7fbbe420bd
Check Cross-Plugin Imports / check (push) Has been cancelled
CRITICAL: - Fix SQL injection in prestart.sh (parameterized query) - Fix secret key validation (always validate, not just production) - Fix workspace model partial index bug (func.text -> text) - Fix HealthResponse schema (add checks field) - Fix Tenant import in permissions.py (NameError on every auth request) - Fix README tech stack (React instead of Alpine.js) - Delete broken test_cross_tenant_security_v2.py - Add fail-closed RLS migration 0084 (48 tenant tables) HIGH: - Add GeneralRateLimitMiddleware for all API routes - Add file type blocklist for DMS and attachment uploads - Fix guest auth: Pydantic schema, tenant_slug required, CSRF bypass - Fix CSRF bypass path matching (in -> endswith) - Add worker healthcheck in docker-compose.yml - Add ARQ max_tries=3 for job retries - Fix 28 bare pass in mail services (-> logger.debug) - Fix print() -> logger in main.py and ai_assistant - Fix duplicate email handling (catch IntegrityError -> 409) - Add session revocation (invalidate_all_user_sessions) - Add resource limits to all containers - Fix CORS default (localhost -> production domain) - Fix SameSite=Lax -> Strict - Fix Redis password visibility in healthcheck - Fix npm vulnerabilities (19 -> 9) - Fix Sidebar OOM (wildcard lucide import -> curated ICON_MAP) MEDIUM: - Localize ErrorBoundary to German - Wire Mail.tsx save/delete filter to API - Document system_notif plugin (no routes needed) - Fix datetime.utcnow() -> datetime.now(UTC) - Pin litellm version (>=1.0,<2.0) - Move CSRF token from sessionStorage to in-memory - Fix restore_backup error handling and transaction - Fix Dms.tsx useEffect cleanup - Add skip-to-content link for accessibility - Add selectinload imports to 3 services - Add .env.example missing variables - Fix AppShell/TopBar/Sidebar test mocks NEW TESTS: - test_guest_auth.py (6 tests) - test_user_service.py (8 tests) - test_backup_service.py (5 tests) NEW SCHEMAS: - saved_filter, saved_view, user_preference, workspace, entity_policy Tests: 22/22 PASSED
119 lines
3.9 KiB
Python
119 lines
3.9 KiB
Python
"""Redis-based rate limiting for auth endpoints and general API."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import logging
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from fastapi import HTTPException, Request, status
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from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
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from starlette.responses import JSONResponse
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from app.core.auth import get_redis
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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async def check_rate_limit(
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redis_key: str,
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max_attempts: int,
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window_seconds: int,
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) -> None:
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"""Check rate limit using Redis INCR + EXPIRE.
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Raises 429 if limit exceeded.
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"""
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redis = get_redis()
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current = await redis.incr(redis_key)
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if current == 1:
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await redis.expire(redis_key, window_seconds)
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if current > max_attempts:
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ttl = await redis.ttl(redis_key)
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_429_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
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detail={
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"detail": "Rate limit exceeded",
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"code": "rate_limited",
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"retry_after": ttl,
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},
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headers={"Retry-After": str(ttl)} if ttl > 0 else {},
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)
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async def reset_rate_limit(redis_key: str) -> None:
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"""Reset a rate limit counter (e.g. on successful login)."""
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redis = get_redis()
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await redis.delete(redis_key)
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def get_client_ip(request: Request) -> str:
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"""Extract client IP from request.
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Only trusts X-Forwarded-For if the direct client is a trusted proxy
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(configured via TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDRS env var, comma-separated CIDRs).
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This prevents IP spoofing to bypass rate limits.
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"""
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direct_ip = request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
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# Check if the direct client is a trusted proxy
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from app.config import get_settings
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settings = get_settings()
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trusted_proxies = getattr(settings, "trusted_proxy_cidrs", "")
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if trusted_proxies:
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import ipaddress
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try:
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client_ip = ipaddress.ip_address(direct_ip)
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for cidr in trusted_proxies.split(","):
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cidr = cidr.strip()
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if cidr and client_ip in ipaddress.ip_network(cidr, strict=False):
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# Trusted proxy — use X-Forwarded-For
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forwarded = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for")
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if forwarded:
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# Use the leftmost (original client) IP
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return forwarded.split(",")[0].strip()
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# Fallback to X-Real-IP
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real_ip = request.headers.get("x-real-ip")
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if real_ip:
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return real_ip.strip()
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break
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except (ValueError, TypeError):
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pass
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# Not a trusted proxy or no trusted proxies configured — use direct IP
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return direct_ip
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class GeneralRateLimitMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
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"""Apply general rate limiting to all API routes."""
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# Paths to skip rate limiting
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SKIP_PATHS = {"/api/v1/health", "/api/v1/health/live", "/api/v1/health/ready", "/api/v1/metrics"}
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async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next):
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from app.config import get_settings
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settings = get_settings()
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path = request.url.path
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# Skip health and metrics endpoints
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if path in self.SKIP_PATHS or path.startswith("/docs") or path.startswith("/redoc"):
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return await call_next(request)
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# Only rate limit API routes
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if not path.startswith("/api/"):
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return await call_next(request)
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try:
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ip = get_client_ip(request)
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await check_rate_limit(
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f"rate:general:{ip}",
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settings.rate_limit_general_max,
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settings.rate_limit_general_window,
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)
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except HTTPException as exc:
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return JSONResponse(
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status_code=exc.status_code,
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content=exc.detail,
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headers=exc.headers,
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)
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return await call_next(request)
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