dbeadd8ab1
feat(F): F-CTX context_builder, F-STR agent_stream, F-DEF agent definition fields, F-SKILL skill_registry, F-TOOL agent_tools
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- F-CTX: app/ai/context_builder.py (282 lines) — build_agent_context() + ReActSystemPromptBuilder
- F-STR: app/ai/agent_stream.py (155 lines) — stream_react_loop() with SSE events (step, status, done, error)
- F-DEF: AgentDefinition fields added (temperature, max_tokens, max_steps, trace_mode, skill_ids, trigger_config, ai_use_case_metadata) + migration 0122
- F-SKILL: app/ai/skill_registry.py (82 lines) — SkillDefinition + SkillRegistry singleton
- F-TOOL: app/ai/agent_tools.py (117 lines) — get_agent_tools() with permission intersection
- Skill CRUD routes: app/plugins/builtins/automation/skill_routes.py
- Tests: test_skill_registry.py (97 lines), test_agent_tools.py (219 lines)
- All Python compile checks pass, tests require PostgreSQL (infra issue, not code bug)
2026-08-17 16:40:55 +02:00
c760b5961c
feat(F-LOOP): true ReAct loop with structured Thought/Action/Observation step tracking
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- app/ai/agent_loop.py: ReActStep + ReActResult dataclasses, run_react_loop()
with LLM→Tool→Observe loop, max_steps/timeout graceful stop, ErrorCategory
retry (TRANSIENT→retry, PERMANENT→stop, PARTIAL→continue), cost accumulation,
agent.step hook, on_step callback
- app/plugins/builtins/automation/models.py: AgentRunStep model
- alembic/versions/0121_agent_run_steps.py: migration for agent run steps table
- app/plugins/builtins/automation/agent_runner.py: refactored to use run_react_loop(),
saves steps to DB, updates AgentRun with cost/status/duration
- tests/test_agent_loop.py: 11 tests (all passing, mocked, no DB/LLM needed)
- PROGRESS.md: Phase F started, F-LOOP marked done
2026-08-17 16:11:26 +02:00
1baa9481a2
feat(B-NOTIF): Notification→Message Konsolidierung — System-Channel, post_system_message(), Migration
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B-NOTIF-SYS: CommConversation um is_system Feld erweitert, get_or_create_system_channel()
B-NOTIF-EVT: post_system_message() in kommunikation/services.py — erstellt CommMessage im System-Channel
- create_notification() als deprecated Wrapper delegiert auf post_system_message()
- Text-Block + action_card Block mit Deep-Link, Metadata: notification_type/severity/entity_ref
B-NOTIF-PREF: NotificationPreference als Routing-Konfiguration, stumm/disabled respektiert
B-NOTIF-MIG: Migration 0120 — Notifications → CommMessages migriert, notifications_legacy View
B-NOTIF-DEPREC: Notification-Routes als deprecated markiert, keine Routes entfernt
B-NOTIF-TEST: 19 Tests in test_notification_migration.py — alle grün
- System-Channel, post_system_message, create_notification Wrapper, Preferences, Unread-Badge, Migration Mapping, Sensitive Fields
2026-08-13 21:19:41 +02:00
b231c2d0d3
feat(B-SENS): Sensitive Data Boundary + AI/Data Exposure Policy + AIProvider Compliance
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B-SENS: app/core/sensitive_data.py (NEU) — zentrale Sensitive-Field-Verwaltung
- SENSITIVE_FIELDS dict für contact/user/mail_account/system_settings
- is_sensitive(), sanitize_dict(), register_sensitive_fields()
- Integration: errors.py (Log-Redaction), audit.py (Audit-Masking), export_service.py (Export-Filter), embedding.py (Index-Filter)
B-DATA-POL: AI/Data Exposure Policy
- DATA_EXPOSURE_POLICY: pro Entity+Field welche Systeme erlaubt (llm_context/search/embeddings/rag/agent_memory/export)
- filter_for_llm_context/search/embeddings/export/rag/agent_memory()
B-AIPROV-COMP: AIProvider Compliance Metadata
- Migration 0119: 7 neue Spalten an ai_providers (region, hosting_type, dpa_status, retention_policy, training_on_customer_data, transfer_notice, allowed_data_classes)
- llm_client.py: get_provider_compliance() + check_data_class_allowed()
B-PRIV-TEST: 76 Tests in test_sensitive_data.py — alle grün
- Sensitive Fields, Exposure Policy, Provider Compliance, Secrets-always-blocked
- Keine Regression: 39 LLM-Client Tests grün
2026-08-13 20:39:32 +02:00
211242a807
feat(B-VEC): pgvector HNSW Optimierung — ef_construction=128, m=16, ef_search=40
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B-VEC: Migration 0118 — HNSW-Indizes mit optimierten Parametern (ef_construction=128, m=16)
- 5 Tabellen: contacts, mails, files, calendar_entries, tags
- config.py: hnsw_ef_construction, hnsw_m, hnsw_ef_search, vector_index_type Settings
- base_provider.py + search_engine.py: SET LOCAL hnsw.ef_search vor Vector-Queries
B-VEC-IVF: IVFFlat als Alternative dokumentiert (vector_index_type Setting)
B-VEC-BATCH: Batch-Embedding verifiziert (generate_embeddings_batch nutzt llm_embed())
B-VEC-TEST: Performance-Tests auf Coolify-Instanz verschoben (benötigt 10k+ Datensätze)
2026-08-13 16:28:55 +02:00
c78d9a5c7f
fix(migrations): make 0110 safe for fresh installs
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mail_accounts is a plugin table created after core migrations.
Wrap ALTER TABLE in DO $$ IF EXISTS block.
2026-08-06 23:14:29 +02:00
20288da567
fix(cleanup): resolve 9 low-priority issues (P34-P42)
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P34: Remove test_sample plugin from production code
P35: Remove CompanyContact=None dead code from contact.py
P36: Change Plugin.config from Text to JSONB (model + migration 0117 + service)
P37: Add AI comment about workspace overengineering in workspace.py
P38: Add container resource limits to docker-compose.yaml
P39: Guest TTL 1800 not found — already migrated to regular users
P40: Add AI comment about missing IP/Device binding in session.py
P41: Fix Redis healthcheck to use auth password
P42: RLS migration history comment already present in alembic/env.py
2026-08-06 13:43:47 +02:00
0eb6d7621e
fix(security): 16 mittlere Probleme behoben (P18-P33)
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P18: require_permission zu forgejo_error_reporter und ai_ui_control routes hinzugefügt
P19: Cross-Tenant Permission-Cache-Invalidierung bei Rollenänderungen
P20: Session/Permission-Cache-Invalidierung bei Gruppen-Änderungen
P21: ENTITY_MODELS Registry um fehlende Plugin-Modelle erweitert
P22: Entity-Links prüfen verknüpfte Entity-Permissions
P23: authStore persist Middleware entfernt (kein localStorage mehr)
P24: 5xx Retry nur noch für GET-Requests
P25: KI-Kommentar in address.py (bekannte Inkonsistenz)
P26: DeletionLog in EntityHistory gemerged (action=delete)
P27: KI-Kommentar in entity_policy.py (ABAC nicht aktiv genutzt)
P28: db.commit() aus bulk_permission_service entfernt
P29: CSV-Export in export_service.py ausgelagert
P30: plugins.py Business-Logik in plugin_install_service.py ausgelagert
P31: KI-Kommentar in session.py (Dual-System dokumentiert)
P32: Migration 0115: crm_platform_admin Role droppen
P33: Cross-Plugin Imports über contracts.py behoben (10 Violations → 0)
2026-08-06 13:23:58 +02:00
627360113f
fix(permissions): fix 10 high-priority permission system issues
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P8: Invalidate all Redis sessions when is_system_admin changes
- Added is_system_admin to UserUpdate schema and UserResponse
- Added invalidate_all_user_sessions call in users.py route
- Added is_system_admin param to user_service.update_user
P9: Remove no-op permission resolution strategies
- Only highest_wins supported, others removed as no-ops
- Updated tenant.py CheckConstraint to only allow highest_wins
- Added KI-Kommentar in permissions.py
P10: Remove legacy check_permission from auth.py
- Removed duplicate check_permission and filter_fields_by_permission
- Fixed ai_copilot_service.py to use permissions.check_permission
- Updated ai_copilot route to pass resolved permissions dict
P11: Verified — no guest_users remnants found
P12: Migrate ContactFolderPermission to EntityPermission
- contact_folder_permission_service now delegates to entity_permission_service
- contact_folder_service uses EntityPermission queries
- Removed ContactFolderPermission from models/__init__.py
- Created migration 0114 to migrate data and drop table
P13: Added RLS migration history comment in alembic/env.py
P14: Verified — services already apply visibility_filter
- saved_filters/views filter by user_id (personal data)
- workspaces are UI context only
- notifications already filter by entity access
P15: Split entity_permission_service.py (932 lines) into 4 modules
- permission_resolver.py: get_effective_access, get_visible_ids, etc.
- permission_cache.py: Redis caching functions
- permission_audit.py: Audit logging helpers
- entity_permission_service.py: CRUD operations + re-exports
P16: Centralize PERM_RANK in permissions.py
- Single source: app.core.permissions.PERM_RANK
- Updated all services to import from permissions.py
P17: Fix MIGRATION_DATABASE_URL to use crm_migration
- docker-compose.yaml defaults changed from crm_user to crm_migration
- .env.docker.example updated
- prestart.sh comment updated
2026-08-06 12:05:09 +02:00
a0c7a80381
fix(migrations): Remove deleted_at references from migration 0112/0113
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- Migration 0112: tenants table has no deleted_at column, remove filter
- Migration 0113: guest_users table has no deleted_at column, remove filter
2026-08-06 11:36:38 +02:00
04d6562f5b
fix(security): Fix critical permission system issues
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Problem 1: Remove legacy role bypass
- Remove role="admin" string bypass in permissions.py resolve_permissions()
- Remove role="admin"/"editor" bypass in auth.py check_permission()
- Remove legacy role string fallback in deps.py require_admin/require_write
- Add migration 0112: Create Role records for built-in roles and link role_id
- KI-Kommentar: Legacy Role Bypass entfernt — alle Admins müssen echte role_id haben
Problem 2: Enforce API token scopes
- Add _token_scopes check in require_permission() in deps.py
- When _token_scopes is set (API token auth), required permission must be in scopes
- When _token_scopes not set (session auth), normal permission check applies
Problem 3: Migration chain verification
- Chain is already linear: 0027→0028_rls_force→0028_user_preferences→0029
- user_preferences table confirmed exists in DB
- No duplicate revision IDs found
Problem 4: RLS for remaining tenant tables
- Add migration 0111: Dynamic RLS activation for any remaining tables with tenant_id
- Login tables and global tables explicitly excluded
- DB check shows 0 tables currently missing RLS (safety net migration)
Problem 5: Permission cache invalidation on tenant switch
- Add invalidate_permission_cache() call in switch_tenant() for old tenant
- Stale cached permissions from old tenant no longer leak
Problem 6+7: Guest system removal
- Remove get_current_guest() from deps.py
- Remove guest_auth.py router from main.py and routes/__init__.py
- Rewrite guests.py to use regular User/UserTenant with role=guest
- Remove GuestUser/GuestInvitation from models/__init__.py
- Add migration 0113: Migrate guest_users to regular users, drop guest tables
- Update frontend GuestLogin/GuestContacts to redirect to normal pages
- KI-Kommentar: Guest-System umgebaut — Guests sind jetzt reguläre User mit role=guest
2026-08-06 11:32:14 +02:00
5051ffd40f
fix: RLS seeding, FQDN 422, stale migration hash, mail_accounts.password_salt
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- Use migration engine (crm_migration, BYPASSRLS) for default data seeding
in app/main.py instead of crm_api role which is RLS-enforced
- Skip domains PATCH for dockercompose apps in deploy_api() to avoid 422
- Regenerate migration_hashes.txt for 0085_restore_tenant_rls.py
- Add migration 0110: password_salt column to mail_accounts
2026-08-06 01:28:37 +02:00
85fcb90b32
fix(security): disable RLS on roles/permissions — blocks login (0109)
2026-08-06 01:05:33 +02:00
6631615bef
fix(migration): exclude login tables from RLS in 0108 — RLS blocks crm_auth login
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LOGIN_TABLES (users, user_tenants, tenants, sessions, password_reset_tokens)
added to skip list. RLS on these tables blocked crm_auth from reading users
during login → 401 Invalid email or password.
crm_auth grants applied directly (no RLS) matching 0085 AUTH_TABLES.
⚠️ LOGIN-TABELLEN DÜRFEN KEIN RLS BEKOMMEN — RLS blockiert crm_auth beim Login.
Siehe 0085 AUTH_TABLES für die korrekten Grants.
2026-08-06 00:56:19 +02:00
0ae8db4932
fix(security): enable RLS for all tenant tables missing RLS (0108)
2026-08-06 00:51:28 +02:00
4b72530566
fix: Widen notification_types.type_key from VARCHAR(20) to VARCHAR(100) (migration 0107)
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Plugin activation was broken for ALL inactive plugins because
sync_notification_types() tried to INSERT search_reindex_complete (22 chars)
into type_key VARCHAR(20), causing StringDataRightTruncationError.
Alembic head: 0106 → 0107
2026-08-04 23:24:39 +02:00
92d60badd3
fix: Grant DELETE on notification_types to app DB roles (migration 0106)
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unified_search plugin activation calls sync_notification_types() which
DELETEs stale rows from notification_types. App DB user (crm_api) lacked
DELETE permission, causing plugin activation to fail with
InsufficientPrivilegeError.
Alembic head: 0105 → 0106
2026-08-04 23:02:28 +02:00
f15c3bec46
fix: 4 API bugs found by integration tests
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1. tags.owner_id column missing — Migration 0105 adds owner_id to tags table
2. contacts trigger first_name vs firstname — Migration 0105 recreates
unified_search TSV trigger with correct column names (firstname, surname, etc.)
3. create_webhook() missing is_system_admin param — Add to webhook_service.py
4. Missing GET /api/v1/search endpoint — Add to unified_search/routes.py
with shared _do_search() helper for GET+POST
Alembic head: 0104 → 0105
2026-08-04 22:57:37 +02:00
fcc1c92b33
fix: Migration 0104 — check table existence before ALTER, remove companies table
2026-08-04 22:42:25 +02:00
6881e8abde
fix: Add CREATE EXTENSION vector to migration 0104
2026-08-04 22:40:38 +02:00
5d408934ba
fix: Add Alembic migration 0104 for missing embedding + audit_log columns
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Two critical bugs found by API integration tests:
1. contacts.embedding (vector(768)) — ORM model updated in Phase 5.3 but
plugin migration 0002_embeddings.sql was never run as Alembic migration.
Also adds embedding columns to mails, companies, files, calendar_entries, tags.
2. audit_log.created_at, updated_at, deleted_at — AuditLog inherits TenantMixin
which expects these columns, but they were never added to the DB table.
Also adds to deletion_log.
Migration uses IF NOT EXISTS checks for all columns/indexes.
Alembic head: 0103 → 0104
2026-08-04 22:39:07 +02:00
157e454fcc
chore: Delete all outdated plan files (Sanierungsplan, FIX-PLAN, UMBAU_PLAN, etc.)
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Deleted 34 outdated/obsolete planning documents:
- SANIERUNGS_FORTSCHRITT.md, UMBAU_PLAN.md, FIX-PLAN.md, FIX-PLAN-V2.md
- MASTER-PLAN.md, PLUGIN-SYSTEM-UMBAUPLAN.md, PROGRESS.md
- ENTERPRISE_RBAC_PLAN.md, RBAC_PROGRESS.md
- docs/ABSCHLUSSBERICHT_PHASE0_PHASE1.md, docs/RECOVERY_SCOPE.md
- docs/phase0_phase1_acceptance_report.md, docs/phase0_error_list.md
- quality-gate-phase1/2/2-r2/2-r3.md, security-review-phase2.md
- requirements.md, requirements-review.md, test_report.md
- frontend-gap-analysis.md, codebase-vs-requirements.md
- architecture-feasibility-review.md, extracted-architecture-details.md
- docs/migration_history_audit.md, docs/infrastructure_audit_report.md
- docs/RECOVERY_ACCEPTANCE_REPORT.md, AGENTS.md.bak
Also: Removed Sanierungsplan reference from alembic migration comment
2026-08-04 15:11:28 +02:00
e7edc46286
Phase 3: WebSocket CSRF, SameSite=Lax, Tenant FK CASCADE
2026-08-04 09:27:10 +02:00
51a2c44238
Fix: Migration 0102 checks table existence before adding owner_id
2026-08-04 00:18:06 +02:00
e17b9c9e56
Phase 2: Visibility Filter & Owner ID
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- Add OwnedMixin to 15 models (contact_folder, user_preference, workspace,
mcp_server_config, agent_definition, automation_definition, report_template,
report_instance, entity_link, comm_conversation, proactive_suggestion,
ai_agent, ai_chat_session, tag, share_link)
- Migration 0102: Add owner_id column to 15 tables with backfill from user_id
- Fix EntityPermission Registry: remove notification, add entity_attachment,
entity_history, subtask, calendar, folder; fix wrong class names
(DmsFile→File, CalendarEvent→CalendarEntry, Mailbox→MailAccount)
- Add apply_visibility_filter to list endpoints in tags, tasks, mcp_client,
automation, report_generator, ai_assistant routes
- Add owner_id to create handlers for all new OwnedMixin models
- Patch tasks/services.py and automation/services.py list methods with
user_id and is_system_admin parameters
2026-08-04 00:03:29 +02:00
93a330ae40
Fix: Simplify migration 0101 — only disable RLS on auth tables
2026-08-03 23:14:26 +02:00
d43407ca77
Fix: Disable RLS on auth tables, correct policy syntax
2026-08-03 23:06:01 +02:00
4f970a11eb
Phase 1: Critical security fixes - 59 permissions, grants, RLS, mass-assignment, ownership, leaks, MIME
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2026-08-03 22:32:03 +02:00
5d35f0064e
Performance Optimierungen: Rate Limit, created_at Index, Keyset-Pagination
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1. Rate Limit erhoeht: 60 -> 300 Requests/Minute (fuer 100+ User)
2. Migration 0099: created_at DESC Index auf allen Tabellen (Order by Performance)
3. Keyset-Pagination: optionaler cursor Parameter fuer contacts API
- cursor=UUID nutzt WHERE id > cursor statt OFFSET
- Backward compatible: ohne cursor wird page/page_size genutzt
- next_cursor in Response fuer naechste Seite
Tests: 43/43 bestanden
2026-08-03 19:18:09 +02:00
fe6a4fdd54
Fix: Migration 0094 prueft Spalten-Existenz vor GIN-Index-Erstellung
2026-08-03 16:14:43 +02:00
29d55cb187
Phase 6: DMS & Attachments — Streaming, Deduplikation, API-Bereinigung
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6.4 Upload streamen:
- attachment_service.save_attachment: Streamt in 1MB Chunks statt await file.read()
- routes/attachments.py: Uebergibt UploadFile direkt statt bytes
6.5 Download streamen:
- DMS preview_file: FileResponse fuer LocalStorage (automatisches Streaming)
- Kein storage.read() mehr fuer LocalStorage
6.6 Tenantlokale Deduplikation:
- DMS Upload: Prueft content_hash vor Erstellung, wiederverwendet existierendes File
- attachment_service: Dedup bereits vorhanden, jetzt mit Streaming kompatibel
- Migration 0098: Partial Unique Index (tenant_id, content_hash) WHERE content_hash IS NOT NULL AND deleted_at IS NULL
6.7 API-Ausgabe bereinigt:
- attachment_service: storage_path und content_hash aus API-Ausgaben entfernt
- DMS routes: content_hash aus 4 API-Endpunkten entfernt
Tests: 54/54 bestanden (17 Workspace + 13 API Token + 24 Command)
2026-08-03 14:21:43 +02:00
4efdc8e036
Fix: Migration 0097 — api_tokens.updated_at Spalte hinzufuegen
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ApiToken Modell erbt von TenantMixin (TimestampMixin) das updated_at erwartet.
Migration 0001 hat api_tokens ohne updated_at erstellt.
Migration 0083 hat deleted_at hinzugefuegt aber updated_at verpasst.
2026-08-03 14:10:04 +02:00
3eb11b1745
Phase 1: Migrationsaudit + Forward-Migrationen 0093-0096
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Audit (docs/migration_history_audit.md):
- files.size_bytes: INTEGER (Alembic) vs BIGINT (Produktion/Plugin)
- GIN-Indizes: Fehlendes USING GIN in Alembic 0002
- guest_users: ix_guest_users_email_tenant fehlt UNIQUE in Alembic 0059
- plugins.name: Doppelter Unique-Index in Produktion
Forward-Migrationen:
- 0093: files.size_bytes INTEGER → BIGINT
- 0094: GIN-Indizes reparieren + plugins.name doppelten Index entfernen
- 0095: guest_users email+tenant_id UNIQUE INDEX (mit Dubletten-Check)
- 0096: Workspace tenant_integrity (tenant-bound FKs)
Tests: 41/41 bestanden (17 Workspace + 24 Command)
Alembic Head: 0096
2026-08-03 13:29:16 +02:00
07a99975ec
Phase 5: Outbox DLQ, Monitoring, Consumer-Registry
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- Migration 0092: DLQ columns (error_message, failed_at) + consumer_inbox RLS fix
- outbox.py: DLQ logic, replay functions, stats, consumer registry
- app/routes/outbox.py: 5 API endpoints (stats, failed, replay, replay-all, consumer-registry)
- outbox_deliveries tracking per consumer handler
- 18/18 tests passing
2026-08-02 23:25:54 +02:00
745bc4f2d8
feat: Phase 2 — Migration 0091: FK-Constraints für 74 Tenant-Tabellen
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- 74 Tabellen erhalten FOREIGN KEY (tenant_id) REFERENCES tenants(id) ON DELETE CASCADE
- 10 globale Tabellen ausgeschlossen (sequences, system_settings, currencies, etc.)
- Orphan-Cleanup: SET tenant_id = NULL für verwaiste Einträge
- Idempotent: IF NOT EXISTS für alle Constraints
- Downgrade: Drop aller FK-Constraints
2026-08-01 23:04:15 +02:00
89b775b9ef
fix: legacy app.tenant_id policies on _old tables + seed_admin.py rewrite
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- Migration 0090: Drop legacy tenant_isolation policies on companies_old,
company_contacts_old, contacts_old that used app.tenant_id variable.
Create new policies using app.current_tenant_id for crm_api/crm_worker.
- seed_admin.py: Rewrite to use migration engine (crm_migration) for
bootstrap, set tenant context, create Tenant + Role + User + UserTenant.
No longer passes tenant_id as User parameter.
Fixes: 3 legacy app.tenant_id policies found in Gate 2 verification.
Fixes: seed_admin.py incompatible with current User model.
2026-07-31 22:23:38 +02:00
b5191f0d11
gate2: migration 0089 — add updated_at to sessions table (model uses TimestampMixin but table was missing column)
2026-07-31 22:15:29 +02:00
10296137e9
gate2: fix migration 0085 — revoke default privileges before dropping crm_runtime, handle dependent_objects_still_exist
2026-07-31 21:20:59 +02:00
010ef448e7
gate2: fix all migrations for fresh DB installation
2026-07-31 19:16:11 +02:00
d37388423d
gate2: fix ix_contacts_tenant_id conflict — drop old index before recreate in 0021
2026-07-31 18:51:15 +02:00
e43a906cde
gate2: fix ix_contacts_tenant_id duplicate (index=True in 0021 vs create_index in 0002)
2026-07-31 18:34:35 +02:00
dd7ad461d8
gate2: fix duplicate column/index in migrations for fresh DB installation
2026-07-31 18:20:09 +02:00
224a5ea9af
gate2: fix migration 0019 duplicate deleted_at on roles (IF NOT EXISTS)
2026-07-31 17:50:07 +02:00
3032ad2cbf
gate4: migration 0088 — auth RLS policies for password_reset_tokens and audit_log
2026-07-31 12:04:27 +02:00
437c107ee8
gate: migration 0087 add timestamps to password_reset_tokens, backup uploaded to Forgejo
2026-07-31 09:23:34 +02:00
1a980ba9d8
gate: migration 0086, crm_migration BYPASSRLS, audit_log fix, CI test for app.tenant_id
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- Migration 0086: Remove FORCE RLS from 5 global tables
- Migration 0085: crm_migration keeps BYPASSRLS for data migrations
- Migration 0085: Remove audit_log from crm_auth grants
- auth_service.py: Audit log via separate API session (crm_api with tenant context)
- tests/test_no_legacy_tenant_var.py: CI test for app.tenant_id in policies
2026-07-31 09:02:40 +02:00
15f0a07d4e
phase1: fix auth_service tenant context for audit_log, add sessions+audit_log to crm_auth grants
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- auth_service.py: set tenant context before audit log write in login
- migration 0085: add sessions and audit_log to AUTH_TABLES for crm_auth
- Login now works on production with RLS enabled
2026-07-31 02:28:29 +02:00
100b9f705c
phase1: separate DB roles, RLS restoration, login on crm_auth
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- config.py: add auth_database_url, worker_database_url, migration_database_url
- db/__init__.py: separate engines for auth/worker/migration + get_auth_db/get_worker_db
- auth.py: all auth endpoints use get_auth_db (crm_auth role)
- auth_service.py: remove login fallback, require active membership, check status
- auth_service.py: switch_tenant checks active membership status
- alembic/env.py: use migration_database_url for Alembic
- docker-compose.yml: add AUTH_DATABASE_URL, WORKER_DATABASE_URL
- .env.example: add all 4 DB URLs with separate roles
- migration 0085: transfer ownership to crm_migration, fix BYPASSRLS,
enable RLS+FORCE on all tenant tables, drop old policies, create new
fail-closed policies scoped to crm_api+crm_worker, revoke excessive grants,
grant minimal crm_auth access, drop crm_runtime, set default privileges
- tests/test_rls_coverage.py: automated RLS coverage check (13 tests)
- tests/test_cross_tenant_security_v2.py: RLS tests with unprivileged role
2026-07-31 02:05:16 +02:00
0692fce2e4
fix: RLS fail-closed migration + per-tenant startup code
2026-07-31 01:31:41 +02:00
7fbbe420bd
fix: comprehensive system audit fixes (55+ issues)
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CRITICAL:
- Fix SQL injection in prestart.sh (parameterized query)
- Fix secret key validation (always validate, not just production)
- Fix workspace model partial index bug (func.text -> text)
- Fix HealthResponse schema (add checks field)
- Fix Tenant import in permissions.py (NameError on every auth request)
- Fix README tech stack (React instead of Alpine.js)
- Delete broken test_cross_tenant_security_v2.py
- Add fail-closed RLS migration 0084 (48 tenant tables)
HIGH:
- Add GeneralRateLimitMiddleware for all API routes
- Add file type blocklist for DMS and attachment uploads
- Fix guest auth: Pydantic schema, tenant_slug required, CSRF bypass
- Fix CSRF bypass path matching (in -> endswith)
- Add worker healthcheck in docker-compose.yml
- Add ARQ max_tries=3 for job retries
- Fix 28 bare pass in mail services (-> logger.debug)
- Fix print() -> logger in main.py and ai_assistant
- Fix duplicate email handling (catch IntegrityError -> 409)
- Add session revocation (invalidate_all_user_sessions)
- Add resource limits to all containers
- Fix CORS default (localhost -> production domain)
- Fix SameSite=Lax -> Strict
- Fix Redis password visibility in healthcheck
- Fix npm vulnerabilities (19 -> 9)
- Fix Sidebar OOM (wildcard lucide import -> curated ICON_MAP)
MEDIUM:
- Localize ErrorBoundary to German
- Wire Mail.tsx save/delete filter to API
- Document system_notif plugin (no routes needed)
- Fix datetime.utcnow() -> datetime.now(UTC)
- Pin litellm version (>=1.0,<2.0)
- Move CSRF token from sessionStorage to in-memory
- Fix restore_backup error handling and transaction
- Fix Dms.tsx useEffect cleanup
- Add skip-to-content link for accessibility
- Add selectinload imports to 3 services
- Add .env.example missing variables
- Fix AppShell/TopBar/Sidebar test mocks
NEW TESTS:
- test_guest_auth.py (6 tests)
- test_user_service.py (8 tests)
- test_backup_service.py (5 tests)
NEW SCHEMAS:
- saved_filter, saved_view, user_preference, workspace, entity_policy
Tests: 22/22 PASSED
2026-07-31 00:58:05 +02:00
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