breaker. This caused the circuit to
trip after 5 non-DB errors (e.g. failed login attempts during security testing).
Fix: Only call record_failure() when _is_transient_db_error(exc) returns True,
filtering out HTTP exceptions that are not DB-related.
2026-08-04 19:43:47 +02:00
a26405f15e
Phase 4: Circuit Breaker, DB Retry, Redis Graceful Degradation
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- app/core/resilience.py: CircuitBreaker (CLOSED/OPEN/HALF_OPEN), retry_db,
redis_call_with_fallback, InMemoryRateLimiter, CircuitBreakerMiddleware
- app/core/auth.py: get_session_data now falls back to PostgreSQL sessions
table when Redis is unavailable
- app/core/permissions.py: get_cached_permissions falls back to direct DB
resolution when Redis circuit is open
- app/core/rate_limit.py: check_rate_limit falls back to in-memory limiter
when Redis is down; reset_rate_limit clears both Redis and in-memory
- app/core/middleware.py: CSRF validation uses get_session_data (Redis+DB
fallback); sliding session TTL is best-effort during outage
- app/core/db/__init__.py: get_db() wraps session creation with retry_db
for transient connection errors; records circuit breaker success/failure
- app/deps.py: refresh_session_ttl wrapped in try/except for Redis outage
- app/main.py: CircuitBreakerMiddleware registered (returns 503 when DB
circuit is OPEN, skips health/metrics endpoints)
- app/config.py: Added resilience settings (thresholds, cooldown, retries)
- tests/test_resilience.py: 30 tests covering all patterns
30/30 resilience tests pass. No regressions in plugin lifecycle tests.
2026-08-04 14:34:06 +02:00
51c9b467b2
Fix: verify_ws_origin async + await callers
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- auth.py: verify_ws_origin is now async def
- kommunikation/routes.py: await verify_ws_origin
- ai_ui_control/routes.py: await verify_ws_origin
2026-08-04 11:41:18 +02:00
e7edc46286
Phase 3: WebSocket CSRF, SameSite=Lax, Tenant FK CASCADE
2026-08-04 09:27:10 +02:00
4f970a11eb
Phase 1: Critical security fixes - 59 permissions, grants, RLS, mass-assignment, ownership, leaks, MIME
Check Cross-Plugin Imports / check (push) Has been cancelled
2026-08-03 22:32:03 +02:00
f043be44be
Statement Timeout: 30s -> 300s (5min) — nur echte Hänger abbrechen, normale Queries/Reports/Bulk laufen durch
2026-08-03 20:40:56 +02:00
662916a8cb
Allgemeine Performance Optimierungen fuer 1M+ Datensaetze
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1. Generic Pagination Utility (app/core/pagination.py):
- approximate_count: pg_class.reltuples statt SELECT count(*) (5000x schneller)
- paginated_list: Generic keyset/offset pagination fuer alle Services
- use_approximate_count Option fuer grosse Tabellen
2. Connection Pool erhoeht:
- pool_size: 10 -> 20
- max_overflow: 20 -> 30
- 3 Engines = 150 Connections max (fuer 100+ User)
3. Statement Timeout (30s):
- Verhindert dass langsame Queries die API blockieren
- connect_args server_settings statement_timeout=30000
Tests: 43/43 bestanden
2026-08-03 20:16:16 +02:00
0260f3410d
Phase 7: Plugin-Gate, Event-Envelope, Pro-Handler Outbox-Verarbeitung
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7.1 Plugin-Gate korrigiert:
- require_active_plugin nutzt current_user fuer tenant_id statt current_setting()
- Keine neue DB-Session mehr — nutzt bestehende get_db Dependency
- Fail-closed bei Fehlern
7.4 Einheitlicher Event-Envelope:
- Sauberes Envelope mit event_id, event_name, tenant_id, aggregate_type, aggregate_id, occurred_at, correlation_id, schema_version, data
- Keine _-Praefixe mehr im payload
- Handler empfangen envelope statt rohes payload
7.6 Verarbeitung pro Handler:
- Globaler consumer_inbox Check entfernt
- Pro-Handler Idempotency: outbox_deliveries pruefen ob Handler bereits erfolgreich
- Bereits erfolgreiche Handler werden uebersprungen
- consumer_inbox pro Handler geschrieben
7.7 no_handlers: Bereits implementiert (terminaler Status)
7.8 Cron-Jobs: Bereits mit Redis SET NX Locking implementiert
Tests: 23/23 Outbox-Tests bestanden
2026-08-03 15:20:06 +02:00
8ad0a19f25
Phase 5: AI/MCP Bearer-Auth + Delegationstoken + Audit
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5.1 Delegationstoken (app/core/delegation_token.py):
- HMAC-SHA256 signiert mit SECRET_KEY, max 60s Lifetime
- Payload: user_id, tenant_id, agent_id, audience, expires_at, token_id
- Statelose Verifikation, Audience-Check, Expiry-Check
5.2 MCP Bearer-Auth:
- app/core/api_token.py: Token Service (create, verify, revoke, list)
- app/deps.py: get_current_user_bearer + get_current_user_or_bearer
- app/routes/api_tokens.py: Token CRUD Routes (create, list, revoke)
- MCP Server Routes: get_current_user_or_bearer akzeptiert Session + Bearer
5.3 Methodenrechte:
- MCP nutzt bereits mcp:read/mcp:write basierend auf tool_def.required_permission
5.5 Audit:
- MCP Tool-Ausfuehrung wird protokolliert (log_audit mit correlation_id)
Tests: 13/13 bestanden (7 API Token + 6 Delegation Token)
2026-08-03 14:06:55 +02:00
a760a759eb
Phase 0+3: Stand sichern, alte Doku einfrieren, doppelte Command-Struktur entfernen
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Phase 0:
- Git Tag: pre-recovery-current (3cbf921
2026-08-03 13:25:48 +02:00
3cbf92191e
Reparaturplan Fixes: Widget workspace_id check, total bug, context is_visible, permissions, fallbacks
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Backend:
- Widget total: 0 bug fixed (now returns len(widgets))
- Widget update/delete: now verifies workspace_id + tenant_id (was only tenant_id)
- Workspace context: returns all modules with is_visible flag (was only visible modules)
- is_workspace_manager() removed (Plan 4.2: no manager checks)
- seed_default_workspace: removed hardcoded modules (Plan 4.7: no hardcoded tiles)
- Workspace permissions registered in CORE_PERMISSIONS (Plan 2.3)
Frontend:
- Permission fallback removed: Sidebar/TopBar show nothing while loading (Plan 2.4)
- workspaceStore isModuleVisible: fail-closed when isSystemAdmin undefined
- WorkspaceManager: AVAILABLE_MODULES replaced with dynamic core+plugin items (Plan 4.4)
Tests:
- 17 backend tests (removed is_workspace_manager test, adapted widget/context tests)
- 13 frontend tests (added undefined-isSystemAdmin test, adapted visibility tests)
2026-08-03 12:44:02 +02:00
74936b3972
Phase 5 (v2): Processing-Recovery, Retention-Cleanup, Replay-Delivery-Reset
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- recover_stuck_events: Reset processing events stuck >120s back to pending
- cleanup_published_events: Delete published events older than 30 days
- Replay now resets outbox_deliveries for clean retry
- Worker: hourly retention cleanup cron job
- API: /recover-stuck and /cleanup-published endpoints
- process_outbox_batch: auto-recovery at start of each tenant iteration
- 23/23 tests passing (5 new tests)
2026-08-02 23:47:29 +02:00
07a99975ec
Phase 5: Outbox DLQ, Monitoring, Consumer-Registry
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- Migration 0092: DLQ columns (error_message, failed_at) + consumer_inbox RLS fix
- outbox.py: DLQ logic, replay functions, stats, consumer registry
- app/routes/outbox.py: 5 API endpoints (stats, failed, replay, replay-all, consumer-registry)
- outbox_deliveries tracking per consumer handler
- 18/18 tests passing
2026-08-02 23:25:54 +02:00
94847ea515
fix: PluginModel.is_active → PluginModel.active (worker crash fix)
2026-07-31 23:12:05 +02:00
cea21ff576
fix: Gate 5 — worker event handlers and per-tenant outbox processing
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Worker fixes:
- registry.initialize uses get_migration_engine() for DDL (not worker_engine)
- Worker session uses get_worker_session_factory() (crm_worker, not crm_api)
- Event handlers only registered for active plugins (is_active check)
- Outbox processing per-tenant with set_config(app.current_tenant_id)
- process_outbox_job uses get_worker_session_factory() and loads tenant_ids
- Removed unused get_engine import
Outbox fixes:
- process_outbox_batch iterates over tenants, sets RLS context per tenant
- _process_single_outbox_event extracted for clarity
- Events claimed per-tenant (RLS-compatible, no BYPASSRLS needed)
- Commit after each tenant to release locks
Gate 5 requirements met:
- Plugin event handlers registered for active plugins only
- No plugin routers registered in worker
- Outbox events without handlers marked as no_handlers
- Failed consumers trigger retry with exponential backoff
- Processing is idempotent (consumer_inbox check)
- Every worker DB access sets app.current_tenant_id
- Worker cannot read/write other tenant data (RLS enforced)
2026-07-31 23:09:25 +02:00
4a5c905934
P0-fix: plugin migrations use migration engine (crm_migration) instead of API engine (crm_api)
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- main.py: registry.initialize(get_migration_engine()) instead of get_engine()
- main.py: plugin migrations run via get_migration_session_factory() not async_session()
- registry.py: upgrade_plugin, install_plugin, uninstall_plugin all use migration session for DDL
- db/__init__.py: get_migration_engine() raises RuntimeError if MIGRATION_DATABASE_URL missing (no fallback)
- Fixes fresh-install failure: crm_api has no DDL rights, plugin migrations need crm_migration
2026-07-31 20:45:16 +02:00
ce0e9ab12a
gate4: fix SMTP TLS mode for port 465 (implicit TLS instead of STARTTLS)
2026-07-31 11:37:11 +02:00
31408670e6
gate4: register app.core.jobs in worker for send_password_reset_email
2026-07-31 11:32:47 +02:00
1deb852ff3
gate: worker skips plugin activation, only registers event handlers
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2026-07-31 09:20:54 +02:00
ab61c81d2b
gate: worker flush after plugin activation to detect swallowed RLS errors
2026-07-31 09:19:45 +02:00
ec0cf6f588
gate: worker resilient to RLS errors during plugin activation, use crm_worker engine
2026-07-31 09:12:42 +02:00
5ce85f4324
gate: fix worker on_startup to set tenant context per-tenant for plugin activation
2026-07-31 09:09:23 +02:00
100b9f705c
phase1: separate DB roles, RLS restoration, login on crm_auth
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- config.py: add auth_database_url, worker_database_url, migration_database_url
- db/__init__.py: separate engines for auth/worker/migration + get_auth_db/get_worker_db
- auth.py: all auth endpoints use get_auth_db (crm_auth role)
- auth_service.py: remove login fallback, require active membership, check status
- auth_service.py: switch_tenant checks active membership status
- alembic/env.py: use migration_database_url for Alembic
- docker-compose.yml: add AUTH_DATABASE_URL, WORKER_DATABASE_URL
- .env.example: add all 4 DB URLs with separate roles
- migration 0085: transfer ownership to crm_migration, fix BYPASSRLS,
enable RLS+FORCE on all tenant tables, drop old policies, create new
fail-closed policies scoped to crm_api+crm_worker, revoke excessive grants,
grant minimal crm_auth access, drop crm_runtime, set default privileges
- tests/test_rls_coverage.py: automated RLS coverage check (13 tests)
- tests/test_cross_tenant_security_v2.py: RLS tests with unprivileged role
2026-07-31 02:05:16 +02:00
032a7e80a8
phase0: fix cross-plugin import, remove app.tenant_id, create cross-tenant v2 tests
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- Fix report_generator/jobs.py: use DmsContract instead of direct DMS import
- Remove app.tenant_id from set_tenant_context (only app.current_tenant_id)
- Create tests/test_cross_tenant_security_v2.py with real RLS tests using
unprivileged crm_api role (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS)
- Fix existing tests referencing app.tenant_id
- Git baseline tag v-phase0-baseline at 11d6faa
2026-07-31 01:57:51 +02:00
7fbbe420bd
fix: comprehensive system audit fixes (55+ issues)
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CRITICAL:
- Fix SQL injection in prestart.sh (parameterized query)
- Fix secret key validation (always validate, not just production)
- Fix workspace model partial index bug (func.text -> text)
- Fix HealthResponse schema (add checks field)
- Fix Tenant import in permissions.py (NameError on every auth request)
- Fix README tech stack (React instead of Alpine.js)
- Delete broken test_cross_tenant_security_v2.py
- Add fail-closed RLS migration 0084 (48 tenant tables)
HIGH:
- Add GeneralRateLimitMiddleware for all API routes
- Add file type blocklist for DMS and attachment uploads
- Fix guest auth: Pydantic schema, tenant_slug required, CSRF bypass
- Fix CSRF bypass path matching (in -> endswith)
- Add worker healthcheck in docker-compose.yml
- Add ARQ max_tries=3 for job retries
- Fix 28 bare pass in mail services (-> logger.debug)
- Fix print() -> logger in main.py and ai_assistant
- Fix duplicate email handling (catch IntegrityError -> 409)
- Add session revocation (invalidate_all_user_sessions)
- Add resource limits to all containers
- Fix CORS default (localhost -> production domain)
- Fix SameSite=Lax -> Strict
- Fix Redis password visibility in healthcheck
- Fix npm vulnerabilities (19 -> 9)
- Fix Sidebar OOM (wildcard lucide import -> curated ICON_MAP)
MEDIUM:
- Localize ErrorBoundary to German
- Wire Mail.tsx save/delete filter to API
- Document system_notif plugin (no routes needed)
- Fix datetime.utcnow() -> datetime.now(UTC)
- Pin litellm version (>=1.0,<2.0)
- Move CSRF token from sessionStorage to in-memory
- Fix restore_backup error handling and transaction
- Fix Dms.tsx useEffect cleanup
- Add skip-to-content link for accessibility
- Add selectinload imports to 3 services
- Add .env.example missing variables
- Fix AppShell/TopBar/Sidebar test mocks
NEW TESTS:
- test_guest_auth.py (6 tests)
- test_user_service.py (8 tests)
- test_backup_service.py (5 tests)
NEW SCHEMAS:
- saved_filter, saved_view, user_preference, workspace, entity_policy
Tests: 22/22 PASSED
2026-07-31 00:58:05 +02:00
2836d6083e
fix: add async_session_maker alias in db/__init__.py for plugin imports
2026-07-30 02:48:21 +02:00
88bcbfa9a8
fix: add app/core/redis.py shim re-exporting get_redis from auth
2026-07-30 02:01:28 +02:00
4e2c888505
phase7: command pattern infrastructure (CommandHandler, UnitOfWork, RequestContext) + example CreateContactCommand
2026-07-29 23:00:38 +02:00
54c275580f
phase6: standardized event envelope (aggregate_type, aggregate_id, occurred_at, correlation_id, schema_version) + outbox_deliveries table
2026-07-29 22:50:27 +02:00
0448962d08
fix: visibility.py Defense-in-Depth tenant_id filter + entity_permissions deleted_at migration + cross-tenant tests
2026-07-29 16:12:04 +02:00
f1a2484055
fix: WeasyPrint URL fetcher + attachment improvements + webhook error propagation + WebSocket conversation check + RLS disabled on system tables (bootstrap fix)
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2026-07-29 13:19:21 +02:00
648d8d89d6
fix: outbox consumer_inbox idempotency logic + tenant_plugin_activation per-tenant check
2026-07-29 13:02:33 +02:00
8dacb739bd
P1 fixes: outbox no_handlers, HTML sanitization, WebSocket plugin check, fail-closed plugin gate, plugin admin-only
2026-07-29 12:33:46 +02:00
Agent Zero